Looper v. Georgia, Southern & F. Ry. Co.

• Citation: 99 S.E.2d 101,213 Ga. 279
• Decision Date: 10 June 1957
• Docket Number: No. 19685,19685
• Parties: Nancy M. LOOPER at el. v. GEORGIA, SOUTHERN & FLORIDA RAILWAY COMPANY et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 101

99 S.E.2d 101

213 Ga. 279

Nancy M. LOOPER at el. v. GEORGIA, SOUTHERN & FLORIDA RAILWAY COMPANY et al.

No. 19685.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 10, 1957.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where pursuant to terms of the employment contract petitioners were notified that unless they became members of a labor union within 60 days their employment would be terminated, the suit to enjoin such action and to decree the contract void was not prematurely filed.

2. While we must follow the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States that closed shop employment contracts under § 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act, are valid, yet since that court has not held that an employee can by such contract be required as an alternative to losing his job to join a union which will use contributions he makes to it to promote ideological and political issues and candidates he opposes, we hold that the petition of these employees seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the employment contract and decree it void because of such uses of their contributions alleges a cause of action and it was error to dismiss the same.

This is an action for injunctive relief to prevent the defendants, composed of a number of railroad companies and various labor organizations which are the bargaining agents of the employees of such railroad carriers, from enforcing a closed or union shop agreement entered into by the defendants and discharging the petitioners who are named employees of said railroad carriers unless they join or remain members of a union. The petitoners also pray that the so-called 'union shop agreement' be declared void. The petitioners allege that the agreement requires the employees to join or remain members of the various labor organizations applicable to their craft or trade as a condition precedent to the continued employment with the various carriers by whom the petitioners are now employed, and are threatened with discharge unless the actions of the defendants in enforcing such contract is enjoined. The contract is set out as an exhibit attached to the petition and requires all employees to become members of the labor organization party to this agreement representing their craft of class within 60 days after the effective date of the agreement. The contract is attacked as being illegal, unconstitutional and void, and in direct violation of the Georgia right to work laws (Code Ann.Supp. §§ 54-801 through 54-908, Ga.L.1947, pp. 616-620), the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution, and certain named sections of the Georgia Constitution.

By amendment petitioners further allege that the initiation fees, periodic dues and assessments which they would be required to pay under the closed shop agreement will be used in substantial part for purposes not germane to collective bargaining but to support ideological and political doctrines and candidates which they are not willing to support and cannot lawfully be forced to support, thus violating their constitutionally guaranteed rights of freedom of association, thought, liberty and property; and the contract and § 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Eleventh), to the extent that it authorizes such union shop agreement, are violative of the First, Fifth and Ninth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.

After consideration of a written motion to dismiss, brought by counsel for the labor union defendants which states that petitioners fail to state a claim against any defendants upon which relief can be granted, citing decisions of the Federal Supreme Court in support thereof, the lower court sustained the motion, dissolved a temporary injunction previously granted, and dismissed the action as to all defendants. The exception here is to this final judgment.

T. Arnold Jacobs, Macon, Gambrell, Harlan, Russell, Moye & Richardson, W. Glen Harlan, Chas. A. Moye, Jr., John W. Chambers, Atlanta, for plaintiffs in error.

David L. Mincey, Bloch, Hall, Groover & Hawkins, Harris, Russell, Weaver & Watkins, Macon, Schoene & Kramer, M. Kramer, Washington, D. C., for defendants in error.

DUCKWORTH, Chief Justice.

1. The contract complained of was effective April 15, 1953. These petitioners were notified that unless they became members of the union within 60 days from the effective date of the contract their employment would be terminated. This notice accords with a clause in the contract. Thus is alleged and shown by the petitioners definite impending danger of losing their jobs unless this procedure which conforms to the alleged void contract is halted. While a mere apprehension will not authorize resort to equity, Railway Emp. Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112; Mayor, etc., of Athens v. Co-op Cab Co., 207 Ga. 505(2), 62 S.E.2d 906; Nottingham v. Elliott, 209 Ga. 481(3), 74 S.E.2d 93; Armed Forces Service Co. v. Petree, 211 Ga. 867(1), 89 S.E.2d 486, yet one is not required to await the infliction of the injury before seeking to prevent it by injunction. Indeed these petitioners would have appealed to equity too late if they had awaited the completion of the 60 days' notice period and the overt act of discharging them. Mount v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 6 Cir., 226 F.2d 604; Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 541, 67 S.E.2d 767.

While, as indicated above, this appeal to equity for injunctive relief is based upon facts and not mere apprehension and is therefore not premature, there is an additional reason why the judgment dismissing the amended petition cannot be sustained upon the ground that it is premature, and that is the prayer that the contract be decreed illegal and void.

2. Sec. 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 152, subd. 11) plainly authorizes the embodiment of a 'closed shop' clause in contracts of employment, and in sweeping terms, nullifies all State laws in conflict therewith. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such a contract under the act in Railway Emp. Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112, supra. To uphold a closed shop contract the court necessarily approved a denial of one's right to work because he is not a member of a labor union. We do not see a possibility of reconciling that ruling which is based solely upon the status of the individual...