Lopez-mendez v. Lexmark Int'l Inc
| Decision Date | 21 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 08-1521 (FAB). |
| Citation | 680 F.Supp.2d 357 |
| Parties | Maribel LOPEZ-MENDEZ, Plaintiff, v. LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
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Harry Anduze-Montano, Jose A. Morales-Boscio, Harry Anduze Montano Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Rosangela 0. Sanfilippo-Resumil, Sylvia M. Arizmendi-Lopez-De-V, Arizmendi & Sanfilippo, Gilberto L. Oliver-Davila, Gilberto L. Oliver Law Office, Guaynabo, PR for Defendants.
Pending before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment and defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs statement of material facts. (Docket No. 50; Docket No. 66) Having considered the arguments contained in defendants' motions, plaintiffs oppositions, and defendants' replies, the Court GRANTS both the motion to strike and the motion for summary judgment.
On May 5, 2008, plaintiff Maribel LopezMendez ("Lopez" or "plaintiff) filed a complaint alleging discrimination and retaliation claims against Lexmark International, Inc. ("Lexmark"), Jairo Fernandez ("Fernandez"), Ruben Colon ("Colon") Luis Viloria ("Viloria"), and Antonio Diaz ("Diaz"). (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶2.1-2.6) Plaintiffs claims are brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e15, the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, Puerto Rico Law 100 ("Law 100"), P.R. Laws Ann tit. 29, §§ 146-151, and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code ("articles 1802 and 1803"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit 31, §§ 5141, 5142. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 1.1-1.2)
In a June 23, 2009, opinion and order the Court dismissed plaintiffs claims against individual defendants pursuant to Title VII, the ADEA, the EPA, and Law 100. Lopez-Mendez v. Lexmark Int'l Inc., 627 F.Supp.2d 66 (D.P.R.2009).1 In the same opinion and order, the Court also dismissed any claim by plaintiff for mental anguish or emotional distress based on the EPA or the ADEA and plaintiffs separately plead claim for intentional infliction of emotional damages. Id. The Court clarified that plaintiff may, however, present evidence of intentional infliction of emo- tional damages as part of her claim pursuant to articles 1802 and 1803. Id.
On September 23, 2009, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that: (1) plaintiff cannot provide sufficient evidence, either direct or circumstantial, of discriminatory animus to maintain her claims under Title VII, the ADEA, or Law 100 based on her termination; (2) plaintiffs claim of age and sex discrimination based on an alleged failure to promote is untimely; (3) plaintiff does not satisfy the necessary elements for a prima facie case of failure to promote, even if plaintiffs discrimination claim on that basis is timely; (4) plaintiff cannot establish that her termination was retaliatory; (5) plaintiff cannot establish the necessary elements to prevail on her hostile work environment discrimination claim; (6) Lexmark is entitled to the affirmative defense established in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998); and (7) plaintiff cannot establish the necessary elements of a prima facie case under the EPA. (See Docket No. 50.)
On November 6, 2009, plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 59) Rather than helpful legal analysis specifically responding to the arguments raised by defendants, plaintiffs opposition consists primarily of material copied and pasted from the "Additional Facts" section of her statement of material facts. See id. Plaintiff also relied on vague generalizations asserting that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the pretextual nature of defendants' nondiscriminatory reasons for actions taken toward plaintiff. See id. In short, plaintiff did little more than repeat facts that, pursuant to Local Rule 56(c), should properly be listed in her statement of material facts, and invite the Court to complete her task of using those facts to demonstrate the existence of genuine issues of material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment.
On November 16, 2009, defendants filed a motion to strike plaintiffs statement of material facts for failure to comply with Local Rule 56, arguing that plaintiff failed properly to respond to defendants' statement of material facts filed in conjunction with their motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 66) On December 10, 2009, after being granted two extensions of time, plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to strike arguing that she identified "with specificity the issues of fact which are contested," and that "even deeming admitted defendants' statement of facts, there are material controversies of issues of facts [sic]... substantiated by [her] Statement of Additional Facts, with specific citations to the record."2 (Docket No. 82)
Local Rule 56(c) requires a non-moving party to file with its opposition "a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts" which shall "admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts and unless a fact is admitted, shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation as required by this rule." Local Rule 56(c) also requires that, if the nonmoving party includes any additional facts, those facts must be in a separate section, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs, and be supported by a record citation.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has "repeatedly... emphasized the importance of local rules similar to Local Rule 56 [of the District of Puerto Rico]." Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2007). Rules such as Local Rule 56 "are designed to function as a means of 'focusing a district court's attention on what is-and what is not-genuinely controverted.' " Id. (quoting Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir. 2006)). Due to the importance of this function to the summary judgment process, "litigants ignore [such rules] at their peril." Id.
Where a party does not act in compliance with Local Rule 56, "a district court is free, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to accept the moving party's facts as stated." Id. (citing Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.2004)). In Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir.2007), the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that, in the context of a motion for summary judgment, where a non-moving party does not admit, deny, or qualify the moving party's assertions of fact as required by Local Rule 56(c), but instead files an "alternate statement of facts in narrative form," a district court is justified in issuing an order deeming the moving party's assertions of fact admitted.
In this case, plaintiff has failed to comply with requirements of Local Rule 56(c). Although plaintiff admitted several of the assertions contained in defendants' statement of material facts, she did not properly deny or qualify the remaining assertions. (See Docket No. 60 at ¶¶ 1.11.4.) Instead of supporting denials of defendants' remaining assertions with specific record citation as required by Local Rule 56, plaintiff merely included a blanket denial for ninety-nine assertions and directed the court to examine a section entitled "Additional Facts." Id. This section, however, is clearly not a separate section of supplemental assertions of fact as contemplated by Local Rule 56. Rather, plaintiffs section styled "Additional Facts" is an attempt to avoid the "rigors that [Local Rule 56] imposes...." Plaintiff ignores her responsibility specifically to address each assertion contained in defendants' statement of material facts, and then launches into her own narrative explanation of the facts in the present case. See Caban Hernandez, 486 F.3d at 7.
Due to the noncompliance with Local Rule 56 as described above, defendants moved to strike plaintiffs statement of material facts. (Docket No. 66) In plaintiffs one-paragraph opposition to defendants' motion to strike, she does not specifically address her flagrant disregard of the local rule governing summary judgment pleadings. (See Docket No. 82.) Plaintiff argues that even if the Court were to deem defendants' assertions of fact as admitted, her "Additional Facts" section creates genuine issues of material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. Id. In essence, plaintiff concedes that she did not comply with Local Rule 56, but expects the Court to pick through her "Additional Facts" section and sort assertions which are truly additional from those meant to contest defendants' assertions of fact. See id. The Court will not tolerate plaintiffs wholesale abandonment of the summary judgment procedure established by the Local Rules of the District of Puerto Rico.
The purpose of Local Rule 56 is to create an organized and clear representation of issues of fact which are truly contested between the parties. See Caban Hernandez, 486 at 7-8. Plaintiff has chosen to shirk her responsibility to provide such a representation, and must now face the consequences of that decision. Plaintiffs statement of material facts and accompanying exhibits, (Docket No. 60), are STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD. The assertions contained in defendants' statement of material facts, (Docket No. 53), are DEEMED ADMITTED and, in conjunction with their supporting exhibits, will form the SOLE BASIS for the factual background of this opinion and order ruling on defendants' motion for summary judgment, (Docket No. 50).
Having stricken plaintiffs statement of facts from the record, the following factual background is derived...
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