LOPEZ-STAYER EX REL. STAYER v. Pitts
Decision Date | 22 June 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 21984-4-III.,21984-4-III. |
Citation | 122 Wash.App. 45,93 P.3d 904 |
Parties | Amber D. LOPEZ-STAYER, a minor, By and Through Angela P. STAYER, Guardian ad Litem, Appellant, v. Kevin S. PITTS, M.D., Respondent. |
Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
James E. Baker, Seattle, William D. Pickett, Yakima, for appellant.
Mary H. Spillane, William Kastner & Gibbs, Seattle, Dennis L. Fluegge, Yakima, for Respondent.
The scope and extent of voir dire is vested in the discretion of the trial judge conducting the trial. State v. Frederiksen, 40 Wash.App. 749, 752-53, 700 P.2d 369 (1985). Here, the trial judge refused to let the plaintiff's lawyer use the word "insurance" in the conduct of his voir dire of a jury. The judge did permit extensive inquiry into the jurors' attitudes on medical malpractice litigation, the medical malpractice "crisis," claims, and frivolous lawsuits. We conclude that the limitations imposed by the trial judge fell well within his discretionary authority. And we therefore affirm the judgment and the court's order denying a motion for a new trial.
Angela P. Stayer,1 as guardian ad litem for her daughter, Amber D. Lopez-Stayer, sued Dr. Kevin Pitts. She claims that he negligently managed Amber's delivery. Amber's shoulder stuck behind her mother's pubic bone. This resulted in a condition known as shoulder dystocia. Ms. Stayer argued that Amber suffered permanent injury to her nerves when Dr. Pitts elected to continue with a vaginal delivery. Dr. Barbara Bates, Ms. Stayer's family practice physician, referred the case to Dr. Pitts for a Cesarean section after she identified the shoulder dystocia problem and determined that a vaginal delivery could not be safely performed.
Dr. Pitts moved to exclude mention of liability insurance coverage at trial. Ms. Stayer wanted to question the jury on the malpractice insurance "crisis" and related publicity.
The court permitted broad inquiry into "claims," "lawsuits," and the medical malpractice "crisis" in general, but refused a specific discussion of insurance:
Well, the Court is going to preclude reference to insurance. I looked over the [jury] questionnaire and I don't see that in the questionnaire insurance is referenced at all. Malpractice is referenced. Malpractice crisis is referenced but not insurance, unless I've missed something. The Court is not going to allow inquiry either in voir dire or during the course of the trial about insurance. It would make no sense to allow it in voir dire and then not allow it during the trial. So I think you can phrase your questions, Mr. Baker [2] — I have confidence in you — in the spirit of the questionnaire which doesn't talk about insurance but does talk about problems in the industry, if we can refer to medicine as an industry.
Report of Proceedings (RP) at 51.
Prospective jurors completed a questionnaire as part of the voir dire process. It included the following statements:
a. It is worse to award too little than too much to an injured party in a lawsuit.
Disagree
b. A bad outcome usually means malpractice has been committed.
Disagree
c. Lawsuit damages are often the only way to make doctors accountable.
Disagree
d. Malpractice lawsuits help "police" the medical profession and keep it honest.
Disagree
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 336. And it included the following questions:
CP at 337-38. Ms. Stayer renewed her request to discuss malpractice insurance during voir dire based on certain of the venire's responses to the questionnaire. She noted that 5 of the first 18 jurors questioned volunteered some concern about the effect of malpractice suits on medical malpractice insurance.
The court responded:
Mr. Baker, my question is this. Why do you have to reference the word "insurance" to inquire about that of this jury? Can't you just reference the word "claims," "lawsuits" or anything else and still get to the same place? I say that because whether or not Dr. Pitts is paying this out of his pocket and, therefore, he has to charge more money per patient or his malpractice, if I can use that word, rates go up because of insurance and he has to pay that out of his pocket, I mean, the difference is the same in my mind.
The trial judge again prohibited reference to insurance:
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Pitts.
Ms. Stayer moved for a new trial on a number of grounds, including the court's failure to allow her to discuss insurance. The court denied the motion.
Our system vests a trial judge with considerable latitude in shaping the limits and extent of voir dire. Murray v. Mossman, 52 Wash.2d 885, 887, 329 P.2d 1089 (1958). This trial judge abused his discretion only if his decision is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wash.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).
Voir dire is not a topic that lends itself to appellate review because of the nuances and subtleties presented by each jury case. State v. Davis, 141 Wash.2d 798, 825-26, 10 P.3d 977 (2000). It is for these reasons that "[t]he trial court is vested with discretion (1) to see that the voir dire is effective in obtaining an impartial jury and (2) to see that this result is obtained with reasonable expedition." Frederiksen, 40 Wash.App. at 753,700 P.2d 369. The ultimate test here is not whether the trial judge should or should not have allowed any single question or even line of questioning. The test is whether the court permitted the plaintiff here to ferret out bias and partiality. Id. at 752, 700 P.2d 369. The primary purpose of voir dire is to give a litigant an opportunity to explore the potential jurors' attitudes in order to determine whether the jury should be challenged. Id.
Ms. Stayer's specific assignment of error here is that the trial judge based his ruling on an erroneous understanding of the law — that ER 4115 did not permit the introduction into evidence of liability insurance. And a discretionary ruling based on error of law is an abuse of discretion. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash.2d 299, 339, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). We disagree with her assertion for two...
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