Lopez v. Jackson
| Citation | 32 So. 117,80 Miss. 684 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
| Decision Date | 02 June 1902 |
| Parties | LAZARO LOPEZ v. CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS JACKSON |
March 1902
FROM the circuit court of Harrison county. HON J. IRA FORD Special Judge.
Jackson appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; Lopez, appellant was defendant there. The suit was a civil action for assault and battery. The altercation between the parties occurred in the courthouse at Mississippi City, during the trial of a case in the circuit court, and had its origin in and immediately followed Jackson's striking the district attorney, while that officer was prosecuting him for larceny. The testimony was conflicting as to the circumstances under which defendant struck plaintiff with an umbrella; some of the witnesses stated the facts in such a way as to make defendant, if not excusable, so nearly so as to exempt him from liability for anything more than compensatory damages. Plaintiff's injuries were very slight; the jury, however awarded him $ 1,500, and judgment having been rendered for said sum, defendant appealed to the supreme court. [For a report of the decision of a motion in this case, see Lopez v. Jackson, 79 Miss. 460.]
Reversed and remanded.
McWillie & Thompson and Walter A. White, for appellant.
The court cannot fail to observe that the relative financial worth of the parties litigant was quite prominently brought forward in the lower court, and the defendant, Lopez, having been shown to be a man of wealth, this instruction was given for the plaintiff: "If the jury find for the plaintiff, they have a right to take into consideration, in estimating the damages, the pecuniary condition of defendant."
This instruction is clearly erroneous, since it allows the jury to take into consideration the defendant's pecuniary condition, whether or not they should think the case one for the imposition of exemplary damages. The instruction is without qualification, and authorizes the jury to consider the wealth of the defendant in fixing the verdict, no matter whether they thought it should be punitive or not. How the defendant's wealth could be made the measure of the plaintiff's just compensation for actual injuries, whether mental or physical, passes all understanding.
One thing is certain in this case, as an examination of the instructions will demonstrate. The jury could not have rendered a verdict for the plaintiff awarding him only compensatory damages without violating an instruction. One instruction directs a verdict for the defendant unless the battery was malicious, another that if it were malicious exemplary damages could rightfully be awarded, and yet another that if they found for plaintiff they had a right to consider defendant's pecuniary condition, etc. These instructions practically took from the jury the subject matter of compensatory damages. This condition was not wholly brought about by appellant's instruction, but is the fault as well of appellee's charges. Now, let us suppose the jurors, one or more of them, were men of sense, who intelligently comprehended the case and correctly interpreted the instructions as a whole, and let us suppose further that they concluded that defendant ought not to be wholly acquitted, but should be made to pay only compensatory damages. How could a proper verdict, the jury so finding, be awarded without violating an instruction? If the jury found for plaintiff, they would violate the defendant's charge to the effect that he could not be convicted unless the battery was malicious. If they found for the plaintiff, then the question of defendant's pecuniary condition was to be considered, and exemplary damages to be entered upon by them according to the plaintiff's instructions. A conscientious juror who comprehended the case, and whose judgment led to a verdict for plaintiff awarding only compensatory damages, was thus placed in a position where he could not do right. In fixing damages at least, he was constrained by the court to exceed a compensatory award.
The conduct of Jackson, the plaintiff, was so...
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