Lopez v. Ohio Dept. of Human Serv.

• Decision Date: 11 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 4-93-6,4-93-6
• Parties: LOPEZ, Appellee, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellant. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 231

88 Ohio App.3d 231

623 N.E.2d 689

LOPEZ, Appellee, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellant. ^*

No. 4-93-6.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Defiance County.

Decided June 11, 1993.

Pamela Weaner, Defiance, for appellee.

Lee Fisher, Atty. Gen., and Rebecca Fist, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbus, for appellant.

HADLEY, Judge.

Appellant, the Ohio Department of Human Services ("ODHS"), appeals from a judgment in the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas which reversed an administrative agency's decision reducing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits ("ADC") of appellee, Monica Lopez ("Monica"). Because of the issue raised in this appeal, this case is transferred from the accelerated calendar to the regular calendar.

The facts, as stipulated, are as follows. Monica resides with her minor daughter from a prior relationship, Christina Lopez; Monica's boyfriend, Roberto Martinez; and Monica and Roberto's minor daughter, Stephanie Martinez. Christina is a recipient of ADC benefits.

During part of the year, Roberto is employed in seasonal work. During that time, he and Stephanie are excluded from Christina's ADC assistance group. During the part of the year that Roberto is unemployed, he receives unemployment compensation. Effective January 1992, the Defiance County Department of Human Services determined that Roberto and Stephanie should be included in Christina's ADC assistance group and that Christina's ADC benefits should be reduced when Roberto is receiving unemployment compensation.

Monica appealed the decision of the Defiance County Department of Human Services and a state welfare hearing was held. The state hearing officer determined that the reduction in the ADC benefits was proper. Monica filed an administrative appeal, which was overruled. Monica then appealed to the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas. The Defiance County Court of Common Pleas disagreed with the administrative agency and department of human services and determined that there was no evidence in the record to support the administrative agency's decision and that the decision was, therefore, contrary to law. It is from this judgment that ODHS asserts the following assignment of error.

"The Defiance County Court of Common Pleas was in error when it determined that federal and state law do not require half-siblings of a child receiving ADC to be included in the assistance unit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 602(A)(38) where such half siblings are not independently ADC eligible."

This appeal centers on whether a half-sibling can be included in a child's ADC assistance group if there are no facts presented that the half-sibling is dependent other than the fact that the half-sibling's father receives unemployment compensation. ODHS argues that the administrative agency's interpretation should be adhered to, that a half-sibling should be included in an assistance group for another child when the half-sibling's parent receives unemployment compensation. Monica argues that ODHS's interpretation of the federal and state statutes relating to ADC benefits is inconsistent with the language of these statutes and that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Before examining the statutes involved, we must note that, although we are reviewing a decision of the trial court involving the decision of an administrative agency, we do not apply an "abuse of discretion" standard as this matter's only issue involves a question of law. Thus, we are permitted to apply our own determination as to the application and interpretation of the law involved. In re Raymundo (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 262, 586 N.E.2d 1149.

Moreover, since we are called upon to review an interpretation of the law, we must give effect to the language as intended by Congress and the Ohio legislature, as that intention is implemented by and through the respective agency. See Sullivan v. Everhart (1990), 494 U.S. 83, 110 S.Ct. 960, 108 L.Ed.2d 72, and Jones Metal Products Co. v. Walker (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 173, 58 O.O.2d 393, 281 N.E.2d 1. Likewise, if the statute is ambiguous, the agency's interpretation of the statute is also given due deference. Sullivan, supra; Jones Metal Products, supra. This is because the agency, in exercising the day-to-day responsibility of implementing the intention of Congress, has acquired "substantial expertise." Jones Metal Products, supra.

Thus, necessary to this appeal is a recitation of the relevant portions of the federal law which implements ADC benefits for recipients in each state. Section 602(a)(38), Title 42, U.S.Code, states the persons to be included in a child's assistance group in order to determine the amount of benefits the child should receive.

"(a) Contents

"A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must--

" * * *

"(38) provide that in making the determination [of eligibility] with respect to a dependent child * * * the State agency shall * * * include--

"(A) any parent of such child, and

"(B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or sister meets the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a) of this title or in section 607(a) of this title,

"if such parent, brother, or sister is living in the same home as the dependent child, and any income of or available for such parent, brother, or sister shall be included in making such determination and applying such paragraph with respect to the family * * *[.]"

Our first determination under this statute is whether Stephanie is a sister of Christina, pursuant to Section 602(a)(38)(B). Section 206.10(a)(1)(vii)(B), Title 45, C.F.R., provides some insight into this determination.

"(vii) For AFDC only, in order for the family to be eligible, an application with respect to a dependent child must also include, if living in the same household and otherwise eligible for assistance:

" * * *

(B) Any blood-related or adoptive brother or sister[.]"

Therefore, as Christina is related by blood to Stephanie, Christina is a sister of Stephanie.

Our next determination is whether Stephanie meets the conditions of Sections 606(a) or 607(a), Title 42, U.S.Code, and, therefore, falls into Christina's assistance group. The relevant provision is Section 607(a), Title 42, U.S.Code, as it pertains directly to unemployment compensation. It states as follows:

"(a) 'Dependent child' defined. The term 'dependent child' shall, notwithstanding section * * * [42 U.S.C.S. § 606(a) ], include a needy child who meets the requirements of * * * [42 U.S.C.S. § 606(a)(2) ], who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) of the parent who is the principal earner, and who is living with any of the relatives specified in section * * * [42 U.S.C.S. § 606(a)(1) ] in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his (or their) own home."

Thus, if a child is deprived of her parent's support or care by reason of the parent's unemployment, the child is a dependent child and must be included in the [half] sibling's assistance group.

ODHS argues that if Stephanie's father is unemployed, that fact alone is sufficient to conclude that she is a dependent child. Monica argues that since Stephanie is not deprived of Roberto's support or care by reason of his unemployment, because Roberto receives unemployment compensation which supports Stephanie, Stephanie should not be deemed a dependent child, pursuant to Section 602(a)(38), Title 42, U.S.Code. We agree with the agency's interpretation of the statute.

In Orris v. Sullivan (C.A.9, 1992), 974 F.2d 109, a similar situation was presented to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. A woman and her two daughters lived with a man and the man and woman had a son in Hawaii. The man was injured at work and began receiving workers' compensation benefits. After the man began receiving workers' compensation benefits, the Hawaii Department of Human Services discontinued the woman's AFDC benefits because the benefits exceeded the group's standard of need. A question was presented whether the man and the son should be included in the woman's and daughters' ADC family filing unit.

While the matter sub judice involves a parent being unemployed and Orris involved a parent being unable to work because of a physical injury, a statute analogous to Section 607, Title 42, U.S.Code, applies to determine whether a child is dependent. That statute is Section 606(a), Title 42, U.S.Code, which provides:

"(a) The term 'dependent child' means a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the * * * physical * * * incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father * * * in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen[.]"

Applying this statute to the facts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

"Father's injury constituted a 'physical incapacity' as defined by 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(1)(iv), and this incapacity resulted in Son being labelled a 'deprived' child under 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(1). As a deprived child who was under the age of eighteen and a blood-related sibling of Orris' two daughters, Son had to be included in the Orris household family filing unit as a 'dependent' child for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(1) and (2)(A). Because Son was included in the family filing unit, Father also had to be included therein as the parent of an AFDC-eligible child under 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38)(A), and any income received by Father had to be attributed to the household pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38)." (Footnotes omitted.)

Thus, analogizing the facts of the matter sub judice to Orris, we find that Stephanie and her father Roberto should have been included as part of Christina's assistance group. Roberto's unemployment results in Stephanie being labelled a "dep...