Lopez v. State
| Citation | 18 S.W.3d 220 |
| Parties | (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) RUDOLFO LOPEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS NO. 677-99 |
| Decision Date | 03 May 2000 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas |
O P I N I O N
Rudolfo Lopez was charged with sexually assaulting a 12-year-old boy named Paul. At trial, he unsuccessfully sought to introduce evidence that two years earlier Paul had falsely accused his mother of physical abuse. Lopez argues that the evidence should have been admitted because the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution demands it. We conclude that the trial court properly excluded the evidence.
Paul testified that Lopez compelled Paul to perform oral sex on Lopez numerous times over the course of several months. Lopez attempted to impeach Paul's credibility with evidence that two years earlier, Paul had complained to the Texas Department of Human Services that his mother had thrown him against a washing machine and that case had been closed without any action taken against the mother.
Lopez was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child, and sentenced to 12 years in prison on each count. On appeal, Lopez argued he should have been permitted to impeach Paul with evidence of the prior false accusation. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the evidence should have been admitted.1 We vacated that opinion and remanded the case for the court of appeals to address the State's argument that the evidence was inadmissible pursuant to Rule of Evidence 608(b).2 On remand, the court of appeals held, despite Rule 608(b), the Confrontation Clause demands that the evidence be admitted.3
Both the District Attorney and the State Prosecuting Attorney filed petitions for discretionary review, which we granted. The District Attorney argues that "[t]he Court of Appeals erred in holding that [Lopez] was entitled under the right to confrontation to impeach [Paul's] credibility with evidence that [Paul] made a prior false or unfounded allegation of abuse, of a kind different than that for which [Lopez] was prosecuted, and made against someone other than [Lopez]." The State Prosecuting Attorney's petition asks, "Does the exclusion of evidence, pursuant to Tex.R.Evid. 608(b), that the victim of a sexually-related offense made a previous, unsubstantiated complaint of physical abuse against a third person, constitute a violation of the accused's federal constitutional right to confrontation of witnesses?"
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him.4 Confrontation means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically.5 A primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of cross-examination.6 Each Confrontation Clause issue must be weighed on a case-by-case basis, carefully taking into account the defendant's right to cross-examine and the risk factors associated with admission of the evidence.7 In weighing whether evidence must be admitted under the Confrontation Clause, the trial court should balance the probative value of the evidence sought to be introduced against the risk its admission may entail.8 The trial court maintains broad discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination to avoid harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, endangering the witness, and the injection of cumulative or collateral evidence.9
We have previously indicated that the Confrontation Clause will prevail if there is a conflict between it and the Rules of Evidence.10 Indeed, Rule 101(c) of the Rules of Evidence dictates that the Constitution should control if there is a conflict. But that Rule also admonishes us that, "where possible, inconsistency is to be removed by reasonable construction."
Rule 608(b) of the Rules of Evidence11 provides that "[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness nor proved by extrinsic evidence." The issue we face is whether, in a case involving a sexual offense, the Confrontation Clause demands that evidence of the complainant's prior false allegations of abuse against a person other than the defendant be admissible, despite Rule 608(b)'s proscription against admitting specific instances of conduct. We must decide whether the Confrontation Clause requires us to carve out a special exception to the Rules of Evidence for sexual offenses.
We addressed a similar issue in Boutwell v. State.12 In that case, the issue was whether the State could admit extraneous offense evidence against the defendant. A plurality of this Court recognized "a narrow exception for sex offenses to permit admission of similar extraneous sex offenses which occurred between the minor complainant and the accused."13 But we later disavowed Boutwell in Vernon v. State,14 where we pointed out that the Rules of Evidence, enacted after Boutwell, were "the most important guide to admissibility" of evidence.15
Based on Vernon, the Rules of Evidence should govern the admissibility of evidence, and we should not create a special exception to Rule 608(b) for sexual offenses. But today's case is different because it involves the admission of previous bad acts against the complainant, as opposed to the admission of extraneous offenses against the defendant. So the Confrontation Clause becomes relevant and may dictate a different result.
Other states have held that the Confrontation Clause requires creating a special exception for sexual offenses to allow admission of prior false accusations of abuse by the complainant despite evidentiary bars.16 But the rationale behind these opinions is not at all clear. Some recurring themes are that sex offenses are somehow unique because (1) they are easily charged and difficult to disprove;17 (2) there are usually no witnesses to the offense, so the credibility of the complainant and the defendant are more critical issues;18 and (3) the nature of the charge is apt to arouse sympathy and create bias.19 None of these rationales persuades us to create an across-the-board exception to the Rules of Evidence for sex offenses.
* First, sex offenses are not any easier to charge or any more difficult to disprove than any other case. In fact, often it is just the opposite. Studies show that "rape is rarely reported to anyone, and women who do report the crime often wait days, weeks, months, or even years before confiding in a family member, a friend or a rape crisis counselor, much less going to the police."20 The fact is that in sex offenses, it is often extremely difficult for the victim to come forward. And these offenses are no more difficult to disprove than any other accusation. As with any other charge, a defendant may argue mistaken identification, consent, failure of the State to meet its burden of proof, or any other defense available in a criminal case.
* Credibility of the witnesses is no more important in sex offenses than in any other case. Any case can involve a swearing match between two witnesses: an assault in which the defendant and the victim are alone and the defendant threatens the victim with imminent bodily injury; a kidnapping in which the defendant restrains the victim in an isolated location and the victim eventually escapes; an attempted theft in which the defendant and the victim are alone and the defendant grabs the victim's purse but is unable to get it away from the victim. In each of these examples, there is no physical evidence and there are no additional witnesses to the crime. In contrast, although some sex offenses have no corroborating physical evidence, many sex offenses do - such as evidence of victim penetration or traces of the attacker's DNA. So the complainant's and the defendant's credibility are no more critical issues in sex offense cases than in any other type of case.
* Any emotions associated with sex offenses are all the more reason to prevent admission of prior false accusations by the victim. To justify creating the special exception for sex offenses in Boutwell, we said that "[s]exual offenses are highly emotional issues in our society and the defendants are regarded differently from the 'ordinary' criminal."21 But the same is true for victims of a sexual offense. They, too, are regarded differently from the "ordinary" victim. No other victim of any offense is so likely to be accused of fabricating, fantasizing, or "asking for it." The increased emotional level associated with sexual offenses is all the more reason to refuse to allow the jury to be additionally confused by collateral acts of misconduct by a witness. Indeed, that is the entire purpose behind Rule 608(b).
Legal commentators have also recognized the peculiarity of the sex-offense exception recognized in other states. Professors Goode, Wellborn, and Sharlot point out that this rule 22
We agree. Rule 608(b) mandates that "[s]pecific acts not resulting in conviction may not be used to demonstrate the witness's untrustworthy nature."23 As the Ohio Court has pointed out, "the mere fact that an alleged rape victim made prior false allegations does not automatically mean that she is fabricating the present charge."24 Prior false allegations of abuse "do not tend to prove or disprove any of the elements of rape."25
So...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Delamora v. State
...... Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.). The assessment of whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel must be made according to the facts of each case. Lopez v. State, 96 S.W.3d 406, 417 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. ref'd). Whether the Strickland test has been met is to be judged by the "totality of the representation" rather than by isolated acts or omissions of trial counsel, and the test is applied at the time of the trial, not through hindsight. ......
-
State v. Long
......See, e. g., Pantazes v. State, 376 Md. 661, 831 A.2d 432, 447 (2003); Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 333 (Alaska App.2002); State v. West, 95 Hawai'i 452, 24 P.3d 648, 654 (2001); Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (refusing to adopt per se rule but looking at each case individually); State v. Walton, 715 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Ind.1999); State v. Smith, 743 So.2d 199, 202-03 (La.1999); State v. Johnson, 123 N.M. 640, 944 P.2d 869, 878 (1997); People v. Grano, 286 ......
-
Butler v. Dir., TDCJ-CID
...the possibility of misleading or confusing a jury, and the possibility of undue delay or waste of time." Id.; see Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Moreover, "the Confrontation Clause guarantees an ......
-
Moore v. State
....... The prior DWI conviction is not relevant to Hauerland's truthful character because it is not a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. See Shipman v. State, 604 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Lopez v. State, 990 S.W.2d 770, 778 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.); see also Perez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (felony DWI not a "high crime" under art. XVI, § 2 of Tex. Const. because it does not involve "moral corruption" or "dishonesty"). Thus, the court did not abuse its ......
-
Trial Issues
...Crim. App. 2006). The Confrontation Clause will prevail if there is a conflict between it and the Rules of Evidence. Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). For a complete discussion of Crawford and the admissibility of evidence in situations implicating the Confrontation Clau......
-
Child Sexual Abuse
...Clause requires a case by case determination as to whether evidence of prior false allegations should be admissible. Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Rule of Evidence 613(b), which creates an exception to Rule 608(b), provides that a witness may be impeached by using ex......
-
Trial Issues
...Crim. App. 2006). The Confrontation Clause will prevail if there is a conflict between it and the Rules of Evidence. Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). For a complete discussion of Crawford and the admissibility of evidence in situations implicating the Confrontation Clau......
-
Trial Issues
...Crim. App. 2006). The Confrontation Clause will prevail if there is a conflict between it and the Rules of Evidence. Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). For a complete discussion of Crawford and the admissibility of evidence in situations implicating the Confrontation Clau......