Lopez v. State
| Decision Date | 09 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D12–854.,2D12–854. |
| Parties | Victor Lee LOPEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Bruce P. Taylor, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Victor Lee Lopez, pro se.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Tonja Rene Vickers, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Victor Lee Lopez appeals from his Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentence for felony battery with a weapon. See§ 775.082(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). He argues that under Alleyne v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), a judge may no longer determine whether a defendant's release date from a state correctional facility subjects him or her to PRR sentencing based on a preponderance of evidence; rather, a jury must make such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence is an element of the offense that must be submitted to the jury. 133 S.Ct. at 2155 (). Lopez contends that because the jury did not determine that he met the statutory requirements for PRR sentencing, his PRR designation must be reversed.
The State responds that the jury is not required to make the PRR factual determination because Apprendi carved out a specific exception for recidivist statutes. We agree. The Supreme Court in Apprendi stated that “ [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added). In this case, it is not the fact that Lopez has a prior conviction that increases his sentence under the PRR statute. Rather, it is the date that Lopez was released from prison for the prior offense that is the fact that may increase his sentence. However, as this court stated in Calloway v. State, 914 So.2d 12, 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), “[w]hile we recognize that the fact of [the defendant's] date of release from his prior prison sentence is not the same as a bare fact of a prior conviction, we conclude that it is directly derivative of a prior conviction.” Therefore, because Lopez's date of release from prison is a part of his prior record, that fact determination did...
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Jossey v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
...a prior conviction. Accordingly, we hold that Alleyne does not require a jury to make the PRR factual determination. SeeLopez v. State, 135 So.3d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). This Court and other federal courts have reached similar conclusions, finding comparable state court adjudicationsconcern......
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Myles v. Sec'y
...standard as determined by a jury. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 203 So. 3d 192, 193-94 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Lopez v. State, 135 So. 3d 539, 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Williams v. State, 143 So. 3d 423, 424 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).III A federal habeas court may set aside a state court's ruling on the......
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Cruz v. State, 4D13–1408.
...So.2d at 18 ; Culp v. State, 141 So.3d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ; Williams v. State, 143 So.3d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ; Lopez v. State, 135 So.3d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).Appellant's habitual offender sentence did not violate Apprendi or Alleyne. Under current precedent, the existence of app......
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Cruz v. State, 4D13–1408.
...So.2d at 18; Culp v. State, 141 So.3d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Williams v. State, 143 So.3d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Lopez v. State, 135 So.3d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).Appellant's habitual offender sentence did not violate Apprendi or Alleyne. Under current precedent, the existence of appell......