Lopez v. State

Decision Date26 July 2001
Docket NumberNo. 25967.,25967.
Citation30 P.3d 952,136 Idaho 174
PartiesGuadalupe LOPEZ, Claimant-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, Defendant-Respondent.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Beck & Guthrie, Chartered, Idaho Falls for appellant. Robert K. Beck argued.

Hopkins Roden Crockett Hansen & Hoopes, PLLC, Idaho Falls for respondent. Paul B. Rippel argued.

EISMANN, Justice.

Guadalupe Lopez is totally and permanently disabled from an occupational disease. She appeals from the Industrial Commission's ruling that the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) was not liable for benefits under Idaho Code § 72-332 even though she had a pre-existing, permanent physical impairment from an earlier manifestation of the disease. We affirm the ruling of the Industrial Commission.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In approximately 1977 at the age of 40, Lopez began working for Basic American Foods on the trim line. Her work involved extensive hand trimming of potatoes. In 1979 she sought medical attention due to cervical pain, and her physician diagnosed her as having early degenerative changes in her cervical spine. Her complaints resolved with conservative care, and she returned to work.

In December 1986, Lopez developed pain in her right arm, chest, and shoulder while sorting potatoes. She again sought medical attention, and her physicians treated her for cervical spine disease and C6 radiculopathy. As a result, she was off work from December 1986 until February 1987. Her symptoms improved with medication and therapy to the point that she was able to return to work, although since this 1986 incident she has had numbness in her right index finger and in portions of her right forearm.

In February 1991, Lopez felt a sharp pain between her shoulders while she was throwing potatoes from a basket. The pain worsened for several days to the point that she was unable to continue working. She again sought medical attention, which included chiropractic care, pain medications, and therapy. One of her treating physicians indicated that she would eventually need cervical therapy. She was off work due to her cervical pain until January 14, 1992. When she returned to work, her residual symptoms were worse than they had been after her 1986 injury. She had pain in both hands and awoke at night with bilateral hand numbness. She began taking over-the-counter pain medications regularly in order to continue working.

In February 1997, Lopez again felt a sharp pain between her shoulders while working at sorting and throwing potatoes. She also began to suffer balance problems. She continued working until March 9, 1997, when she could no longer tolerate the pain and sought medical attention. Her physician prescribed pain medications, and her employer changed her job to light-duty office cleaning, sorting papers, and filing. On April 17, 1997, a cervical MRI revealed prominent bulging discs and osteophyte complexes at C5-6 and C6-7. Lopez ceased working on April 19, 1997, and one month later she underwent surgery, which reduced, but did not eliminate, her pain.

On February 13, 1996, Lopez filed a complaint with the Industrial Commission seeking worker's compensation benefits for the February 1991 incident, and on September 16, 1997, she filed a second complaint seeking benefits for the February 1997 incident. Upon motion of the employer/surety, both complaints were consolidated. On June 24, 1998, the employer/surety filed a complaint against the ISIF, and the matter was set for hearing on October 22, 1998. Before the hearing, Lopez and the employer/surety entered into a lump sum agreement, which was approved by the Commission. The only issue tried at the hearing was the liability of the ISIF. Based upon the evidence presented, the Commission determined that ISIF was not liable to Lopez, and she appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When this Court reviews a decision of the Industrial Commission, it exercises free review over questions of law, but reviews questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. Rivas v. K.C. Logging, 134 Idaho 603, 7 P.3d 212 (2000). Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Id. Because the Commission is the fact finder, its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. This Court does not weigh the evidence or consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence presented. Id. We exercise free review over the construction of a statute. Crawford v. Department of Corr., 133 Idaho 633, 991 P.2d 358 (1999).

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

A. Is the Industrial Commission's finding that Lopez suffered a progressive industrial disease rather than a series of industrial accidents or injuries supported by substantial and competent evidence?

B. When a claimant becomes totally and permanently disabled from a progressive, occupational disease, is the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund liable for benefits under Idaho Code § 72-332 if the claimant had a pre-existing, permanent physical impairment from an earlier manifestation of that disease?

C. Did the Industrial Commission err in failing to award Lopez attorney fees?

IV. ANALYSIS

A. IS THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT LOPEZ SUFFERED A PROGRESSIVE INDUSTRIAL DISEASE RATHER THAN A SERIES OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS OR INJURIES SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE?

The Commission found that Lopez suffers from a degenerative cervical disc disease and cervical arthritis and that the hazard of that condition was increased by the repetitive head, neck, and bilateral arm movements characteristic of the potato sorting and trimming work she performed. It found that as a result of her employment at Basic American Foods, Lopez incurred a compensable occupational disease that totally incapacitated her by April 1997. After considering the medical and nonmedical factors, the Commission found that Lopez was totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. Finally, the Commission found that Lopez suffered a single, progressive disease and not an industrial accident or injury.

In making its findings, the Commission relied upon the testimony given by Dr. Walker, a physician who examined Lopez on July 8, 1998, at the request of the employer/surety. The parties deposed Dr. Walker on September 2, 1998, and again on October 19, 1998. In its Findings of Fact, the Commission quoted and cited portions of Dr. Walker's testimony as follows:

Dr. Walker testified that Claimant's turning of her head in 1986 most likely caused a temporary nerve compression which produced the upper extremity symptoms she reported at that time. He placed a 5% impairment rating on Claimant's degenerative cervical condition as it existed in 1986. Dr. Walker did not attribute any additional permanent impairment to Claimant's 1991 flare up of cervical symptoms. Considering the progression of Claimant's cervical disease, Dr. Walker opined: "The bottom line is we're talking about a process here that is not an isolated injury, but rather a summation of not only a few different isolated episodes, but also a summation of years and years of doing repetitive motion." Walker Deposition, p. 26 (October 19, 1998). Dr. Walker testified that an acute episode can start or at least speed up a degenerating cascade. Although not using the precise statutory phrase "aggravation and acceleration," Dr. Walker testified that Claimant's final episode in March 1997 was "the kicker that put her over the top .... the straw that broke the camel's back" and produced severe symptoms which forced her to surgery. Walker Deposition, p. 38 (October 19, 1998).

The Commission then concluded, "Dr. Walker clearly indicated Claimant's condition was not an isolated episode, but rather the result of years of repetitive motion." Lopez contends that the Commission misinterpreted Dr. Walker's testimony. She argues that Dr. Walker described two different processes: a degenerative disease aggravated by years of doing repetitive motion and three separate isolated accidents or injuries that aggravated her preexisting disease.

It is the role of the Industrial Commission, not this Court, to determine the weight and credibility of testimony and to resolve conflicting interpretations of testimony. Spencer v. Allpress Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P.3d 475 (2000); McAlpin v. Wood River Medical Center, 129 Idaho 1, 921 P.2d 178 (1996); Monroe v. Chuck & Del's, Inc., 123 Idaho 627, 851 P.2d 341 (1993). On appeal, this Court will not conduct a de novo review of the evidence or consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence presented. Spencer v. Allpress Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P.3d 475 (2000); Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927 (1986). This Court will not disturb the Commission's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Spencer v. Allpress Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P.3d 475 (2000). Considering the testimony given by Dr. Walker during both of his depositions, we cannot find that the Commission's interpretation of his testimony was clearly erroneous.

B. WHEN A CLAIMANT BECOMES TOTALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED FROM A PROGRESSIVE, OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, IS THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND LIABLE FOR BENEFITS UNDER IDAHO CODE § 72-332 IF THE CLAIMANT HAD A PRE-EXISTING, PERMANENT PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT FROM AN EARLIER MANIFESTATION OF THAT DISEASE?

Lopez contends that she is entitled to benefits from the ISIF under...

To continue reading

Request your trial
34 cases
  • James v. City of Boise
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 21 May 2015
    ...not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed constructions. Lopez v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 136 Idaho 174, 178, 30 P.3d 952, 956 (2001). The Plaintiff's interpretation of section 25–2808 would mean that an officer who uses a police dog to su......
  • James v. City of Boise
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 23 March 2016
    ...not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed constructions. Lopez v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 136 Idaho 174, 178, 30 P.3d 952, 956 (2001). The Plaintiff's interpretation of section 25–2808 would mean that an officer who uses a police dog to su......
  • State, Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Housel
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 28 April 2004
    ...further analysis must be applied to arrive at the legislative intent underlying I.C. § 56-203A. See Lopez v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 136 Idaho 174, 178, 30 P.3d 952, 956 (2001) (where a statute is ambiguous, this Court will attempt to ascertain the legislative When interpreting a......
  • State v. Anderson
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 9 January 2008
    ...law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Maidwell, 137 Idaho 424, 426, 50 P.3d 439, 441 (2002) (citing Lopez v. State, 136 Idaho 174, 30 P.3d 952 (2001)). "The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of defendants." State v. Barnes, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT