State, Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Housel

• Decision Date: 28 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. 28652.,28652.
• Citation: 140 Idaho 96,90 P.3d 321
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard A. HOUSEL and Kimberly C. Housel, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

90 P.3d 321

140 Idaho 96

STATE of Idaho, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard A. HOUSEL and Kimberly C. Housel, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 28652.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2004 Term.

April 28, 2004.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Jerold W. Lee argued.

Richard Alex Housel, pro se respondent.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

The Department of Health and Welfare ("Department") appeals from the district court's determination that the magistrate judge had no right or power to order child support payments between parents who were married and not legally separated.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At the time this action was initiated Richard Housel ("Richard") and Kimberly Housel ("Kimberly") were married and the parents of three minor children. Although the Housels were living separately, neither had filed for divorce or legal separation.

On October 1, 1998, the Department filed a complaint against Richard seeking an order of support for his three minor children. Kimberly was not mentioned in the complaint. The complaint alleged that Richard was the natural father of the three children and that he was capable of providing support. The complaint did not allege that the Department was providing assistance to the children or any matters concerning Richard's marital status or any other factual basis for the requested relief.

Richard was served the summons and complaint on October 23, 1998. On December 14, 1998, a magistrate entered a default order requiring Richard to make support payments for two of the three Housel children. Apparently, the third child was in Richard's custody.

On May 2, 2001, the Department moved to join Kimberly as a party defendant, alleging that Kimberly was the biological mother of the minor children and a party of interest with regard to the Department's petition for modification of child support, which had not yet been filed. Kimberly was joined as a party defendant on May 4, 2001.

On June 18, 2001, the Department filed its petition to modify the December 14, 1998, order based on an alleged substantial and material change in Richard's income. The petition was subsequently amended on July 31, 2001, alleging that Richard was the father of the minor children and that "all children were born of marriage between the parties." The amended petition did not, however, contain allegations regarding the Housels' current marital status or custody and support of their minor children, though it erroneously referred to a decree of divorce. The amended petition states, "THAT the JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE should be modified to increase the support obligation of the Defendant, RICHARD A. HOUSEL ...." (emphasis added). However, the Housels testified at the December 2, 2001, hearing that they were still legally married, and the record contains no indication that a divorce decree had ever been entered.

On September 13, 2001, the Department, Richard and Kimberly filed a stipulation to modify the order of support, stipulating that Richard was the natural father of the three children and that he should pay for their support.

On September 21, 2001, the magistrate ordered that a hearing be held to verify the Housels' marital status. This was a different magistrate than the one who had entered the December 14, 1998, order of support. On September 27, 2001, the Department moved to dismiss the amended petition without prejudice. A hearing was held on December 2, 2001, at which time the magistrate ordered, apparently sua sponte, that Richard's support obligation be modified to zero. The transcript of the hearing indicates that the reason for the order was the fact that Richard and Kimberly were neither divorced nor living in a state of legal separation. The magistrate did not rule on the Department's motion to dismiss. The Department filed its notice of appeal to the district court on November 7, 2001.

The district court perceived the issue to be whether a court had the right and power to order child support payments between parents who were legally married and not living in a state of legal separation. The district court concluded that child support payments may not be ordered in such cases, and that the magistrate did not err in terminating its order of support, finding the order of December 14, 1998, to have been void in the first instance.

The Department appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews the decisions of the magistrate division independently, with due regard for the decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity. Stevens v. Stevens, 135 Idaho 224, 227, 16 P.3d 900, 903 (2000).

A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, which is to say that findings that are based upon substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. DeChambeau v. Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568, 571, 976 P.2d 922, 925 (1999). The credibility and weight to be given evidence is in the province of the trial court, and this Court liberally construes the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment entered. Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999). However, when the issue is one of law, this Court exercises free review of the trial court's decision. Id.

Whether a judgment is void is a question of law. Cramer v. Wade, 985 P.2d 467, 470 n. 2 (Alaska 1999). This Court reviews questions of law de novo. State, Dep't of Fin. v. Res. Serv., Co., 130 Idaho 877, 880, 950 P.2d 249, 252 (1997).

As a general principle, "this Court will refrain from considering issues not raised on appeal." Clark v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 134 Idaho 527, 529 n. 1, 5 P.3d 988, 990 n. 1 (2000). Nevertheless, the magistrate's sua sponte modification of the December 14, 1998, support order raises two relevant issues which were not addressed by the Department in its initial appeal or briefing. Prior to oral argument the Court gave notice of its concerns and afforded the parties an opportunity to respond.

III. THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE DECEMBER 14, 1998 CHILD SUPPORT ORDER WAS VOID

The transcript from the October 2, 2001, hearing indicates that the magistrate declared the prior order entered December 14, 1998, by another magistrate to be void because the Housels were still married and not legally separated when the order was entered. For a judgment to be considered void, there generally must be some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter judgment, because the court lacks either personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction. Catledge v. Transp. Tire Co., Inc., 107 Idaho 602, 607, 691 P.2d 1217, 1222 (1984) (citing First Sec. Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 570 P.2d 276 (1977)). Additionally, a judgment is void when a "court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process." Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644, 647, 991 P.2d 369, 371 (Ct.App.1998).

The threshold question is whether the magistrate court had acquired personal jurisdiction over Richard when the default judgment of December 14, 1998, was entered. "Personal jurisdiction refers to the court's authority to adjudicate the claim as to the person." 20 Am Jur. 2d Courts § 72 (1995). "Jurisdiction to enter a default is based upon the fact of service and, ordinarily, it will not be defeated by a showing of mere ministerial defects in the service or return of service." Fisher v. Crest Corp., 112 Idaho 741, 744, 735 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Ct.App.1987). The record indicates that Richard was a resident of Idaho¹ on October 23, 1998, when he was served with both a summons and complaint. "[P]ersonal service of a defendant within the borders of the state of his residence is always sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of that state." Jonasson v. Gibson, 108 Idaho 459, 462, 700 P.2d 81, 84 (Ct.App.1985) (citation omitted). Richard was personally served—thus he was legally before the court when the default order was entered against him on December 14, 1998.

The next question is whether the magistrate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. "Subject matter jurisdiction is the right and abstract power of the tribunal to exercise power over cases of the kind and character of the one pending." Young Elec. Sign Co. v. State, 135 Idaho 804, 809, 25 P.3d 117, 122 (2001) (quoting Knight v. Dep't of Ins., 124 Idaho 645, 649, 862 P.2d 337, 341 (Ct.App.1993)). "Lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time." Fisher v. Crest Corp., 112 Idaho 741, 744, 735 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Ct.App.1987) (citation omitted). This Court has narrowly construed the ability to void a judgment, however, on the basis of a defect in a court's subject matter jurisdiction. As the Court explained in Gordon v. Gordon:

In the sound interest of finality, the concept of void judgment must be narrowly restricted. And it is.

By jurisdiction over the subject matter the cases mean that the court must have jurisdiction or power to deal with the class of cases in which it renders judgment.... In brief, then, except for the rare case where power is plainly usurped, if a court has the general power to adjudicate the issues in the class of suits to which the case belongs its interim orders and final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject to collateral attack, so far as jurisdiction over the subject matter is concerned.

118 Idaho 804, 807, 800 P.2d 1018, 1021 (1990) (quoting 7 Moore's Federal Practice and Procedure, ¶ 60.25[2], p. XX-XXX-XXX (1990)) (emphasis in original).

I.C. § 56-203A authorizes the Department to bring an action to establish, modify or enforce child support obligations in cases of abandonment or nonsupport. See discussion infra. By implication, courts have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain such actions. The magistrate had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the December 14,...