Lopez v. Universal Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 March 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 13–1478 GAG.
• Parties: Jose A. BARREIRO LOPEZ and Doris I. Palacios Rivas, Plaintiffs v. UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

98 F.Supp.3d 349

Jose A. BARREIRO LOPEZ and Doris I. Palacios Rivas, Plaintiffs

v.UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

Case No. 13–1478 GAG.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed March 13, 2015.

Jorge M. Izquierdo–San–Miguel, Izquierdo–San Miguel Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Grisselle Gonzalez–Negron, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ, District Judge.

Jose A. Barreiro Lopez (“Barreiro”) and Doris I. Palacios Rivas (collectively “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action seeking compensatory damages against Universal Insurance Company (“Defendant”) under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code (“Article 1802”), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. (Docket No. 1.) Plaintiffs, both residents of Bilbao, Spain, invoke the court's diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, seeking to hold Defendant liable for damages allegedly suffered when Barreiro lost the tip of the third finger on his left hand from an accident that occurred on Plaintiffs' leased property. Id.

Presently before the court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 33), which Plaintiff opposed. (Docket No. 39.) After careful consideration, the court DENIES Defendant's motion for summary judgment at Docket No. 33.

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue is genuine if ‘it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party’ at trial, ... and material if it ‘possess[es] the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law.’ ” Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.2006) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “The movant must aver an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at least one fact issue which is both genuine and material.” Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994). The nonmovant may establish a fact is genuinely in dispute by citing particular evidence in the record or showing that either the materials cited by the movant “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the court finds that some genuine factual issue remains, the resolution of which could affect the outcome of the case, then the court must deny summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of any and all reasonable inferences. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Moreover, at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. Summary judgment may be appropriate, however, if the non-moving party's case rests merely upon “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Forestier Fradera v. Mun. of Mayaguez, 440 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir.2003) ).

II. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

Mr. Anton B. Guernica (“lessor”), owner of the property leased to Plaintiffs, obtained an insurance policy for the leased property. (Docket Nos. 1 & 4.) During the month of December, 2008, Lessor and Plaintiffs signed the first lease agreement, leasing Guernica's property to Plaintiffs for a period of twelve (12) months. (See Docket No. 39–1.) A Second Lease Agreement was signed in January, 2009, leasing the property for an additional twelve (12) months. (See Docket No. 39–2.) In the Second Lease Agreement, the parties added an addendum, which was not included in the terms of the first agreement, to now make the lessee, i.e. Plaintiffs, responsible for the maintenance of the green areas and the pool. Id. at 3.

Thereafter, on November 14, 2009, Barreiro was pulling his boat out of the water on his leased property. (Docket No. 33 ¶ 13.) Barreiro was using an electric two-crane mechanism located on the premises and owned by the lessor. Id. Once he got the boat out of the water, he began lowering it to place it on a plank. Id. While lowering it, he noticed that the crane that was lowering the back part of the boat was working slower than the other crane. Id. He turned the power off on both cranes and proceeded to attempt to see what was causing the malfunction. Id. While he was leaning on the crane, he touched a steel braided cable, which resulted in the loss of his third finger distal phalange. Id. Barreiro was rushed to the hospital. (Docket No. 33–4.) Despite receiving medical attention, Barreiro lost the tip of his index finger.Id.

On April 9, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a complaint before the Commonwealth Court of First Instance. That action came to an end on September 10, 2012, after Plaintiffs moved for dismissal without prejudice. (Docket No. 1.) On June 18, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the instant action, seeking damages for their alleged injuries under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code. Id.

Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing that, pursuant to the Second Lease Agreement, it is not liable for Plaintiffs' damages because it was Plaintiffs' duty to provide maintenance to the crane. (Docket No. 32.) Likewise, Defendant argues that even if it was the lessor's responsibility, Plaintiffs had knowledge of the crane's deteriorated condition, and failed to notify the lessor, as established by the Second Lease Agreement. Id. at 9. For that reason, Defendant contends that Barreiro was contributorily negligent by failing to notify the lessor of the crane's deteriorated condition, and, as such, therefore he assumed the risk of his actions when he touched the crane and lost his finger. Id. In addition, Defendant contends that Barreiro's injuries were not foreseeable. Id. In response, Plaintiffs contend that the lessor, according to the lease agreement, was responsible for the maintenance to the crane, but failed to provide it. (Docket No. 38.) Consequently, Plaintiffs contend that the accident would have been avoided if lessor had provided the appropriate maintenance to the crane. Id.

III. Discussion

The crux of the parties' arguments lies on who had the duty provide maintenance to the crane that caused Barreiro's injuries. Both parties agree that the accident was caused by the crane's deteriorated condition due to lack of maintenance.

The substantive law of Puerto Rico governs the instant diversity action based on Puerto Rico torts and contract law. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code establishes the elements for a general torts claim. These are: “(1) evidence of physical or emotional injury, (2) a negligent or intentional act or omission (the breach of duty element), and (3) a sufficient causal nexus between the injury and defendant's act or omission (in other words, proximate cause).” Vázquez–Filippetti v. Banco Popular, 504 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir.2007) ; see also Torres v. KMart Corp., 233 F.Supp.2d 273, 277–78 (D.P.R.2002). The court need not examine the first element, as Plaintiffs' physical and emotional damages are not being challenged.

Puerto Rico's general tort statute recognizes comparative negligence principles. P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. Thus, “[i]n Puerto Rico, when a negligent act is caused by the actions of more than one person, each person is a joint tortfeasor and is liable in full to the plaintiff for the harm caused.” García Colón v. García Rinaldi, 340 F.Supp.2d 113, 126 (D.P.R.2004) (citations omitted). In the present case, Defendant argues that Barreiro was contributorily negligent in his actions that lead to his injuries. (See Docket No. 4.) As such, the discussion centers on elements two and three and their particulars.

A. Duty owed

As noted above, the parties primarily disagree as to who was responsible for the maintenance of the crane that caused Barreiro's accident. On one hand, Plaintiffs contend that the lessor defaulted by not providing maintenance to the crane. (Docket No. 38.) On the other hand, Defendant sustains Plaintiffs were responsible for the crane's maintenance. (Docket No. 32 at 9.)

In 1802 actions, when the second element, i.e., the breach of duty, is based on an omission, the defendant must have had a duty to act. Rodríguez–Quiñones v. Jiménez & Ruiz, S.E., 402 F.3d 251, 254–55 (1st Cir.2005) ; Muniz v. National Can Corp., 737 F.2d 145, 148 (1st Cir.1984). The Civil Code establishes that “a legal duty arises in one of three ways: (1) by a statute, regulation, ordinance, bylaw or contract; (2) as the result of a special relationship between the parties that has arisen through custom; or (3) as the result of a traditionally recognized duty of care particular to the situation.” De Jesus–Adorno v. Browning Ferris Indus., 160 F.3d 839, 842 (1st Cir.1998) ; see also Sanchez v. Seguros Triple S, Inc., 687 F.Supp.2d 6, 9 (D.P.R.2010).

In this case, the lessor's alleged duty to act emanates from the Second Lease Agreement. As such, to determine whether the lessor had a duty to act, the court turns to the language of the Second Lease Agreement that relates to repairs. Defendant emphasizes Paragraph six (6) of the Second Lease Lease Agreement, which states:

The LESSEE shall be responsible for the cost of any

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