Lorchitsky v. Gotham Folding Box Co.

• Citation: 230 N.Y. 8,128 N.E. 899
• Parties: LORCHITSKY v. GOTHAM FOLDING BOX CO. et al.
• Decision Date: 16 November 1920
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

230 N.Y. 8

128 N.E. 899

LORCHITSKY

v.GOTHAM FOLDING BOX CO. et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 16, 1920.

In the matter of the claim of Benjamin Lorchitsky for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act against the Gotham Folding Box Company, employer, and the United States Fidelity & Guarantee Company. From an order of the Appellate Division, unanimously affirming an award of the State Industrial Commission (179 N. Y. Supp. 932), the employer and Guarantee Company appeal.

Reversed, and new hearing granted.

See, also, 180 N. Y. Supp. 943.

Elkus, J., dissenting.Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

M. Linn Bruce and William Warren Dimmick, both of New York City, for appellants.

Charles D. Newton, Atty. Gen. (E. C. Aiken, of Albany, of counsel), for respondents.

HISCOCK, C. J.

[1] A substantial award was made to the claimant because of injuries received by him while in the employ of the appellant box company. It is insisted by appellants that, while these injuries arose in the course of his employment, they did not arise out of it. Since the award has been unanimously affirmed, we are confined in a consideration of this claim to the facts as found by the commission.

At the outset of our consideration we encounter a practice by the commission which we regard as unfortunate. This is the one of incorporating the opinion written by the commission as part of the findings. The statute requires the commission to make findings of fact, and this contemplates a more precise and decisive statement of the facts than is apt to be found in an opinion which discusses the general features of a claim, the conflicting contentions of the parties, and the nature of the evidence tending to support those claims, as is illustrated in the present proceeding. A discussion which is entirely appropriate as a means of reaching and justifying the conclusions of a trial court is apt to be very unsatisfactory as a statement of the final and material facts which are found to have been established.

The findings proper state that while claimant was in the regular course of his employment he received certain injuries, and that these injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. This latter statement is a mere conclusion, and an award ought not to rest upon so general and inadequate a basis. But, further than this, the findings then state that his injuries were sustained as set forth in the opinion of the commissioner writing in the case, ‘which is adopted herein as if set forth in full.’ We therefore are not only permitted, but required, to turn to this opinion in the endeavor to find out what did happen to the claimant and to ascertain how his injuries arose.

It appears therefrom that while claimant was engaged in his work an outsider offered to assist him, and notwithstanding claimant's rejection of his offer he attempted to do so. He bungled his work, and thereupon claimant applied an opprobrious epithet to him. This the stranger resented, by striking the claimant several blows. Some time thereafter, while claimant was engaged in his work he fell to the floor; his fall, so far as appears, not being caused by anything then connected with his employment. After these two occurrences-the assault and the fall-were over the claimant had the injuries complained of, and the commissioner writing the opinion proceeds to a discussion of the facts in the attempt to decide which caused the injuries. In the end, however, he does not decide this question, but simply reaches the conclusion that the injuries resulted from either one cause or the other, being of the opinion that it was unnecessary to determine which was the cause, because, where ‘there is distinct proof of an accident, section 21 of the Compensation Law raises the presumption that it arose out of and in the course of the employment.’

This view of the law was erroneous, and did not furnish any excuse for not determining which of the two causes resulted in claimant's injuries. It is not the law that mere proof of an accident, without other evidence, creates the presumption under section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must be some evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in the course of the employment. Matter of Eldridge v. Endicott, Johnson & Co., 228 N. Y. 21, 126 N. E. 254;Matter of Woodruff v. Howes Const. Co., 228 N. Y. 276, 127 N. E. 270;Matter of Hansen v. Turner Const. Co., 224 N. Y. 331, 120 N. E. 693;Matter of Belcher v. Carthage Machine Co., 224 N. Y. 326, 120 N. E. 735.

Therefore, treating this opinion as stating findings of fact, as we are required to do by the action of the commission, we have it that it has simply been found that the claimant's injuries resulted from one or the other of two causes, and it is too well settled to require citation of authorities that such alternative findings are insufficient to sustain the award which has been made, unless each of the two causes was of such a character as would authorize and justify it. That is not the case.

There is some difference of opinion amongst the members of the court whether the assault committed upon the claimant was so connected with and incidental to his employment that it would justify an award. In view of the fact that a new hearing must be had, we shall not attempt now finally to decide this question, but leave it to be decided hereafter, if it becomes necessary on the evidence as it may then be presented to us. We are all agreed, however, that if the injuries resulted from claimant's fall there were no findings which indicated that such fall was in any manner connected with or incidental to the employment. In fact, some of the statements contained in the opinion would seem to indicate that it was more liable to have resulted from a diseased condition of the claimant in no wise connected with or arising from his employment. Under these circumstances, if claimant's injuries resulted from the fall, as for the purpose of testing the award we must assume they did, the findings do not justify the conclusions that they arose out of his employment, and no award could properly be made therefor. Matter of Hansen v. Turner Const. Co., 224 N. Y. 332, 120 N. E. 693.

Therefore the order and award must be reversed, and a new hearing granted, with costs to abide the event.

ELKUS, J. (dissenting).

Benjamin Lorchitsky, the claimant, was employed by the Gotham Folding Box Company as a packer and general helper on March 11, 1918. On that day he was carrying bundles of cardboard from the sidewalk in front of his employer's premises, loading them on the elevator to be carried upstairs. While thus engaged, one Matrullo, a stranger, offered to assist in his work. The claimant refused his services, but Matrullo insisted upon carrying a bundle and while so doing, the cord fastening the same broke. Thereupon the claimant called Matrullo vile names, and Matrullo, without any further cause, struck the claimant several times. The claimant continued his work for nearly an hour, when, walking in the premises of his employer, carrying another bundle, he suddenly fell down and became unconscious. No one saw him fall, and whether he tripped on an obstacle or not is not known, and he is apparently unable to tell. It is conceded that the claimant is afflicted with paralysis of the right side of the face and upper and lower limbs.

The Industrial Commission has found that he received injuries consisting of a fractured jaw, and that such injuries were received while in the course of his employment. An opinion was written by one of the commissioners after hearing the testimony, and this opinion had been specifically made a part of the award, which has been made in favor of the claimant. The Industrial Commission unanimously found, as a fact, that the claimant was injured while working for his employer at his employer's plant, and that while engaged in the regular course of his employment he received the injuries stated, and that these injuries were accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. This determination has been unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division.

In enacting the Workmen's Compensation Law, the Legislature was exercising the police power of the sovereignty under the provisions of article 1 of the Constitution, and in so doing outlined a general scheme, the details of which, as applied to each individual state of facts, was necessarily left to the State Industrial Commission. The findings of the commission, when supported by a proper hearing, with the opportunity to produce facts, is final, as though the Legislature itself had passed the act specially to cover the facts presented. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205;Health Dept. of N. Y. v. Rector, etc., of Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833,27 L. R. A. 710, 45 Am. St. Rep. 579;Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, 24 Sup. Ct. 88, 48 L. Ed. 195;Burfenning v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 321, 16 Sup. Ct. 1018, 41 L. Ed. 175;Bates & Guld Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 24 Sup. Ct. 595, 48 L. Ed. 894.

Section 23 of the Compensation Law provides that the award or decision of the commission shall be final and conclusive, unless reversed or modified upon appeal. Upon such appeal, this court is bound by the presumptions imposed by the Compensation Law itself to the same extent as the commission. These presumptions are found in section 21 of the law and are as follows:

‘In any proceeding for...