Lord v. Poore

• Citation: 48 Del. 595,108 A.2d 366,9 Terry 595
• Parties: , 48 Del. 595 Edwin L. LORD, Defendant Below, Plaintiff in Error. v. Noble POORE, Plaintiff Below, Defendant in Error.
• Decision Date: 26 October 1954
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 366

108 A.2d 366

9 Terry 595, 48 Del. 595

Edwin L. LORD, Defendant Below, Plaintiff in Error. v. Noble POORE, Plaintiff Below, Defendant in Error.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Oct. 26, 1954.

Everett F. Warrington, Georgetown, for defendant below, plaintiff in error.

James L. Latchum, of Berl Potter & Anderson, Wilmington, for plaintiff below, defendant in error.

SOUTHERLAND, C. J., BRAMHALL, J., and SEITZ, Chancellor, sitting.

SOUTHERLAND, Chief Justice.

In the court below Noble Poore, the plaintiff, recovered judgment against Edwin L. Lord, the defendant, for injuries suffered in a motor vehicle collision. Lord appeals. The principal question is whether the evidence justified the court below in submitting to the jury the issue of 'last clear chance'. Other errors are also asserted.

The facts hereinafter set forth are undisputed, except where conflict is noted.

On an evening in August, 1952, Poore and Arthur Boyce, a friend, left Milford, Delaware, in Poore's automobile to take their dogs out for exercise. They stopped at a point on an unimproved road some distance from Milford. The road has a slight crown, and on either side is a low bank about eighteen inches high. Poore's car was parked on the right (or westerly) side of the road, headed southerly toward Milford. The lights were turned out and were not turned on at the time of the collision, or for some time before. This was a violation of the motor vehicle laws.

Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that on parking the car he left a clear space of twenty feet between his car and the left-hand side of the road, as required by law. Defendant's evidence was that the clear space was only eighteen feet.

At the place where the car was parked there were open fields on both sides of the road. The road was straight. It was a clear, bright, moonlight night. The moon was two days past the full and had risen about quarter past nine o'clock.

At about 11:45 p.m. Poore and Boyce called the dogs and made ready to go home. Poore went to the rear of his car to put one of the dogs into the trunk compartment.

Shortly before this time Lord's car had appeared on the road, headed north. It had stopped some distance away to the south. Its lights were then turned off. Soon thereafter Lord started his car again and proceeded north. In violation of the motor vehicle laws he was driving without lights. Nevertheless, Boyce, who was sitting in the front seat of Poore's car, could see Lord's car plainly as it approached. Lord continued on and crashed into the left front of Poore's car, forcing it back against Poore, who was behind it. Poore was knocked down and seriously injured, and his automobile was badly damaged. There was evidence that Lord was driving at a rate of forty to forty-five miles an hour, and was driving on the wrong side of the road--to his left. There was also evidence that Lord was looking to his side just before the collision and hence was not keeping a proper lookout for objects on the road ahead of him.

In submitting the case to the jury the court held that both parties were guilty of negligence in failing to have lights of their cars turned on, in violation of statutory requirements. The issue relating to the required clearance of twenty feet was left to the jury. The trial judge then proceeded to explain to the jury the doctrine of last clear chance. Holding that under the facts this was a jury question, he left it to the jury to determine whether Poore's negligence was succeeded by Lord's negligence by such an interval of time that Lord's negligence intervened to render Poore's negligence inoperative, that is, whether Poore's negligence was so remote as not to be a contributing cause of the accident.

The submission of this issue to the jury is assailed as error. Lord contend that Poore' negligence--parking without lights--continued up to the time of the accident and was, as a matter of law, a concurring or contributing cause thereof. Hence Lord says that as a matter of law the rule of last clear chance was inapplicable, and judgment should have been given in his favor.

The doctrine of last clear chance has been twice applied by our Supreme Court to cases of motor vehicle collisions involving cars parked illegally upon public roads. Island Express Co. v. Frederick, 5 W.W.Harr. 569, 35 Del. 569, 171 A. 181; Baker v. Reid, 5 Terry 112, 44 Del. 112, 57 A.2d 103. In the Island Express case, the Court observed that the doctrine was a special application of proximate cause, and said [35 Del. 569, 171 A. 186.]:

'* * * The doctrine, whether it be given the particular designation of 'last clear chance,' of 'discovered peril' or simply 'proximate cause,' should be applied where the negligence of the plaintiff is subsequent to that of the defendant, and the facts and circumstances of the plaintiff's negligence are such that the negligence of the defendant is so insulated, or detached from the real cause of the damage as to be what is a remote cause, while the negligence of the plaintiff is the supervening active cause.' ¹

The Court also said:

'* * * if the negligences were not concurrent, or mutual, but one succeeded the other by an appreciable interval of time, then a question of proximate cause, meaning effective legal cause in the sense of sole cause, arises for consideration and determination by the jury, under proper instructions, * * *.'

In the Baker case these rules were reaffirmed. In that case a car, parked on the highway in violation of law but with its rear lights lighted, was struck by another car and the driver of the first car was killed. There was evidence tending to show that the approaching driver saw the lights of the parked car in time to have avoided the accident. The Court held that the facts justified a charge on last clear chance. In that case the charge was manifestly based upon the language of the Island Express case, and was held to be correct.

Such a charge was given in this case. Lord's contention here is, as above stated, that no charge on last clear chance was justified. In particular he says that there was no evidence that any interval of time intervened between Poore's negligence and Lord's, and the jury could not reasonably make such a finding.

In one sense it is true that plaintiff's negligence continued to the time of the accident. This, indeed, is the basis for invoking the doctrine of last clear chance. The question always is, whose negligence, for the purpose of applying the doctrine, is to be regarded as the proximate cause of the accident? The rule of 'successive negligence' is merely a way of stating the rule of proximate cause.

It may be conceded that the concept of proximate and remote cause, which is basic in our decisions, and in those of many other courts, often presents difficulty in application and is somewhat less than satisfactory. See the review of the Virginia cases, and the general discussion of the problem, in 40 Virginia Law Review, No. 5, 637 ff.

The modern view is that the doctrine of last clear chance is simply an exception to the rule that contributory negligence bars recovery. It is applied, first, to the case of a plaintiff who has negligently placed himself in a position of helpless peril, that is, a position from which he is unable physically to extricate himself just before the accident. In such a case the defendant is liable if either he saw the plaintiff or by the exercise of reasonable care could have seen him. It is applied, second, to the case of a negligently inattentive plaintiff, that is, a plaintiff who has negligently placed himself in a dangerous position, but who is able, at any time before the accident, to extricate himself from his position of peril. But in the latter case it must appear that the defendant actually discovered the plaintiff's position, knew of the plaintiff's situation and had reason to realize that plaintiff was inattentive. See Re-Statement of the Law of Torts, Negligence, § 479 and § 480.

We do not suggest that the concept of proximate and remote cause should be abandoned in this State. It has twice been approved by our Supreme Court and appears to represent the prevailing law. Nevertheless, the weight of authority in those states which apply the concept of proximate and remote cause accepts the distinction made between a plaintiff in a position of helpless peril and a plaintiff negligently inattentive who, knowing himself in a position of peril, could have extricated himself therefrom at any time before the accident. In the latter case, plaintiff's negligence is held not to be remote but concurrent, and recovery is denied, unless ...