Lorencz v. Ford Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 22 January 1991 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. 118349,118361 |
| Citation | 187 Mich.App. 63,466 N.W.2d 346 |
| Parties | Julius J. LORENCZ and Kathy Lorencz, Individually and as Next Friend of Nicholas A. Lorencz, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. Frances GROSS and Laverne Gross, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Charles N. Simkins, Northville, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. by Ernest R. Bazzana, Donald H. Dawson, Jr., and Kelli C. Claes, Detroit and Gary L. Hayden, Dearborn for defendant-appellant.
Before GRIFFIN, P.J., and SAWYER and BRENNAN, JJ.
In these consolidated cases, defendant Ford Motor Company appeals by leave granted orders of the Wayne Circuit Court denying its motions for change of venue improperly laid. We reverse, and hold that in an action based on tort the county in which all or part of the plaintiff's injuries or damages occurred is first in priority when determining proper venue.
These are product liability actions against Ford Motor Company in which plaintiffs seek damages as a result of a one-car accident in Gratiot County on June 6, 1987. Plaintiffs filed suit in Wayne County, claiming venue on the ground that the vehicle had been defectively designed, manufactured, and assembled at Ford's Wayne County facilities. In both cases, defendant filed motions for change of venue improperly laid, arguing that venue is properly in Gratiot County because plaintiffs' injuries arose there and because defendant conducts business there.
At a hearing on defendant's motion in Lorencz, defendant admitted that the vehicle had been designed, manufactured, and assembled in Wayne County. The lower court denied defendant's motions on the ground that plaintiffs' cause of action "arose in part" in Wayne County. M.C.L. Sec. 600.1629(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1629(1)(a).
On appeal, defendant contends that the court below erred in denying its motions for change of venue. We agree.
In 1985 and 1986, the Legislature debated a series of bills which ultimately became the tort reform act, 1986 P.A. 178. One of the bills concerned a change in the statutory grounds and priorities for venue in tort actions. The text of the statute at issue is as follows:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), in an action based on tort, the following provisions apply:
(a) A county in which all or part of the cause of action arose and in which either of the following apply is a proper county in which to commence and try the action:
(i) The defendant resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county.
(ii) The registered office of a defendant corporation is located in that county.
(b) If no county satisfies the criteria under subdivision (a), a county in which all or part of the cause of action arose and in which either of the following apply is a proper county in which to commence and try the action:
(i) The plaintiff resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county.
(ii) The registered office of a plaintiff corporation is located in that county.
(c) If no county satisfies the criteria under subdivision (a) or (b), a county in which both of the following apply is a proper county in which to commence and try the action:
(i) The plaintiff resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county, or the registered office of a defendant corporation is located in that county.
(ii) The defendant resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county, or the registered office of a defendant corporation is located in that county.
(d) If no county satisfies the criteria under subdivision (a), (b), or (c), a county which satisfies the criteria under section 1621 or 1627 is a proper county in which to commence and try an action. [M.C.L. Sec. 600.1629; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1629.]
Plaintiffs argue that Wayne County is a county in which all or part of their cause of action arose because Wayne County is where the allegedly defective vehicle was designed, manufactured, and assembled. Plaintiffs assert that negligence or a product defect is a part of the cause of action and that either theory is supported by actions which occurred at least in part in Wayne County.
Defendant argues that the statutory phrase "a county in which all or part of the cause of action arose" refers to the county or counties in which all or part of the plaintiffs' injuries or damages occurred. Defendant relies upon extensive legislative history in support of its position and upon case law construing the phrase in prior statutes.
The analysis of the venue provision at issue prepared by the House Legislative Analysis Section is supportive of defendant's construction. The bill analysis identifies as the "apparent problem" the practice of many lawyers of forum shopping by filing lawsuits in Wayne County for accidents which occur in other counties. A suit filed in Wayne County for a Grand Traverse County accident was cited as an abuse of the former venue statute:
The Apparent Problem:
During discussions of the high cost and limited availability of liability insurance, some people alleged that lawyers for plaintiffs go to great lengths to get cases tried in certain venues where juries are more sympathetic or more likely to grant generous awards in personal injury cases. Theoretically, it is beneficial to plaintiffs to bring actions in the metropolitan tri-county area (Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties) and especially in Wayne County. In one standard story, a suit arising from an injury that occurred in Grand Traverse County, where all the parties to the case were from, was filed in Wayne County because the defendant "did business" there (by virtue of the fact that he did business all over the state). The act governing the determination of venue says "the county in which a defendant resides, or has a place of business, or conducts business, ... is a proper county in which to commence and try an action." Some suggest that, for tort actions at least, a new order of priority for the determination of venue should be enacted in order to address the problem of "forum shopping." [House Legislative Analysis, HB 5150, November 19, 1985.]
The House Legislative Analysis Section also identified the following arguments in support of the venue reform bill:
Arguments:
For:
The bill would have lawsuits filed on the basis of where the injuries occurred, or where defendants live or work, or where plaintiffs live or work, and not on the basis of which county has juries that are most sympathetic to plaintiffs or that produce the largest awards. In addition to spelling out the proper priority of venue, the bill would assess costs against those who lose arguments over change of venue motions unless the decision is made for the convenience of the parties or to assure a fair trial. This provision would deter questionable venue motions. [House Legislative Analysis, HB 5150, November 19, 1985.]
Additional legislative history can be found in the form of the following analysis of the tort reform package prepared by the House Special Committee on Liability Insurance:
Tort Reform Proposals
7. Problem: Because of reports of very large jury verdicts, numerous attorneys apparently seek to file claims which have only a marginal relationship to Wayne County in that county in an effort to get a potentially large jury verdict.
Response: (a) Make the costs of venue motions taxable against the losing party except when the motion for a change of venue is made for the convenience of the parties or on the court's own motion.
(b) Modify the venue statute to establish proper venue in tort claims on a priority basis with the following order of priority: where the injury occurred; where the defendant resides; where the plaintiff resides. [October 31, 1985, letter by Representative Lewis N. Dodak, Chairman of the House Special Committee on Liability Insurance, to House Speaker Gary M. Owen.]
The primary goal of judicial construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. People v. Hawkins, 181 Mich.App. 393, 396, 448 N.W.2d 858 (1989). In construing statutes, we should be cognizant of the objectives the Legislature sought to achieve by enacting the statute.
Almost one hundred years ago, the Michigan Supreme Court in Davis v. Frankenlust Twp., 118 Mich. 494, 76 N.W. 1045 (1898), first construed a venue statute which required an action to be brought "in the county where the cause of action arises." In Davis, the plaintiff's farm located in Saginaw County was flooded by the defendant's tortious conduct of discharging excess water in neighboring Bay County. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that venue was proper in the county in which the tortious act occurred (Bay County) and held that, under the former venue statute, venue was proper only in the county in which the damages occurred (Saginaw County):
What is the fact in this case which gives complainant a right to maintain this proceeding, if he has such a right? It is manifestly a trespass to his lands by causing to come upon them water in unusual quantities, to his injury. That trespass does not occur until the water reaches his land. It is true, some of the agencies which cause this result are set in motion some distance away from his land, and in the adjoining county. These acts would have constituted no cause of complaint had they not resulted in a trespass, and the act which constituted the trespass was the arrival and the spreading of the water upon the land of complainant in unusual quantities. The complainant resides in Saginaw County. The land injured is in that county. The trespass occurs upon the land in that county, and we think the chancery court of that county has jurisdiction to dispose of the...
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