Lorentz v. HJ & Edwards Enterprises, LLC

• Decision Date: 28 January 2020
• Docket Number: DBDCV196033239S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Rita Lorentz v. HJ & Edwards Enterprises, LLC dba Sky Zone

Rita Lorentz v. HJ & Edwards Enterprises, LLC dba Sky Zone

No. DBDCV196033239S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Danbury, Danbury

January 28, 2020

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): D’Andrea, Robert A., J.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

D’ANDREA, Robert A., J.

The defendant HJ & Edwards Enterprises, LLC d/b/a Sky Zone ("Sky Zone") filed a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration dated December 20, 2019, which was marked "take papers," for the January 6, 2020 short calendar. The plaintiff Rita Lorentz ("plaintiff") did not file an objection to the defendant’s motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. The court reviewed the defendant’s motion, exhibits, applicable case law, and statutory provision, and found that the defendant had met its burden of proof, and, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-409 arbitration was required. This court then issued order #104.01 granting the defendant’s motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. The plaintiff, thereafter, filed a motion to reargue, dated January 10, 2020, with an exhibit. In order to allow all parties an opportunity to present their respective positions, the court granted the motion to reargue, and will revisit the merits of the defendant’s motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Rita Lorentz ("plaintiff") voluntarily signed a participation agreement ("agreement"), on July 26, 2017 at 1:52 p.m. with the defendant HJ & Edward Enterprises, LLC d/b/a Sky Zone a/k/a Sky Zone Bethel ("defendant"), and alleges that on or about July 26, 2017, a short time after signing the agreement, she was using a restroom, when she fell to the ground after slipping on water near the sink. The agreement provides that any disputes regarding the agreement are to be determined by binding arbitration before an arbitrator to be administered by JAMS pursuant to its comprehensive arbitration rules and procedures. The agreement provides in pertinent part: "I understand that by agreeing to arbitrate any dispute as set forth in this section, I am waiving my right ... to maintain a lawsuit against SZ and the other Releasees for any and all claims covered by this Agreement. By agreeing to arbitrate, I understand that I will NOT have the right to have my claim determined by a jury ... Reciprocally, SZ and the other Releasees waive their right to maintain a lawsuit against me ... for any and all claims covered by this Agreement, and they will not have the right to have their claim(s) determined by a jury. Any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to my ... use of the sky zone premises and/or its equipment ... shall be ... be determined by arbitration ..."

The plaintiff filed no objection or memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant’s motion, but then decided to file a motion to reargue, in an attempt to prevail upon this court that the granting of the defendant’s motion to stay proceedings compel arbitration was made in error.

DEFENDANT’S POSITION

The defendant, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-409, presented the plaintiff with the agreement on July 26, 2017, which she voluntarily signed at 1:52 p.m., which contains a provision compelling arbitration in this matter. The plaintiff claims that the defendant "owned and/or operated and had control over" a trampoline park known as Sky Zone Bethel, located at 13 Francis J Clarke Circle, Bethel, Connecticut, and alleges that on or about July 26, 2017, she was a patron at the subject premises, and using a restroom when she was caused to allegedly fall to the ground after slipping on water near the sink, and claims that the defendant was negligent in various ways. The agreement provides that any disputes regarding the agreement are to be determined by binding arbitration before an arbitrator. The Agreement provides in pertinent part: "I understand that by agreeing to arbitrate any dispute as set forth in this section, I am waiving my right ... to maintain a lawsuit against SZ and the other Releasees for any and all claims covered by this Agreement. By agreeing to arbitrate, I understand that I will NOT have the right to have my claim determined by a jury ... Reciprocally, SZ and the other Releasees waive their right to maintain a lawsuit against me ... for any and all claims covered by this Agreement, and they will not have the right to have their claim(s) determined by a jury. ANY DISPUTE, CLAIM OR CONTROVERSY ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO MY ... ACCESS TO AND/OR USE OF THE SKY ZONE PREMISES AND/OR ITS EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE SCOPE OR APPLICABILITY OF THIS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE, SHALL BE ... DETERMINED BY ARBITRATION ... THIS CLAUSE SHALL NOT PRECLUDE PARTIES FROM SEEKING PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN AID OF ARBITRATION FROM A COURT OF APPROPRIATE JURISDICTION. This Agreement shall be governed by, construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Connecticut, without regard to choice of law principles." (Emphasis [capitals] in the agreement.) No provision of the agreement permits this claims to be brought before this court. The defendant is willing and ready to proceed with binding arbitration. "Connecticut has adopted a clear public policy in favor of arbitrating disputes." Nussbaum v. Kimberly Timbers, Ltd., 271 Conn. 65, 71, 856 A.2d 364 (2004). There exists a "strong commitment to the arbitration of disputes, especially when the parties have voluntarily agreed to arbitration ..." Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183, 197, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996). "Our courts have wholeheartedly endorsed arbitration as an effective alternative method of settling disputes intended to avoid the formalities, delay, expense and vexation of ordinary litigation ... Courts favor arbitration as a means of settling differences." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Metropolitan District Commission v. American Federation of State, City & Municipal Employees, Council 4, Local 184, 237 Conn. 114, 118, 636 A.2d 825 (1996). General Statutes § 52-409 provides, in pertinent part: "If any action for legal or equitable relief or other proceeding is brought by any party to a written agreement to arbitrate, the court in which the action or proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied that any issue involved in the action or proceeding is referable to arbitration under the agreement, shall, on motion of any party to the arbitration agreement, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration has been had in compliance with the agreement, provided the person making application for the stay shall be ready and willing to proceed with the arbitration."

The defendant claims that the court "must stay any action as to which the applicant for a stay can establish the following facts: (1) that both the applicant and the plaintiff are parties to a written arbitration agreement; (2) that one or more issues referable to arbitration under that agreement are involved in the action sought to be stayed; and (3) that the applicant is ready and willing to proceed to arbitration on such arbitrable issues." Sordoni Skanska Construction Co., Inc. v. Charles Beckman Swanson Architects, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X02-CV-00-161286 (May 11, 2001, Sheldon, J.) (Conn.L.Rptr. 189). The plaintiff’s claims are subject to the arbitration because they meet all three requirements for the court to stay an action pursuant to § 52-409, as i) all parties to the instant lawsuit are parties to the written arbitration agreement; ii) one or more issues referable to arbitration under that agreement are involved in the action sought to be stayed; iii) the defendant is ready and willing to proceed to arbitration. "In looking at the first prong of § 52-409, whether the applicant and plaintiff are parties to a written arbitration agreement, the court looks to the Agreement itself." Danbury Sports, LLC v. Harry N. Pharr/Architect & Planner, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No.CV11-6006358-S (Feb. 14, 2012, Ozalis, J.). As to the first prong there is no dispute that all parties to the lawsuit are parties to the agreement, as signed by the plaintiff, including her electronic signature, date of birth, e-mail address, and phone number.

As to the second prong "Connecticut has adopted a clear public policy in favor of arbitrating disputes." Nussbaum v. Kimberly Timbers, Ltd., 271 Conn. 65, 71, 856 A.2d 364 (2004). Connecticut courts have employed the "positive assurance" test for arbitrability. Under this test, "judicial inquiry ... must be strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance ... An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) White v. Kampner, 229 Conn. 465 473, 641 A.2d 1381 (1994). "Whether the parties intended to arbitrate the issue of arbitrability may be determined from an express provision to that effect or from the use of broad terms." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Scinto v. Sosin, 51 Conn.App. 222, 227-28, 721 A.2d 552 (1998). Here the arbitration clause clearly requires arbitration of any disputes between the parties arising out of the agreement or the breach thereof. The plaintiff’s complaint sounds in negligence against the defendant arising out of the use of the Sky Zone Bethel facility, and since the claims asserted by the plaintiff clearly do arise out of and relate to the agreement, such...