Louisville & N. R. Co v. Meredith
| Decision Date | 04 December 1941 |
| Docket Number | No. 29014.,29014. |
| Citation | 18 S.E.2d 51 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. MEREDITH et al. |
Rehearing Denied Dec. 19, 1941.
Syllabus by the Court.
Under the facts of this case legal service was perfected on the defendant railroad corporation which did business in this State by serving its soliciting freight agent who had an office in the county in which the present suit was filed and service perfected, although the defendant did no business in this county other than that of the soliciting of freight
Error from City Court of Macon; Cecil A. Baldwin, Judge.
Suit by D. F. Meredith, as next friend and grandfather of Bettie Jo Reid, an infant, against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by Bettie Jo Reid as result of the alleged negligence of the defendant while Bettie Jo Reid was a passenger on a train of the defendant. To review an adverse judgment, the defendant brings error. Judgment affirmed.
D. F. Meredith as next friend and grandfather of Bettie Jo Reid, an infant of three years, brought suit against the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company in the city court of Macon, Bibb County, Georgia, to recover damages on account of certain personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the child as the result of the negligence of the defendant railroad company. It was alleged in the petition that the defendant is a railroad corporation chartered and organized under the laws of Kentucky and doing business in the State of Georgia, that it has an agent, office and place of business in Bibb County, Georgia and is subject to the jurisdiction of the city court of Macon. It was further alleged in the petition that the defendant railroad is doing business in Bibb County and is operating therein, together with the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, as joint lessees, the Georgia Railroad. It was alleged in the petition that this infant was a passenger of the defendant at the time she was injured, that on March 2, 1940, she was traveling with her grandmother who was also a passenger of the defendant and who had purchased at Pensacola, Florida, a ticket from the defendant to Macon, Georgia, that the infant and her grandmother had traveled on the passenger train of the defendant to Floma-ton, Alabama, where they, in order to continue their journey to Macon, Georgia, had to change from the Pensacola train to another train operated by the defendant going from Flomaton to Montgomery, Alabama, that this change of trains had to be made around midnight and at a time when it was raining and the steps of the coach on the train in which they had been riding were wet and slippery, and that as they were making this change of trains the infant was, by reason of the negligence of the defendant, injured.
The sheriff of Bibb County, through his deputy, served this suit upon the commercial agent of the defendant in that county as an officer of the defendant in charge of its business in that county. The plaintiff filed an amendment to the petition and alleged that the defendant operates under its own name a railroad line in Georgia, running from Marietta in Cobb County to Blue Ridge in Fannin County and from there into Tennessee and North Carolina. It was further alleged in this amendment that the infant Bettie Jo Reid was abandoned by her parents, James Reid and his wife of Jacksonville, Florida, and turned over to B. F. Meredith and his wife, her grandparents, when she was six months old, and that the parents of Bettie Jo Reid have not supported the child during this time, and she has been in the exclusive custody and control of B. F. Meredith and his wife and has lived in the City of Macon with them for three years before the filing of this suit. It was further alleged in the amendment that Bettie Jo Reid is a resident of Bibb County, Georgia. To the return of service of the sheriff by his deputy the defendant filed a traverse, making the sheriff and the deputy parties, and alleging that the person served by the deputy sheriff was engaged in soliciting business only, and maintained no office of the defendant company, and that the defendant company is not doing business in Bibb County, Georgia within the purview of the laws of Georgia so as to entitle it to be sued in that county.
The defendant, without waiving its traverse, but subject thereto and appearing solely for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction, filed its plea in which it alleged that the city court of Macon had no jurisdiction of the case, that the case should be dismissed because it appears that it is based on a transitory cause of action between two nonresidents arising out of business in no way related to the business that the defendant railroad company was doing in this State, that it appears that the plaintiff was a nonresident of Georgia and was at the time of filing suit, and was a resident of Jacksonville, Florida, that it appears that the defendant railroad company is a nonresident corporation organized under the laws of Kentucky, that the alleged cause of action arose in Flomaton, Alabama, and did not arise out of any of the business transacted in the State of Georgia, and bears no relation to business transacted in Georgia, that the city court of Macon has no jurisdiction of the defendant, but that if any court has jurisdiction the circuit court embracing Flomaton, Alabama, or some court of concurrent jurisdiction has jurisdiction of the cause of action, and that this defendant has not voluntarily consented to be sued in this case, and the action grows out of no business transacted by the defendant in this State, and for these reasons the city court of Macon is without jurisdiction and the action should be dismissed.
The defendant demurred to the plaintiff's petition on the ground that no cause of action is alleged and because the city court of Macon has no jurisdiction after it appears that the plaintiff is a nonresident and this defendant is a corporation of the State of Kentucky and it appears that this is a transitory cause of action between two nonresidents arising out of business in no way related to business that this defendant was doing in Georgia, and that therefore it appears upon the face of the petition that the court is without jurisdiction as to the defendant, and is therefore without jurisdiction to hear and determine this action. The defendant also demurred specially to various paragraphs of the petition.
On February 18, 1941, the issue made by the traverse of the defendant to the return of service came on to be heard upon the law and facts as stipulated between the plaintiff and the defendant before the court without the intervention of a jury, and the court found against the defendant and dismissed the traverse.
On the same day the defendant moved orally to dismiss the plaintiff's petition on the ground that it appeared that the court did not have jurisdiction, which oral motion to dismiss was denied.
On February 20, 1941, upon motion of the plaintiff the plea to the jurisdiction was stricken as being insufficient in law.
On February 20, 1941, the demurrers came on for a hearing and the court passed this order: "The plaintiff having amended her petition, and the defendant renewing this demurrer and continuing to urge it against the petition as amended, it is ordered and adjudged that the same be and is hereby overruled on each of the grounds of general and special demurrer."
Within the time required by law the defendant excepted to the judgment dismissing the traverse, to the order of the court overruling its motion to dismiss the plaintiff's case and ordering the case to proceed to trial, to the sustaining of the plaintiff's motion to strike its plea to the jurisdiction and striking the plea, and to the order of the court overruling its demurrers general and special to the plaintiff's petition, by writ of error to the Court of Appeals.
Harris, Harris, Russell & Weaver, of Macon, for plaintiff in error.
T. A. Jacobs, Jr., and J. J. Gautier, both of Macon, for defendant in error.
STEPHENS, Presiding Judge (after stating the foregoing facts).
The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company is a foreign corporation operating lines of railroads in Georgia. It has an office and place of business in Bibb County, but it does not have any railroad tracks in that county. It does have an agent in Bibb County, and this agent was served with the petition and process. The plaintiff is a little girl three years of age, who it is alleged has been abandoned by her parents and is in the custody and care of her grandparents who are residents of Bibb County, Georgia. This suit is instituted by the grandfather of the plaintiff, as next friend.
It is alleged that the plaintiff was injured through the negligence of the defendant in the operation of one of its trains in Alabama when the plaintiff and her grandmother undertook to change trains at Flomaton, Alabama by disembarking from one of the defendant's trains for the purpose of boarding another of its trains so as to continue their journey to Macon, Georgia. It is alleged that the plaintiff was traveling with her grandmother who had purchased from the defendant a ticket from Pensacola, Florida to Macon, Georgia. This journey on the defendant's trains and over its lines necessitated the plaintiff and her grandmother changing trains at Flomaton, Alabama.
It is contended by the defendant that the city court of Macon in Bibb County, Georgia, had no jurisdiction of this cause of action. It is contended that because it did not own any line of railroad in Bibb County and that because the service of the petition was upon an agent of the defendant in Bibb County who maintained an office there but who was only a soliciting freight agent, the city court of Macon did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit against it by the plaintiff on account of the alleged negligence of the defendant in...
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