Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Allen

• Citation: 65 So. 8,67 Fla. 257
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. ALLEN.
• Decision Date: 27 March 1914
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

65 So. 8

67 Fla. 257

LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. ALLEN.

Florida Supreme Court

March 27, 1914

Error to Court of Record, Escambia County; Kirke Monroe, Judge.

Action by Mallory Johnson Allen against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, a corporation. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The general and well-established rule is that a release or discharge of one or more joint tort-feasors, executed in satisfaction of the tort, is a discharge of them all, on the ground that the party injured can have but one satisfaction for his injury. Each is considered as sanctioning all the acts of the others, thereby making them his own, and each is liable for the whole damage as if it had been occasioned by himself alone; hence the law considers that he who pays for the injury has paid for all, and there is nothing left for which the other tort-feasors can be liable.

A release, executed to one tort-feasor, in satisfaction of the tort, being taken most strongly against the releasor, as a general rule, is conclusive evidence that he has been satisfied for the wrong; and after satisfaction, although it moved from only one of the tort-feasors, no foundation remains for an action against any one. A sufficient atonement having been made for the trespass, the whole matter is at an end. It is as though the wrong had never been done.

Where although concert is lacking, the separate and independent acts of negligence of several combine to produce directly a single injury, each is responsible for the entire result even though his act or negligence alone might not have caused it. To make tort-feasors liable jointly there must be some sort of community in the wrongdoing, and the injury must be in some way due to their joint work, but it is not necessary that they be acting together or in concert if their concurring negligence occasions injury.

The rule under which parties become jointly liable as tort-feasors extends beyond acts or omissions which are designedly co-operative, and beyond any relation between the wrongdoers. If their acts of negligence, however separate or distinct in themselves, are concurrent in producing the injury, their liability is joint as well as several. Each becomes liable because of his neglect of duty, and they are jointly liable for the single injury inflicted because the acts or omissions of both have contributed to it.

It is negligence on the part of an electric street railway company in the construction and establishment of its road, to so place one of its trolley wires over the track of a steam railway company as not to afford sufficient space for the latter's trains to easily and conveniently pass, without risk of danger and injury to its servants and employés. It is negligence on the part of a steam railway company to permit an electric street car company to so construct and maintain over the track of the steam railway company a trolley wire that it will endanger the lives of its servants and employés. In the event of an injury to an employé of the steam railway company, while in the discharge of his duty, occasioned by his coming in contact with such wire, the electric company and the steam railway company are jointly liable as tort-feasors for such injury.

The mere fact that a plaintiff might not be able to sue all the tort-feasors in the same forum or join them in the same action would not of itself change the liability of such tort-feasors or prevent them from being jointly liable.

The acceptance of a sum of money from one joint tort-feasor in satisfaction of a claim for damages, and the execution of a release and discharge under seal of such joint tort-feasor from all damages by reason of the injuries inflicted reciting that such sum of money was received 'in full compromise, payment, discharge, accord, and satisfaction' for or on account of such injuries, operates as a release of the other joint tort-feasor, even though it is stipulated therein that the release of such tort-feasor shall not operate so as to discharge the other, and the right to sue the other joint tort-feasor is expressly reserved. Such an instrument will be held to be a release and not a covenant not to sue.

COUNSEL Blount & Blount & Carter, of Pensacola, for plaintiff in error.

J. P. Stokes and R. P. Reese, both of Pensacola, for defendant in error.

OPINION

SHACKLEFORD C.J.

Mallory Johnson Allen brought an action at law against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, a corporation, to recover damages for personal injuries received by him through the alleged negligence of the defendant. The declaration contains two counts, which, omitting the formal parts, are as follows:

'The plaintiff, Mallory Johnson Allen, by his attorneys, sues the defendant, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Kentucky, for that, to wit:

'That prior to the institution of this suit, defendant was a common carrier by railroad engaged in commerce between the state of Florida and the state of Alabama, and between the state of Florida and other states, and, as such common carrier, defendant was possessed of, owned, and operated a line of steam railway, running from the city of Pensacola, in Escambia county, Fla., to the village or town of Flomaton in Escambia county, Ala., and to other points in the state of Alabama and to points in other states: and other lines of tracks in and about the said city of Pensacola, used and operated in connection with its lines mentioned herein. That a part of defendant's said line of steam railway ran over and along a certain public street in said city of Pensacola, known and called Alcaniz street, crossing and intersecting another public street in said city, known and called Gregory street. That the Pensacola Electric Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Maine, was possessed of, owned, and operated a line of electric street railway running over and along said Gregory street, crossing and intersecting said Alcaniz street, and crossing the line of steam railway of defendant herein mentioned. That, for the purpose of providing the electric current necessary to propel its cars, said Pensacola Electric Company provided and placed its trolley wire over and above its line of railway, over and along said Gregory street and across said Alcaniz street, crossing defendant's line of steam railway, aforesaid, at right angles. That said trolley wire was hung so low, and so near the surface of said streets where said streets intersected, that employés of defendant upon the tops of cars drawn by defendant's locomotives, over and along said Alcaniz street, under said trolley wire, could not pass under said trolley wire with safety to themselves. That, prior to the institution of this suit, plaintiff was employed by defendant in the capacity of switchman, and, as defendant's said employé, it was plaintiff's duty to be upon the top of cars, drawn by defendant's locomotives, over and along Alcaniz street, over and across Gregory street, under the trolley wire of the Pensacola Electric Company, as aforesaid. That, as defendant's employé, it was defendant's duty to plaintiff to furnish plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work and to perform his duty to defendant. That, notwithstanding its duty to plaintiff, defendant carelessly and negligently allowed said Pensacola Electric Company to place and install its said trolley wire so near the surface of said streets, where said streets intersected, that employés of defendant, upon the tops of cars drawn by defendant's locomotives, over and along said Alcaniz street, under said trolley wire, could not pass under said trolley wire with safety to themselves. That, prior to the institution of this suit, plaintiff was employed by defendant in the capacity of switchman, and, as defendant's said employé, it was plaintiff's duty to be upon the top of cars, drawn by defendant's locomotives, over and along Alcaniz street, over and across Gregory street, under the trolley wire of the Pensacola Electric Company, as aforesaid. That, as defendant's employé, it was defendant's duty to plaintiff to furnish plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work and to perform his duty to defendant. That, notwithstanding its duty to plaintiff, defendant carelessly and negligently allowed said Pensacola Electric Company to place and install its said trolley wire so near the surface of said Alcaniz street where said street intersected said Gregory street as to endanger the life and safety of plaintiff when upon the top of cars drawn by defendant's locomotives, in the discharge of his duty to defendant, and defendant carelessly and negligently allowed said trolley wire to be and to remain so low as to endanger the life and safety of plaintiff when upon the top of cars drawn by defendant's locomotives, in the discharge of his duty to defendant. That, prior to the institution of this suit, to wit, September 27, A. D. 1912, after dark, plaintiff in the discharge of his duty to defendant, as switchman, aforesaid, was employed by defendant in commerce between the state of Florida and the state of Alabama, and between the state of Florida and other states, and, while so engaged, plaintiff was upon a car, drawn by defendant's locomotive, over and along said Alcaniz street, and, by reason of defendant's negligence in failing to provide plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work and to perform his duty to defendant, plaintiff was forcibly and violently thrown against the trolley wire of the Pensacola Electric Company, placed and installed so near the surface of said Alcaniz street as to be dangerous to the life and safety of plaintiff

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