Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ragan

Decision Date05 March 1938
Citation113 S.W.2d 743
PartiesLOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. RAGAN.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Appeal from Chancery Court, Davidson County; R. B. C. Howell, Chancellor.

Suit by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company against Lee A. Ragan to enjoin the prosecution of a suit brought against it by the defendant in another state. From a decree overruling the defendant's demurrer to the bill, the defendant appeals.

Decree affirmed.

Jeff McCarn, of Nashville, for appellant Ragan.

A. W. Stockell, of Nashville, for appellee Louisville & N. R. Co.

GREEN, Chief Justice.

This bill was filed by the complainant to enjoin the prosecution of a suit brought against it by the defendant in the circuit court at St. Louis, Mo. From the decree overruling his demurrer to the bill, the defendant was permitted an appeal to this court.

The bill shows that defendant Ragan was formerly in the employment of Nashville Terminals, an organization operated jointly by complainant Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company and the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway. He worked at Radnor Yards in Nashville in Davidson county, Tenn. Defendant is now and has been for many years a resident himself of Nashville, Tenn.

It appears from the bill that in 1934 the defendant instituted a suit against the two railroad companies at Nashville to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him while in the employ of Nashville Terminals. It further appears that defendant instituted another suit against the two railroad companies at Nashville to recover for alleged underpayment of wages during the period he was employed at Nashville Terminals. Both these suits were dismissed on grounds not involving their merits.

On November 20, 1936, defendant instituted a third suit against the complainant Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company in the circuit court at St. Louis, Mo., to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained in the same accident while in the employ of Nashville Terminals. This suit, the bill avers, was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.

It is set out in the bill that all the witnesses to the alleged accident upon which the suit at St. Louis is based live at Nashville. That certain physicians whose testimony will be required as to the nature and origin of plaintiff's injuries or disabilities live in Nashville. That if required to try this suit at St. Louis, the complainant herein will be under the necessity of transporting these witnesses to St. Louis and paying their expenses while there. That the witnesses are for the most part engaged in the employ of the complainant and their absence will disrupt its service. That the transportation of the doctors to St. Louis will involve not only their expenses, but reasonable professional compensation for their absence from their business, and that the trial of the case at St. Louis will be generally oppressive upon the complainant.

The bill likewise discloses that complainant Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company is a carrier engaged in interstate commerce, its lines running through several states. That its lines do not run into the state of Missouri, although it has freight and passenger offices there, the lines of the railroad ending at East St. Louis, Ill., and its trains there being turned over to a terminal organization which takes them into St. Louis.

A suit of this kind brought by a resident of a particular state in the courts of another state against a railroad company whose...

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2 cases
  • Southern Ry. Co. v. Painter
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • January 10, 1941
    ...a quotation to this effect is given from High on Injunctions, Sec. 106. Also 14 R.C.L. Sec. 114, pp. 413-14; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ragen, 172 Tenn. 593, 113 S.W.2d 743. It contends that upon this construction of the injunction suit it should be ruled that actions under the Federal Emplo......
  • Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency v. Brown Stove Works, Inc.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • April 29, 1982
    ...eastern section of this court will be open as of right and the supreme court thereafter. MDHA relies on Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Ragan, 172 Tenn. 593, 113 S.W.2d 743 (1938) in its assertion that the doctrine of former suit pending does not apply and that the Davidson County Chance......

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