Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Lee

• Decision Date: 13 December 1892
• Citation: 97 Ala. 325,12 So. 48
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. LEE.

12 So. 48

97 Ala. 325

LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. LEE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 13, 1892

Appeal from circuit court, Escambia county; John P. Hubbard, Judge.

Action by Nancy C. Lee against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company for personal injuries caused by defendant's negligence. From a judgment entered on the verdict of a jury in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

The grounds of the action, and also the plaintiff's evidence are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The defendant requested several charges in writing, and separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of them. Among the number was the general affirmative charge in its behalf. The opinion renders it unnecessary to set out these charges. There was judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant brings this appeal, and assigns as error the refusal of the court to give the several charges requested by it.

J. M Falkner and Chas. P. Jones, for appellant.

T. M Stevens and J. M. Davison, for appellee.

HARALSON J.

The plaintiff's own evidence establishes her contributory negligence to the injury she received. Without any warning to the conductor or other employe of the railroad company that she had not gotten off the train at her destination, and had not had time to do so, she attempted to and did alight because, as she said, "she did not want to be carried by Brewton," at a time when she did not know, as she admits, how fast the train was moving, but when, it seems, it was fast enough to do her the damage of which she complains. Common prudence would have dictated to her to remain aboard after the train had been put in motion. If the conductor was at fault, as she complains he was, in not having tarried long enough for her, being reasonably diligent, to get off, he was legally bound, at her request, to stop, return, and put her off, or, in default, the company would have been responsible to her for the damage it did her. When she attempted therefore, to alight, under the circumstances detailed by her, she herself took the risk of the peril involved in the venture. She, better than any one else, saw how fast the train was running at the time, (for no one saw her get off, so far as it appears,) and, better than any other person, she knew whether, in her enfeebled condition, she could make the leap; and, without reference to the negligence of the railroad company, admitting it was guilty of some fault, s...