Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Mathis
| Decision Date | 18 December 1913 |
| Citation | 9 Ala.App. 643,64 So. 197 |
| Parties | CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. MATHIS. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Geneva County; H.A. Pearce, Judge.
Action by Ella Mathis against the Central of Georgia Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Count 1 of the complaint is as follows: After stating that defendant was common carrier of passengers for hire between certain points in the state, and that plaintiff, on a certain day purchased and paid for a ticket for transportation between said points, and took passage for said point, it is averred that, "when defendant's said train stopped at said point of destination, defendant's servant or servants operating and controlling said train put said train in motion while plaintiff was in the act of leaving said car, to plaintiff's great peril; that the porter belonging to said train saw plaintiff's said peril, and signalled the engineer to stop said train (the latter on information and belief), which said signal was not heeded by said engineer and, while said train was so moving out from said station said porter pulled plaintiff from said car while she was on the platform or steps thereof, and caused her to fall heavily upon the ground, when she was hurled under the edge of said train by the momentum thereof, and was [here follows catalogue of injuries]; and plaintiff avers that defendant's servant or servants operating said train knew that Malvern was a regular station on said railroad for taking on and letting off passengers, and knew that said train did not stop long enough for passengers to leave its cars without great peril, and knew or would have known of plaintiff's peril but for the wanton and reckless indifference to the consequences of so putting said train in motion while plaintiff was so in the act of leaving said car and plaintiff charges and avers that the act of said defendant's servant or servants in putting said train in motion while plaintiff was in the act of leaving said car at said station, and failing to stop said train when plaintiff's peril was known or would have been known to defendant's said servant or servants operating said train but for the wanton and reckless indifference to all consequences, was negligence on the part of defendant's said servant or servants operating said train, and gross and wanton negligence on the part of defendant's said servant or servants, by which said gross and wanton negligence of defendant's said servant or servants operating said train plaintiff avers that she suffered the aforesaid injuries, to the damage of plaintiff," etc.
The demurrers are that the complaint contains a misjoinder, in that two separate and independent causes of action were joined in one count, and that on account thereof said count is inconsistent and repugnant. The demurrers also raise the point that the complaint shows that the train was stopped at the station, and, for aught that appears, it was stopped a sufficient length of time to permit plaintiff to alight, and that it fails to allege that the conductor or engineer had any notice or knowledge or anything to put them on notice of plaintiff's position of peril.
Counts A and B were added by way of amendment; count A counting on the simple negligence in the negligent way in which defendant then and there conducted its said business, by reason of which plaintiff received the injuries complained of. The other count contains practically the same allegations of negligence, though varying in the form of expression.
Benj. F. Reid, of Dothan, for appellant.
C.D. Carmichael, of Geneva, for appellee.
The appellee, who was a passenger on one of defendant's (appellant's) trains, brings this action for injuries received while attempting to alight from the train upon its reaching her destination, and as a result of the train's having been set in motion for leaving the station before she landed safely on the ground.
The law is well settled that defendant, who operated an ordinary railroad, was under duty to plaintiff as a passenger to stop its train a sufficient length of time at the station to allow plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to alight therefrom with safety, and is liable to her for all injuries received by her in attempting to alight which were sustained as a proximate result of its negligence in breaching said duty by starting said train before the expiration of such reasonable length of time, whether the conductor or person in charge of the operation of said train knew or not of plaintiff's position of peril, because, until the expiration of such time, it was his duty to see and know. When, however, the train has stopped for the required length of time, the rule obtaining is different from that applying to street railroads, and the conductor in charge of the train, in the absence of knowledge or good reason to believe to the contrary, has a right to assume that all passengers desiring to alight have availed themselves of the ample opportunity afforded them to that end, and alighted; and his act in thereafter starting off the train could not form the basis of an action for negligence--although but for the act the plaintiff would not have been injured--unless at the time he gave the signal to start plaintiff was in a position of peril, which was known to him, or which he had good reason to know of. His duty to know, however, ended with the expiration of the reasonable length of time he was required to and did hold the train. After that, a liability for negligence must be predicated, not upon this duty to know, but upon actual knowledge of, or good reason to believe, plaintiff's peril. H.A. & B.R. Co. v Burt, 92 Ala. 294, 9 So. 410, 13 L.R.A. 95; Birmingham Union Ry. Co. v. Smith, 90 Ala. 60, 8 So. 86, 24 Am.St.Rep. 761; Montgomery & Eufaula R. Co. v. Stewart, 91 Ala. 421, 8 So. 708; L. & N.R. Co. v. Lee, 97 Ala. 325, 12 So. 48; Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Miles, 88 Ala. 262, 6 So. 696; Nash & Chat. Ry. Co. v. Casey, 1 Ala.App. 347, 56 So. 28; B. & A.R. Co. v. Norris, 4 Ala.App. 368, 59 So. 66
As was said by the elder McClellan, speaking for our Supreme Court in the case of Birmingham Union Ry. Co. v. Smith, supra ...
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