Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Edmonds' Adm'x

• Decision Date: 15 October 1901
• Citation: 64 S.W. 727
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. EDMONDS' ADM'X. [1]
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

64 S.W. 727

LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. EDMONDS' ADM'X. ^[1]

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

October 15, 1901

Appeal from circuit court, Warren county.

"Not to be officially reported."

Action by the administratrix of E. T. Edmonds against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J. A Mitchell, H. W. Bruce, W. D. Hines, and Edward W. Hines, for appellant.

B. F Proctor, G. H. Herdman, C. P. Chenault, and John W. Ray, for appellee.

O'REAR J.

E. T Edmonds, conductor of a freight train on the Memphis branch of appellant's road, was killed by the gross carelessness or negligence of an engineman and other train men, in charge of a freight train on the Henderson division of appellant's railroad at Guthrie, Ky. on September 4 1897. The tracks of the two divisions cross at that point. The first question presented on this appeal is the sufficiency of the proof offered showing the qualification and appointment of appellee as administratrix. The record discloses that decedent was a resident of Warren county, Ky. at the time of his death, and that his widow was such resident when she applied for administration on his estate, and continued to reside there. The order of the county court, admitted in evidence, is as follows: "Mrs. Delia Edmonds, having been appointed administratrix of E. T. Edmonds, deceased, appeared in open court, and took the oath required by law; whereupon she, with B. F. Proctor as surety, executed bond to the commonwealth of Kentucky, conditioned according to law." The criticism made by appellant is that the foregoing order does not appoint Mrs. Edmonds administratrix, and that there must be an order making the appointment. True, the order quoted is not in as apt language as it might have been. But it has been the policy of this court to give liberal construction to terms and language used in orders and judgments of inferior courts, in order to arrive at their true meaning. It is also the mandate of the Code that we disregard immaterial errors, such as do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Applying to this question those policies, we conclude that the order in question was sufficient evidence, in connection with the other evidence in the record, of the proper appointment and qualification of the appellee as the personal representative of the deceased.

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