Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Cayce

• Citation: 34 S.W. 896
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. CAYCE et al.
• Decision Date: 12 March 1896
• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky

34 S.W. 896

LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. CAYCE et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 12, 1896

Appeal from circuit court, Christian county.

"Not to be officially reported."

Action by Rosa Cayce and her husband against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company for breach of contract of carriage. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Joe McCarroll, for appellant.

John Phelps, James Breathitt, and Edward W. Hines, for appellees.

HAZELRIGG, J.

According to the published time card of the appellant, the train on which the appellee and her husband took passage from Hopkinsville to Lebanon stopped at Lebanon Junction, reaching there shortly after midnight. Whether the appellee averred a knowledge of this fact or not in her petition, she and the public generally had the right to rely on these published schedules, unless notified to the contrary. When, therefore, without her consent, she was carried beyond her station on to Louisville, and compelled to stay up the balance of the night in a strange city by reason of which she was greatly inconvenienced and distressed, and became sick, her right of action was complete and undoubted. That a majority of travelers preferred this arrangement to be carried on to Louisville and brought back to the junction next morning free of charge, rather than the train be stopped at the junction at this hour of the night, is no reason for violating the company's duty to stop its trains where it said to the public it would stop them. The regulation relied on, providing such an arrangement, may be reasonable enough, but the public should have some notice of it. It appears, here, that even some of appellant's conductors knew nothing of such a regulation. In this view of the law, the instructions were correct, and the only remaining question is the alleged excessiveness of the verdict. Two juries have assessed the damages,-the first at $580, and the last at $500; and, from the proof, we are not inclined to think the sum so excessive as to warrant our interference. Judgment affirmed.