Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Sharp

• Decision Date: 04 April 1891
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. SHARP.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

16 S.W. 86

91 Ky. 411

LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. SHARP.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

April 4, 1891

Appeal from circuit court, Taylor county.

"To be officially reported."

John McChord, for appellant.

W. J Lisle and W. E. Russell, for appellee.

HOLT C.J.

In 1881 the appellee, Thomas G. Sharp, recovered a judgment against the appellant for $800 for a personal injury. The statute then in force provided: "A judgment, except for malicious prosecution, libel, slander, or injury to the person, shall bear legal interest from its date." Gen St. c. 60, § 6. This judgment did not, therefore, bear interest, and was so entered. The appellant appealed and superseded it. The bond is of the usual form. It stipulates "The appellant will pay to the appellee all costs and damages that may be adjudged against the appellant on the appeal; also that they will satisfy and perform the judgment above stated, (for eight hundred dollars damages,) in case it shall be affirmed, and any judgment or order which the court of appeals may render or order to be rendered by the inferior court, not exceeding in amount or value the judgment aforesaid; (and also pay all rents, hire, or damage which during the pendency of the appeal, may accrue on any part of the property of which the appellee is kept out of possession by reason of the appeal.)" The portion of the bond in parenthesis was doubtless inserted by the draughtsman because it is given in the form to be found in the Civil Code; but it is there stated that it is only to be added if the appellee will be kept out of the use or possession of property; and it was not a proper or necessary stipulation of the bond in this case, the judgment superseded being only for money. The form was intended for all cases, whether a delay in the payment of money or the delivery of property resulted from the supersedeas. The judgment was affirmed in 1889 by a divided court, and the appellee allowed 10 per centum damages. He refused to accept the $800, together with the 10 per centum damages and his costs, in satisfaction of the judgment, and brought this action upon the appeal-bond to recover damages for being kept out of his money. His pleadings clearly show that he seeks to recover damages in lieu of interest upon the judgment, and whether he is entitled to it is the question before us.

After the mandate of this court had been filed in the lower court showing the affirmance of the judgment, the appellee on October 15, 1889, and after the two actions had been consolidated, entered a motion in the old suit to allow him. nunc pro tunc, interest upon his judgment from the time of its rendition in the lower court. This was properly refused. The legislature on March 1, 1888, amended the statute above cited by striking out the words, "except for malicious prosecution, libel, slander, or injury to the person;" but this amendment is not retrospective in its terms, and there is nothing evidencing any legislative intention that it was to be so regarded. It is a rule that no statute will be so construed unless there be something in the nature of the case, or the language used, showing that it was so intended by the law-making power. Unless this appear, new statutes will be held to apply only to future cases. Judge Cooley says: "There is no doubt of the right of the legislature to pass statutes which reach back to and change or modify the effect of prior transactions, provided retrospective laws are not forbidden eo nomine by the state constitution, and provided, further, that no other objection exists to them than their retrospective character. Nevertheless, l...