Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton

• Decision Date: 07 October 1908
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. MELTON.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

112 S.W. 618

127 Ky. 276

LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. MELTON.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

October 7, 1908

"To be officially reported."

Dissenting opinion.

For majority opinion, see 105 S.W. 366. See, also, 110 S.W. 233.

BARKER J.

I find myself unable to concur in the opinion affirming the judgment in this case, and the duty I owe myself, as well as that due the appellant, constrains me, much against my natural inclination, to state the reasons for dissenting from the conclusion reached by a majority of my Brethren.

On March 2, 1905, a carpenter's force of the Louisville &amp Nashville Railroad Company were constructing coal chutes near, but not upon, the tracks or roadway of the railroad company at the mines of the Ingle Coal Company, at or near Howell, Ind. The force consisted of seven laborers, including the foreman, one W. C. Shrode, and appellee, Melton. In raising, with an ordinary pulley, block, and tackle, a bent of timber weighing about 1,000 pounds from a partly horizontal to an upright position, the bent fell by reason of a latent defect in the welding of one of the links of a chain with which one of the pulley blocks was temporarily attached to the framework. In falling the bent fell upon Melton and produced a concussion of his spine, resulting in partial paralysis of his lower extremities. For this injury Melton brought his action against the railroad company in the Hopkins circuit court, and elected to proceed under the statute of the state of Indiana commonly known as the "Employer's Liability Act." A trial of the action resulted in a verdict for compensatory damages in the sum of $22,000.

As Melton's cause of action is rested upon the Indiana statute regulating the liability of corporations for injuries received by their employés, the first question with which we are confronted is whether or not that act, as construed by the majority opinion, is constitutional, or whether, on the contrary, it is inimical to that provision in the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution, which guarantees to all the equal protection of the law, or, as has been said the protection of equal laws. As the act in question is fully set out in the opinion of the court, it is not necessary to incorporate any part of it here. It is deemed sufficient to say that it prescribes a different rule of liability for those employers who may be brought within its purview from that imposed by the laws of Indiana upon other employers for injuries occurring to their employés, and unless it can be differentiated by a reasonable classification from those laws it must be held violative of the federal Constitution.

It is earnestly contended by counsel for appellant that the Indiana court of last resort has construed this act to be applicable only to those employers operating railroads, and, further, that it has limited its application to injuries occurring to employés engaged in the hazard of the actual operation of the railroad at the time they were hurt. Whether this be so, or not, I shall not now investigate. This court has enforced the act as applying to injuries occurring to all railroad employés, whether they be at the time engaged in the active operation of the railroad as such, or whether they are engaged in what may be termed collateral occupations, among which may be included all those occupations which are merely auxiliary to the active operation of the railroad and not subject to the extreme hazard which exists in the active carrying forward of its operation. This conclusion makes it necessary to inquire whether the act, as construed, is or not inimical to the equality clause of the federal Constitution.

As said before, it is not permissible, under the federal Constitution, to impose arbitrarily upon one class burdens which are not imposed upon the community in general; nor may a Legislature arbitrarily impose a liability upon one class of employers which is not imposed upon others. Undoubtedly the state may regulate the liability of employers to their employés if the classification for regulation be based upon just and reasonable principles; but it may not arbitrarily select one class, whose liability is to be ascertained by rules more stringent than apply to employers generally doing a similar business. This principle has nowhere been more clearly and forcibly expressed than by the Supreme Court of the United States in G., C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 S.Ct. 255, 41 L.Ed. 666, where the question we have in hand is discussed. In the opinion it is said: "But it is said that it is not within the scope of the fourteenth amendment to withhold from states the power of classification, and that if the law deals alike with all of a certain class it is not obnoxious to the charge of a denial of equal protection. While, as a general proposition, this is undeniably true (citing many cases), yet it is equally true that such classification cannot be made arbitrarily. The state may not say that all white men shall be subjected to the payment of the attorney's fees of parties successfully suing them, and all black men not. It may not say that all men beyond a certain age shall be alone thus subjected, or all men possessed of a certain wealth. These are distinctions which do not furnish any proper basis for the attempted classification. That must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis. *** But arbitrary selection can never be justified by calling it classification. The equal protection demanded by the fourteenth amendment forbids this. No language is more worthy of frequent and thoughtful consideration than these words of Mr. Justice Matthews, speaking for this court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220: 'When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.' The first official action of this nation declared the foundation of government in these words: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' While such declaration of principles may not have the force of organic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of right and duty, and while in all cases reference must be had to the organic law of the nation for such limits, yet the latter is but the body and the letter of which the former is the thought and the spirit, and it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. No duty rests more imperatively upon the courts than the enforcement of those constitutional provisions intended to secure that equality of rights which is the foundation of free government. *** It is apparent that the mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause of the fourteenth amendment, and that in all cases it must appear, not only that a classification has been made, but also that it is one based upon some reasonable ground--some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification, and is not a mere arbitrary selection. Tested by these principles, the statute in controversy cannot be sustained."

Upon the same subject the Supreme Court, in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 22 S.Ct. 431, 46 L.Ed 679, said: "The difficulty is not met by saying that, generally speaking, the state, when enacting laws, may in its discretion make a classification of persons, firms, corporations, and associations in order to subserve public objects; for this court has held that classification 'must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis. *** But arbitrary selection can never be justified by calling it classification. The equal protection demanded by the fourteenth amendment forbids this. *** It is apparent that the mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause of the fourteenth amendment, and that in all cases it must appear, not only that a classification has been made, but also that it is one based upon some reasonable ground--some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification, and is not a mere arbitrary selection." To the same effect are Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards Company, etc., 183 U.S. 79, 22 S.Ct. 30, 46 L.Ed. 92, Ballard v. Mississippi Cotton Oil Company, 81 Miss. 507, 34...