Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sowell

• Citation: 15 S.W. 837,90 Tenn. 17
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. SOWELL.
• Decision Date: 03 March 1891
• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee

15 S.W. 837

90 Tenn. 17

LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. SOWELL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 3, 1891

Error from circuit court, Maury county; ED. D. PATTERSON, Judge.

Hughes & Hatcher, for plaintiff in error.

Webster & Taylor, for defendant in error.

SNODGRASS J.

The defendant in error sued the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company for damages consequent upon an injury to a horse which he was having transported from Montgomery, Ala., to Columbia, Tenn., and which he alleged was injured by the negligence of the railroad company in course of transportation. He obtained verdict and judgment for $550. The company moved for a new trial, and, its motion being overruled, it appealed, and assigned errors. These go to the pleading, evidence, and charge, but are all practically disposed of by a construction of the contract under which the shipment was made, and therefore we determine, first, the effect of that instrument. It was what is known as a "live-stock contract," with limited liability clause, upon an agreed valuation as follows: "And it is further agreed that, should damages occur for which the railroad company may be liable, the value at the place and date of shipment shall govern the settlement, in which the amount claimed shall not exceed, for a stallion or jack $200 for a horse or mule $100, which amounts it is agreed are as much as such stock as are herein agreed to be transported are reasonably worth." If the clause quoted is an agreement as to limit of the valuation of the particular horse injured and is valid, the judgment is erroneous. The circuit judge charged that it was not an agreement as to the value of this particular horse, and, besides, the clause was void, because it limited defendant's liability for its own negligence. In the contract this clause follows that in which the railroad company acknowledged receipt for shipment of four horses, the one injured making one of that number. It manifestly referred to all received, and was as definite and specific in effect as though it had named or perfectly described the horses shipped. It was in reference to them and only to them, it became a contract when signed and accepted by the shipper, and needed no more particular reference. The question is whether such a contract is void as against public policy. It is not now a matter of controversy that a common carrier cannot by contract exempt itself from liability for its own negligence. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Coward v. Railroad Co., 16 Lea, 225; Railroad Co. v. Wynn, 88 Tenn. 320, 14 S.W. 311. These cases are cited, not merely to support the proposition, for it needs no support, but to call attention to the precise contracts upon which they were predicated, and to the distinction between them and another class of cases holding that a contract for payment of an agreed value or limit of value is one which can be lawfully made between a shipper and a common carrier. In the three cases named the question decided was presented in different aspects. The Lockwood Case was a suit to recover damages for injury to the person of a drover sustained while traveling on a freight train in charge of certain cattle he had shipped under a special contract providing, among other things, that the person accompanying the cattle should be carried free of charge, but at his own risk of personal injury from whatever cause. The case in 16 Lea was a suit to recover for lost baggage of a passenger. He had accepted a ticket, and signed a contract attached, providing that "none of the companies represented in this ticket will assume any liability on baggage, except for wearing apparel, and then only for a sum not exceeding $100." There was no agreement as to valuation of baggage carried and lost, and the railroad company was held responsible for full value. ...