Louisville & N. Railroad Co. v. Ellis

• Decision Date: 19 October 1936
• Docket Number: 25542.
• Citation: 189 S.E. 559,54 Ga.App. 783
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. et al. v. ELLIS et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

189 S.E. 559

54 Ga.App. 783

LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. et al. v. ELLIS et al.

No. 25542.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division

October 19, 1936

Rehearing Denied Dec. 5, 1936.

Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Right of railroad to lay and use tracks in public street is generally right to use street on equal terms with, and subject to, general public's right to occupy and use street.

Rights of railroad and general public in streets must be exercised with due regard to rights and nature of use of each other.

Right of railroad to occupy and use public street must be exercised in such manner as not unnecessarily or materially to obstruct or interfere with rights of general public in street, and provision for protection of general public, where necessary should be made.

Railroad must exercise right to reasonable use of street with due regard to rights and conveniences of general public.

One whose negligent or unlawful act causes defect or obstruction in highway or street is liable for injury to motor vehicle or its occupants occasioned thereby.

Defendant may be held liable where it appears that his negligence was sole cause of injury complained of, or that it put in operation other causal forces which were direct, natural, and probable consequences of defendant's original act, or that intervening agency could have reasonably been foreseen by defendant as original wrongdoer.

Where two concurrent causes naturally operate in causing injury there may be recovery against both or either of responsible parties, although their duties to injured party were different.

Wrongdoer is liable for injuries resulting from forces put in operation by his wrongful act, where such forces are direct, natural and probable consequence of wrongful act, but not where resulting injuries could not reasonably be foreseen as natural, reasonable, and probable consequences of wrongful act.

All persons are presumed by law to anticipate or foresee reasonable and natural consequences of their conduct.

Mere fact that injury could not have resulted by reason of defendant's acts alone will not limit and define intervening agency as constituting "proximate cause."

Railroad would be liable for injury if dangerous situation created by railroad at street and railroad crossing was one of proximate causes of injury.

Railroad held liable for trainman's negligence in signaling motorist to proceed across street crossing, resulting in collision of motorist with truck, if committed in prosecution of trainman's business with railroad, although railroad had limited trainman's duty to attending to train and to seeing that train did not injure any one at crossing (Code 1933, § 105-108).

Motorist's petition for injuries sustained in collision with defendant's truck, which collision occurred after motorist stopped for codefendant's train, which blocked his view of truck, and received signal from codefendant's trainman to proceed, stated action against codefendant railroad, although truck driver's negligence contributed to collision.

Error from Superior Court, Baldwin County; C.J. Perryman, Judge.

Suit by Mrs. Pauline Godwin Ellis against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company and another, joint lessees of the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company, operating under the name of the Georgia Railroad, and others. To review a judgment overruling the demurrer of some of defendants, including named defendants, to the petition, such defendants bring error.

Affirmed.

STEPHENS, J., dissenting.

Hines & Carpenter, of Milledgeville, and Jones, Johnston, Russell & Sparks, of Macon, for plaintiffs in error.

Brandon, Hynds & Tindall, of Atlanta, and Sibley & Allen, Marion Ennis, and C. A. Giles, all of Milledgeville, for defendants in error.

Syllabus OPINION.

SUTTON Judge.

Mrs Pauline Godwin Ellis brought suit against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company and the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, joint lessees of the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company, operating under the name of the Georgia Railroad, the Milledgeville Railway Company, and the Atlantic Ice & Coal Company, for damages on account of personal injuries sustained by her. In her petition she makes substantially this case: Plaintiff, operating her automobile, was approaching from the west along a public street in the City of Milledgeville, toward a point in such street where it was interested by the tracks of the defendant railroad companies, and another public street in said city which ran north and south; said railway tracks being located in the center of such intersecting street. A train of the defendant railways, composed of an engine and boxcars, was switching on the tracks and had come to a stop on the south side of the crossing, even with the curbing on the street along which plaintiff was approaching, thereby obstructing plaintiff's view of any traffic approaching from the south along said intersecting street. Observing this train, plaintiff brought her automobile to a stop, and thereupon a trainman notified and signaled her to proceed on her way across the intersection. Relying on this signal, plaintiff proceeded slowly on her way and arriving at a point just beyond the end of the train, a large motortruck operated by a servant of the defendant ice and coal company, in the course of its business, going in a northerly direction and approaching the crossing from the south on the side of said train opposite from plaintiff, and traveling at a fast and reckless speed in violation of an ordinance of the city, ran into the automobile of plaintiff, and she was injured. Plaintiff charged that the defendant railways were negligent in placing said train so as to obstruct her vision of traffic approaching from the south on said intersecting street, and in said trainman signaling and motioning to her to proceed across said intersection and on her way, at a time when said truck of the ice company was approaching from the south at a fast and reckless speed. Plaintiff charged that the ice company was negligent because of the acts of its servant in operating said truck at a speed in violation of the city ordinance, in approaching the crossing where the train had plaintiff's view obscured at a fast and reckless speed, and in failing to blow his horn or give some warning of the approaching truck. Plaintiff charged that all of the defendants were negligent in creating a dangerous place and locality at said crossing. The railroad companies demurred generally to the petition on the grounds that no cause of action was...