Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Bate

• Decision Date: 31 December 1883
• Citation: 80 Tenn. 573
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY et al. v. W. B. BATE et al.

80 Tenn. 573

LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY et al.

v.W. B. BATE et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

December Term, 1883.

FROM DAVIDSON.

Appeal in error from the Circuit Court of Davidson county. FRANK T. REID, J.

ED. BAXTER, SMITH & ALLISON, J. M. DICKINSON, W. M. BAXTER, R. N. HOOD, D. H. POSTON and HOLMES CUMMINGS for Railroad.

J. J. VERTREES, A. S. MARKS and Attorney-General LEA for Board of Assessors.

TURNEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The proceedings originated under the act of March 20, 1875, and the amendments of March 20, 1877, and of April 26, 1882.

The assessors and examiners provided for by these acts undertook to assess the taxes due from the following railroad companies, viz.: The Louisville & Nashville; East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia; Rogersville & Jefferson; Knoxville & Augusta; Chesapeake, Ohio & Southwestern, and Memphis & Charleston. After the assessments had passed to the hands of the examiners, and after two of them had affirmed the action of the board of assessors, and while the third was preparing a dissenting report, writs of certiorari and supersedeas were served upon them, and the matters transferred to the circuit court for Davidson county.

The substantial grounds laid in the petitions for the writs are, that section 4 of the act of 1877, as follows: “That all proof taken by said assessors shall be reduced to writing, and be sworn to and signed by the parties, and said assessors shall make such rules and regulations as they may think proper as to notice and the time and mode of taking all proof, so as to afford the parties interested an opportunity to be present and cross-examine witnesses,” has not been complied with. That the main stems, branches, leases, etc., were assessed separately. The franchise, road-bed and superstructure were assessed together, not showing what valuation was put upon either. The rolling-stock and other distributable property were assessed together, commingling the valuation so as to make them indistinguishable. The $1,000 exemption was taken from the main stem valuation, and nothing from the others. The main stems are valued at one estimate, and the branches, leases, etc., at other figures, and the tax value apportioned to the several counties and towns through which they run, on that basis.

Motions to dismiss the petitions were made, because the action of the board of examiners in the matter in the petition complained of is final and conclusive, and cannot be reversed or reviewed or revised, or in any manner interfered with or modified by this court upon certiorari, nor can said proceedings be removed into this court by a writ of certiorari for that purpose.

The several other causes involved in the solution of the one cited, which involves a construction of section 13 of the act of 1877, which provides: “That the action of the board of examiners provided for by the sixth section of the act of March 20, 1875, shall be final and conclusive as to the value of a railroad.”

By the Code, section 3123: “The writ of certiorari may be granted whenever authorized by law, and also in all cases where an inferior tribunal board or officer exercising judicial functions had exceeded the jurisdiction conferred, or is acting illegally, when in the judgment of the court there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy.” This statute is enabling to section 10 of Article 6 of the State Constitution as follows: “The judges or justices of inferior courts of law and equity shall have power in civil cases to issue writs of certiorari to remove any cause, or the transcript of the record thereof from any inferior jurisdiction into such court of law on sufficient cause, supported by oath or affirmation.”

In Wade v. Murry, 2 Sneed, 56, Judge McKinney delivering the opinion of a majority of the court says: “In a case involving a question as to the legal competency of the judge or showing such a substantial departure from the course of proceeding prescribed in the statute as would render the proceedings void the certiorari would be the proper remedy.” I am of opinion with Judge Totten that the revisory jurisdiction extends to any question of error or illegality in the proceedings which has the effect to prejudice the rights of a party. I also think the Legislature has no power to say that any citizen shall be deprived of the right to have all questions touching his life, liberty or property heard, passed upon, and determined by the regular and constitutional courts of the State, such right is inalienable. It is unnecessary in the present case to go beyond the majority opinion in Wade v. Murry .

The allegations of the petitions, in direct terms, charge a departure from the proceeding prescribed in the statute. The petitions are based upon a purpose to have the statute pursued and to prevent its violation. The motions must be treated as a demurrer, and the allegations of the petitions be treated as true, for the purposes of the motion. The petitioners are not attempting to defeat the will of the State, but to enforce that will as the petitioners understand it from a reading of the statutes. This necessarily presents the issue of a proper construction of the language of the statutes from which to derive the meaning of the Legislature. However honest the interpretation of the boards of assessors and examiners may have been, still the parties to be affected thereby have the right to insist upon a different interpretation, and ask the opinion of the courts.

Although the boards may be officers of the State, and proposing to discharge their duties as such, yet if they over-leap the prescribed limits of the law under which they act, it is the right of those about to be injured to ask for, and the duty of courts to grant a restraining relief, we think the petitions make prima facie cases for relief.

What are the facts? Did the boards exceed their authority? as we have seen, the act requires all the proof to be reduced to writing, sworn to and subscribed, etc., and upon this proof the boards to act in fixing their...