Louisville, New Albany & Chicago R. W. Co. v. Treadway
| Decision Date | 28 May 1895 |
| Docket Number | 16,815 |
| Citation | 40 N.E. 807,143 Ind. 689 |
| Parties | The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago R. W. Co. and the Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas City R. W. Co. v. Treadway |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Reported at: 143 Ind. 689 at 701.
From the Putnam Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed as to the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company, and reversed as to the Toledo, St Louis and Kansas City Railroad Company, with instructions to sustain its motion for a judgment in its favor on the special verdict.
C Brown, S. O. Bayless, C. G. Guenther, G. W. Kretzinger and B. Clark, for appellants.
B. Crane and A. B. Anderson, for appellee.
Appellee brought this action against appellants, the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago R. W. Co., commonly called the "Monon," and the Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas City R. R. Co., commonly called the "Clover Leaf," to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been received by her at a depot used and maintained by appellants.
Appellants each filed separate demurrers to the complaint, for the reason that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, which demurrers were overruled by the court, and exceptions were reserved.
The "Monon" filed an answer in two paragraphs, to the second of which appellee's demurrer was sustained, and exception taken. The "Clover Leaf" filed an answer in one paragraph. The cause was tried by a jury, and the special verdict returned; thereupon each appellant filed its separate motion for judgment in its favor on the special verdict, which motions were overruled; to which action of the court appellants each excepted. The court rendered judgment on the special verdict, in favor of appellee, against appellants, to which appellants severally excepted.
Appellants then filed their separate motions for a new trial, which were overruled and exceptions reserved.
Appellants separately assign errors in this court; the reasons urged for a reversal are:
First.--That the court erred in overruling the demurrer of each appellant to the complaint.
Second.--That the court erred in overruling the separate motion of each appellant for a new trial.
Third.--That the court erred in overruling the separate motion of each appellant for a judgment in its favor on the special verdict.
The complaint was sufficient to withstand the demurrers of appellants. The objections urged thereto, so far as it charges negligence, could be reached by a motion to make more specific, but not by demurrer. Neither were the specific statements as to the conduct of appellee sufficient to overthrow the general allegation that appellee was injured without any fault or negligence on her part. Pennsylvania Co. v. O'Shaughnessy, Admr., 122 Ind. 588, 23 N.E. 675, and cases cited; City of Elkhart v. Witman, 122 Ind. 538, 23 N.E. 796, and cases cited; Town of Rushville v. Adams, 107 Ind. 475, 8 N.E. 292.
It is unnecessary to set forth the complaint or the substance of the same, as substantially the same questions are presented upon the special verdict.
The special verdict, so far as necessary to determine the questions presented, is:
That the "Monon" railroad runs north and south through the town of Linden, and the "Clover Leaf" runs east and west through said town; that on the 19th day of January 1891, and for five years prior thereto, there was located at the intersection of said railroads, and in the southeast angle thereof, a station, consisting of a depot building and adjacent platforms, which were on said day, and for five years prior thereto, used and maintained by appellants for the reception and discharge of passengers on appellants' trains respectively, and for the accommodation of persons taking passage on either of said railroads, and for the convenience of persons transacting, or intending to transact, business with either of said companies; that said depot was constructed and maintained about midway between the tracks of said railroads, and facing the intersection thereof, about thirty-five feet from said intersection, and consisting of a waiting room for passengers, a telegraph and ticket office and freight room, the waiting room being at the end nearest to the public highway, and the ticket and telegraph office being between said waiting room and said freight room; that the space between said depot building and said railroad track was covered by a plank platform, which extended around said building at the northeast end thereof to a line running north and south through the east corner of said building; that said platform extended south from the south side of the track of the "Clover Leaf," along the east side of the track of the "Monon," about one hundred and thirty feet, and east from the east side of the track of the "Monon," along the south side of the track of the "Clover Leaf," about one hundred and forty feet, to a public highway running north and south, and crossing the last named railroad, which highway furnished the only public approach to said station, the part of said platform which extended east from the line running north and south through the east corner of said building to said highway being seven feet and four inches wide; that the surface of the ground descended from said highway to the depot building, so that the platform at the northeast end of said building was from three and one-half to four feet above the surface of the ground; that said platforms were used and maintained without guards, guard-rails, railing or barriers of any kind to prevent or protect passengers or other persons having business with said company or either of them, from falling or stepping off said platform at the northeast end of said building, and the erection and maintenance of guards, guard-rails, railings or barriers on the edge of the platform at the northeast end of said building would not have materially interfered with the business of said appellants in the handling of baggage and freight of said station; that said appellants used and maintained said station and platform in their business in the condition aforesaid, on said 19th day of January, 1891, and for several years prior thereto, and during all of said time knew of the dangerous condition thereof; that on said 19th day of January, at about one and a half o'clock, a. m., appellee went to said station for the purpose of taking, and intending to take, passage on the passenger train of the "Monon," going north on said road at about two o'clock and nineteen minutes, a. m., from said station to the station of Hammond, Indiana, both of said stations being regular stopping places for said train, and appellee at the time holding a ticket entitling her to passage on said train from said station of Linden to the station of Hammond; that when appellee went to the station at Linden the depot and waiting room thereof were open for the reception and accommodation of passengers and persons intending to take passage on trains of the "Monon;" that the "Clover Leaf" ran no passenger trains at said time between the hours of six o'clock p. m. and six o'clock a. m., and appellee transacted no business with said last named company; that said appellee approached the station from the highway hereinbefore mentioned, and walked along said platform from the highway to the entrance of the waiting room, and entered the waiting room to await the arrival of the train; that there was no light or fire in the waiting room, and appellee was invited, by the agent of the said appellants, to enter the ticket and telegraph office, and she did enter said office to wait for said train; that appellee was ignorant of the condition of said platform and of the fact that it was unsafe and dangerous and not provided with guards, guard-rails, railings or barriers of any kind as aforesaid, and that said platform, extending to said highway, did not cover all the space between said depot building and the highway; that while appellee was waiting for said train, it became necessary for her to leave said depot and waiting room temporarily, to attend to a necessary and urgent call of nature; that there was no water-closet or privy in or near said depot grounds to which she could go for such purpose, and for the purpose of attending to said call of nature appellee, at about two o'clock a. m., temporarily left said depot building and went out upon said platform and attempted to leave the same by the same route by which she approached said waiting room and depot, and started in that direction, intending to return to said depot building as soon as she had attended to said call; that it was dark and there were no lights about said depot on said platform, nor any means to enable plaintiff to see the edge or termination of said platform, or the dangerous condition thereof; that in attempting to leave said depot and platform, as aforesaid, appellee walked along at a moderate gait, proceeding carefully and cautiously, and on that part of said platform at the northeast end of said building and at a point about seventeen feet from the door of said waiting room, stepped and fell off said platform, and was thrown violently to the hard ground below, a distance of about four feet; that appellee stepped and fell off said platform by reason of the fact that there were no...
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Louisville, N.A.&C. Ry. Co. v. Treadway
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