Louisville Veneer Mills Co. v. Clemonts

• Decision Date: 16 April 1908
• Citation: 109 S.W. 308
• Parties: LOUISVILLE VENEER MILLS CO. v. CLEMONTS.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

109 S.W. 308

LOUISVILLE VENEER MILLS CO. v. CLEMONTS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

April 16, 1908

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Common Pleas Branch Second Division.

"Not to be officially reported."

Action by William Clemonts against the Louisville Veneer Mills Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Bennett H. Young and Marion W. Ripy, for appellant.

Robert L. Page and Harry Robinson, for appellee.

CARROLL J.

Appellee who was injured by a ripsaw he was operating in the mill owned by appellant, brought this suit to recover damages. We are asked to reverse the judgment rendered in his behalf because of the assigned errors of the trial court in failing to give a peremptory instruction to find for appellant and in misinstructing the jury. The request for a peremptory was rested upon two grounds: First, that appellee, in consideration of $36 paid him, agreed to and did release it from liability for the injury sustained; and, second, because he failed to tender the money received before instituting the action to recover damages.

Appellee was injured on April 25, 1905, when four of his fingers were cut off by the rapidly revolving saw, which came in contact with his hand. He was taken to the Deaconess Hospital, where he remained until May 1, 1905. On this date the physician in attendance discharged him from his care. On the day he was dismissed by the physician, but before he left the hospital he was visited by Harry Kline, manager of appellant's mill, and Sherley Crawford, an attorney and agent of an indemnity company in which appellant was insured against loss on account of injury to its employés. These gentlemen went to see appellee for the purpose of settling with him any claim for damages he might have against the company. There is sharp conflict between the statements of appellee and those made by Kline and Crawford as to what took place at the interview between them that resulted in appellee signing the following paper: "For the sole consideration of the sum of $36 this 1st day of May, 1905, received from Louisville Veneer Mills, I do hereby acknowledge full satisfaction in discharge of all claims accrued or to accrue in respect to all injuries or injurious results, direct or indirect, arising or to arise from an accident sustained by me on or about the 25th of April, 1905, while in the employment of the above." Appellee testified that Crawford and Kline told him that he was entitled to $25 accident insurance; that Mr. Kline, the manager of the company, had kept up his insurance; that the paper they wished him to sign was a receipt showing that he had received from the insurance company that amount of money; that he did not read the receipt, nor was it read to him, and he signed it upon their representations as to what it contained, and did not know that it purported to be a compromise or settlement of any claim he might have for damages against the company; that he relied entirely upon the statements made by them as to the contents of the paper, and would not have signed it had he known that it was a settlement of his claim. Kline and Crawford say that the paper was read to appellee and its contents fully explained to him; that he signed it with full knowledge of its purport and meaning; that it was understood $11 was to be paid to the hospital for medical attention received by appellee, and $25 was to be paid to him; that the amount due the hospital was paid, and $25 given to appellee. There was evidence conducing to show that appellee at the time he signed the paper was an intelligent, sensible man, although not well educated, and that he was not suffering from any mental or physical disorder that would render him incompetent to form an opinion about a matter of business, although he was somewhat distressed and disturbed about the condition of his financial affairs.

It will thus be seen that the issue upon the question as to what occurred when appellee signed the paper was purely one of fact. Upon this point the court instructed the jury as follows: "You will find for the defendant, Florence C. Kline, who was the owner of the appellant company, unless you believe from the evidence that the paper shown you as of the 1st day of May, 1905, was signed by plaintiff, William Clemonts, under the belief that the paper was a release or receipt for insurance allowed to him, and that such representations were made by the defendant's agent or an agent of the Ætna Insurance Company that such was the fact, and Clemonts, relying upon them, believing such representations, so signed the paper; or, unless you shall believe from the evidence that at the time Clemonts signed the paper he was in such distress of mind or in such great financial distress as that he would make undue sacrifice of his rights under and by reason of such condition and surrender the same for an inadequate consideration, and such condition, if it existed, was known to the defendant or her agent or the agent of the Ætna...