Love v. Adams
| Decision Date | 19 January 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. H-460,H-460 |
| Citation | 194 So.2d 55 |
| Parties | Robert J. LOVE, Appellant, v. James T. ADAMS and Mary R. Adams, his wife, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Dawson, Galant, Maddox, Sulik & Nichols, Jacksonville, for appellant.
S. Perry Penland, Jacksonvile, for appellees.
The defendant in an automobile collision case has appealed from a judgment notwithstanding the verdict entered by the Circuit Court for Nassau County, setting aside the jury verdict for the defendant, as to the plaintiff wife, ordering a judgment for her on the issue of liability, and ordering a new trial as to her on the sole issue of damages.
The question presented for our determination in this appeal is whether the said court under the law and in view of the evidence adduced by the parties at the trial, properly entered the said judgment.
Briefly stated, there was sufficient evidence at the trial from which the jury could have reasonably drawn the following conclusions:
The collision giving rise to this action occurred within the city limits of Fernandina Beach, Nassau County, Florida, on Eighth Street near its intersection with Jasmine Street. At the point of the said collision Eighth Street is 42 feet wide and divided into two marked lanes for traffic. On the date and at the time in question both the plaintiffs' car and the defendant's car were travelling in a northerly direction on Eighth Street. The plaintiffs, James T. Adams and Mary R. Adams, husband and wife, were in the overtaking car, the husband driving and the wife riding as one of the passengers.
When Adams first saw the defendant's automobile, it was in the middle of his lane of traffic and moving slowly. Approximately 200 feet from the said intersection, the defendant turned on his right blinker signal. When he was almost at the intersection and when his automobile was about two or three feet from the said center line, the defendant commenced making a right turn to a service station. At about this time and for the first time the defendant saw the plaintiffs' automobile passing him on his right (or, in his words, 'on my blind side.') The two automobiles then collided, the defendant's automobile stopping at the point of impact while the plaintiffs' automobile, which had been travelling between 25 and 45 miles an hour, continued on beyond the point of impact for about 75 feet and struck a telephone pole head-on, causing personal injuries to the plaintiffs.
Two ordinances of the City of Fernandina Beach are involved in this litigation: one, providing a maximum speed limit of 25 miles an hour; and the other, requiring a person making a right turn to be as close to the right curb as he 'reasonably can be.'
At the conclusion of the trial the court properly charged the jury that the violation of an ordinance is prima facie evidence of negligence but that such a prima facie showing can be overcome by proof of surrounding circumstances. The jury had before it the questions whether Adams violated the first of the above-mentioned ordinances and whether the defendant violated the second of the said ordinances.
In connection with the question of Adams' violation of the first ordinance, the jury could have considered the evidence that Adams was driving 40 to 45 miles an hour and that Adams was moving at such a speed that he apparently could not control his car, continued on for 75 feet, and ran headon into a telephone pole. In deciding the question whether the defendant was negligent, the jury could have considered the evidence that he turned on his right blinker signal about 200 feet from the intersection and that Adams attempted to pass on the right without blowing his horn or giving the forward car any warning of his approach and intention to pass on the right.
Under the foregoing evidence, the defendant-appellant contends in this appeal that the jury, in reaching its verdict for the defendant, could reasonably have concluded that Adams' negligent conduct was the sole proximate cause of the collision, and we agree.
Following the presentation of the evidence at the trial each of the plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict in their favor. The trial court promptly and properly denied the motion of the plaintiff Adams but reserved its ruling as to the plaintiff Mrs. Adams. This latter action was taken pursuant to subdivision (b) of Rule 2.7 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 31 F.S.A., which subdivision reads as follows:
The trial court then charged the jury concerning the issues raised in both of the plaintiffs' causes of action, and submitted the case to the jury. After deliberation the jury returned a verdict for the defendant and against both of the plaintiffs.
After the trial the plaintiffs timely filed a motion for a new trial and the plaintiff Mary Adams filed a motion for judgment in accordance with her motion for a directed verdict that the court had reserved its ruling on at the trial.
Following a hearing on the said post-trial motions the trial court entered the judgment appealed from herein, denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial but granting the motion of the plaintiff Mary Adams for judgment in accordance with her motion for a directed verdict, notwithstanding the jury verdict on the issue of liability only, and setting her cause against the defendant for trial on the sole issue of damages.
In the said judgment the trial court set forth its reasons for entering the judgment, namely: that it is obvious that the jury either misunderstood the court's charges on the law or misapplied the law; that it is clear from the evidence that the defendant was 'guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident. * * *'; and that it is equally clear from the evidence that, though it was within the province of the jury to find the plaintiff James Adams to have been contributorily negligent, such negligence may not be imputed to the plaintiff Mary Adams. While we agree with the trial court's statement that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff James Adams was not, under the evidence and issues, imputable to the plaintiff Mary Adams, we think that that court's reasoning was deficient in overlooking the fact that, under the evidence and issues, the jury had another legal alternative--they could, we think, reasonably have found that the negligence of the plaintiff James Adams was the sole proximate cause of the collision and, if the jury so found, neither of the plaintiffs could recover against the defendant.
In granting the plaintiff Mary R. Adams' motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability and a new trial on the issue of damages, the...
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Panoz v. Gulf & Bay Corp. of Sarasota
...the adversary that reasonably might be drawn from the evidence as a whole'. Cash v. Gates, Fla.App., 1963, 151 So.2d 838; Love v. Adams, Fla.App., 1967, 194 So.2d 55. Applying the foregoing principles to the case sub judice, and admitting we would so hold only in a clear case, we are constr......
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McQueen v. Atlantic Truck Service, Inc.
...pending in the cause and of which no disposition has yet been made. 3 CARROLL, DONALD K., and RAWLS, JJ., concur. 1 Love v. Adams, (Fla.App.1967) 194 So.2d 55, 58, 59.2 McClain v. Swearingen (1942), 152 Fla. 11, 10 So.2d 564.3 McCloskey v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., (Fla.App.1960)......
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Boles v. Brackin, ZZ-212
...issue from the jury question as to whether causation or actionable negligence actually exists. As we stated in Love v. Adams, 194 So.2d 55, 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967): (P)rima facie evidence of negligence arising from the violation of a statute or ordinance may be overcome by proof of showing t......
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Nofal v. Tulip Realty Co. of Fla., 67--668
...the plaintiff. See also: Greer v. Thweatt, Fla.App.1967, 202 So.2d 574; Daily v. Hendricks, Fla.App.1967, 200 So.2d 566; Love v. Adams, Fla.App.1967, 194 So.2d 55; Smith v. Peninsular Insurance Company, Fla.App.1965, 181 So.2d Accordingly, the order appealed is reversed and the cause is rem......