Love v. Alamance County Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 27 March 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-1326,84-1326
• Citation: 757 F.2d 1504
• Parties: 37 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 633, 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,106, 23 Ed. Law Rep. 1269 Mary M. LOVE, Appellant, v. The ALAMANCE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 1504

757 F.2d 1504

37 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 633,

36 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,106, 23 Ed. Law Rep. 1269

Mary M. LOVE, Appellant, v. The ALAMANCE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee.

No. 84-1326.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 6, 1984.

Decided March 27, 1985.

Jonathan Wallas, Charlotte, N.C. (J. LeVonne Chambers, Chambers, Ferguson, Watt, Wallas & Adkins, P.A., Charlotte, N.C., on brief), for appellant.

Michael A. Gilles, Greensboro, N.C. (Martin N. Erwin, Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter, Greensboro, N.C., Paul H. Ridge, Daniel S. Johnson, Ridge, Richardson & Johnson, Graham, N.C., on brief), for appellee.

Before SPROUSE and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges, and DUPREE, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

SPROUSE, Circuit Judge.

Mary Love, a black female, appeals from a judgment of the district court, 581 F.Supp. 1079, entered in favor of defendant Alamance County, North Carolina, Board of Education in this action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982), and 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983 (1982). The district court held that the Board did not discriminate on the basis of race or sex when it refused on several occasions to promote Love to a position as principal or assistant principal. On appeal Love raises two major arguments: (1) the district court erred in failing to apply strict scrutiny to the Board's articulated reason for not promoting her; and (2) the district court erred in evaluating her claim under the principles enunciated in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Love also claims that the district court's finding that she withdrew her application for a certain position is clearly erroneous. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Love is a black female who began her employment as an elementary school teacher in the Alamance County school system in 1957. Prior to her employment in the system, she received a B.A. degree from Winston-Salem State University in North Carolina in 1955, and taught briefly in various school systems. In 1959 she received a M.A. degree in elementary education from North Carolina Central University.

The Alamance County school system was segregated until the late 1960's. Beginning with the 1969-70 school year, Love transferred to integrated schools and taught reading at E.M. Yoder and South Mebane Elementary schools. At that time she took summer courses at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill but received no degree. Beginning with the 1971-72 school year, she was placed permanently as a reading teacher at South Mebane Elementary School. At this time Love began taking courses in school administration at North Carolina A & T University and received a principal certification, grades K-12, from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction in May 1972. Prior to receiving the certification, she served as an intern at South Mebane Elementary School. From 1972 until 1976 Love took some education courses in reading at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro in order to acquire certification in reading, but since 1972 she has acquired a total only of six credit hours of non-in-service education courses.

Love's work performance as a teacher has been evaluated regularly while in the Alamance system, and through 1977 her evaluations, completed by a number of different principals, were uniformly "satisfactory"--the highest rating permissible on the standardized evaluation forms. Comments included "a real asset to our program," "very resourceful," and "cooperative," and students enjoyed her classes, which were "well planned." Love also was the coordinator of student teaching during the 1974-75 school year. In her June 1975 evaluation, she was given a top rating of "satisfactory" in all categories except punctuality. The evaluator, assistant superintendent of personnel, stated that Love "has continued to grow professionally," that her contributions were "greatly appreciated," and that she had done "a very good job."

Starting in 1978, the standardized evaluation forms included a higher rating--"commendable." In 1978 she was rated "commendable" in seven categories, "satisfactory" in twenty categories, and "marginal" in one category (punctuality). In 1979 she was rated "commendable" in thirteen categories and "satisfactory" in the other fifteen categories.

Love filed a charge of discrimination on October 27, 1978 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that she had been denied promotions because of her race and sex. The EEOC issued to Love a notice of her right to sue, and she timely instituted this lawsuit under Title VII and sections 1981 and 1983 on June 22, 1979.

At trial, Love introduced evidence of at least fifteen rejections for administrative positions in the Alamance school system since 1970. The district court limited its consideration of her claims under Title VII to discriminatory acts occurring after April 30, 1978, that is, within 180 days of her filing her charge with the EEOC ¹ and limited its consideration of her claims under sections 1981 and 1983 to discriminatory acts occurring after June 22, 1976, that is, acts occurring within North Carolina's three year statute of limitations. ² Under these time limitations, the court considered her evidence pertaining only to eight rejections for administrative positions and, finding no discrimination, decided all eight in favor of the Alamance County Board of Education. Love appeals the district court's findings as to only three of the positions she sought: principal at B. Everett Jordan Elementary School in 1977 and again in 1978; and assistant principal at Western Middle School in 1980. These positions were all awarded to whites: Jane Burke, Willis Wheeler, and Ronald Bozeman, respectively.

II.

In evaluating Love's claims, the district court applied the principles for shifting the burden of proof announced in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The district court first found that Love established a prima facie case by showing that she belonged to a protected class (black female), that she applied for a position for which she was qualified, that she was rejected, and that a white was chosen to fill the position. The district court next found that the Board articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not promoting Love into the administrative positions in question--namely, that she was less qualified than the persons chosen. In the third stage of the analysis, the district court found that Love failed to prove that the Board's articulated reasons were pretextual.

Love contends, however, that because the evaluators used subjective criteria in their selection procedures, the legitimacy of and non-discriminatory basis for the Board's decision should be subject to strict scrutiny and that under strict scrutiny, the Board's articulated reason fails to rebut her prima facie case. While we agree with Love that the Board's articulated reason should be subject to strict scrutiny, Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 230 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 102 S.Ct. 388, 70 L.Ed.2d 206 (1981), we believe that its proffered reason is legitimate and non-discriminatory.

When Superintendent Nelson, a white male, was appointed in 1971, he instituted new procedures for the selection of principals and assistant principals. Applications for principal were first screened by him and the assistant superintendent of personnel. Subsequently, a committee consisting of Nelson and the assistant superintendents for personnel and instructional support services interviewed the screened applicants. Following the interviews, the committee made a recommendation to the Board, the ultimate selector. Selections of assistant principals were made essentially by the principal of the respective school following interviews by the principal and assistant superintendent of personnel. A principal's recommendation to the superintendent that a person be hired as an assistant principal was tantamount to that person's selection.

In 1977 Nelson decided to alter substantially the selection process for principals while leaving that for assistant principals unchanged. Under the new procedures, Nelson and the assistant superintendent for personnel initially screened the applications for principal. Selected applicants then were interviewed by a committee of four to six people appointed by Nelson or the assistant superintendent of personnel and drawn from the principals or the central staff. Nelson and the assistant superintendent of personnel then interviewed some or all of the persons recommended by the committee. As under the previous selection procedure, the Board ultimately approved or rejected the final recommendations. Nelson testified that the motivations behind the procedural changes in 1977 were: the sheer number of interviews, the belief that committees naturally would counteract the influence of bias, and the belief that committees would likely select successful people.

Love correctly observes that this court has stated that subjective evaluations may be subject to strict scrutiny. See Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d at 230. We also have said, however, that "the mere fact that subjective criteria are involved in the reason articulated by an employer does not prevent according it sufficient rebuttal weight to dispel the inference of discrimination raised by the prima facie case." Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) ). Here, the district...