Love v. Hartford Life Insurance Co.

• Decision Date: 29 November 1910
• Parties: LACY M. LOVE, Appellant, v. HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

132 S.W. 335

153 Mo.App. 144

LACY M. LOVE, Appellant, v. HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent

Court of Appeals of Missouri, St. Louis

November 29, 1910

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court.--Hon. George H. Williams Judge.

Judgment affirmed and cause remanded.

C. R Skinker for appellant.

(1) Interpleader cannot be maintained, because respondent has incurred an independent liability to appellant. Insurance Co. v. Kidder, 162 Ind. 389; Ludlow v. Strong, 53 N.J.Eq. 326; Wakeman v. Kingsland, 46 N.J.Eq 113; French v. Robrchard, 50 Vermont 43, 7; Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 841; Crawshay v. Thornton, 2 My. and Cr. 1; Sprague v. Soule, 35 Mich. 35; Cromwell v. Trust Co., 57 Hun. 151; Pfister v. Wade, 56 Cal. 46. (2) Respondent is not disinterested. Hartsook v. Chrissman, 114 Mo.App. 558; Conley v. Insurance Co., 67 Ala. 477; Insurance Co. v. Pingrey, 141 Mass. 411; Kyle v. Railroad, 112 Ala. 610; Ryan v. Lamson, 44 Ill.App. 204; Pfister v. Wade, 56 Cal. 46. (3) The titles of appellant and Mrs. von Borcke are adverse. Commissioners v. Safe Co., 133 U.S. 486; Colortype Co. v. Continental Co., 188 U.S. 107; Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 286; Morrill v. Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 260. (4) The same debt is not claimed by appellant and Mrs. von Borcke. Glyn v. Duesbury, 11 Sim. 148; Johnson v. Atkinson, 3 Anstr. 798; Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 84; Conley v. Insurance Co., 67 Ala. 477; Pfister v. Wade, 56 Cal. 46. (5) Respondent raises a question as to the amount due. Smith v. Grand Lodge, 125 Mo.App. 207. (6) Appellant has a clear right to collect the proceeds from respondent. Woodmen v. Wood, 100 Mo.App. 658; Sullivan v. Knights of Father Mathew, 73 Mo.App. 45; Funk v. Avery, 84 Mo.App. 494.

Jones, Jones, Hocker & Davis for respondent.

The judgment of the court permitting the bill of interpleader and ordering the money to be paid into court was right and equitable and should be affirmed. Roselle v. Bank, 119 Mo. 84; School Dist. v. Weston, 31 Mich. 85; Morrill v. Ins. Co., 183 Ill. 260; N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Richards, 99 Mo.App. 88; Woodmen of the World v. Wood, 100 Mo.App. 655; Supreme Council L. of H. v. Palmer, 107 Mo.App. 157.

NORTONI, J. Reynolds, P. J., and Caulfield, J., concur.

OPINION

NORTONI, J.

This is a suit on two policies of life insurance, but the question for decision relates to defendant's right of interpleader which is interposed in its answer. The court granted the relief prayed for in respect of this matter, directed the claimants to interplead for the fund which was paid into court, discharged defendant, and plaintiff prosecutes the appeal from that judgment.

Defendant is an incorporated life insurance company and it appears that it issued two policies of insurance, numbered 21, 261 and 21, 262, of $ 1000 each, on the life of Charles A. von Borcke in 1881. Both of these policies were made payable to Mary L. von Borcke, wife of the insured, who was denominated as the beneficiary therein. Afterward, in August, 1906, the insured, Charles A. von Borcke, and his wife, Mary L. von Borcke, sole beneficiary under the policies, for value, assigned each of said policies in writing to plaintiff Love, a creditor of the insured, Charles A. von Borcke, and directed the same to be paid to him on the death of the insured as his interest might appear. The assignment of the two policies was duly executed by both the insured and his wife, Mary L. von Borcke, the beneficiary, annexed to the policies and approved and accepted by defendant insurance company in writing indorsed thereon.

All the premiums were duly paid and the insured departed this life February 27, 1908. Thereafter proofs of death were duly made by plaintiff Love, assignee of the policies, but defendant neglected to pay the amounts due thereunder for the reason Mrs. von Borcke, the widow, notified it that she laid claim to a portion of the fund. Plaintiff Love, the assignee of the policies, thereupon instituted this suit against the insurance company to the end of recovering the amount of the two policies together with interest thereon, and defendant answered by way of an interpleader. In its answer, defendant admitted its obligation to pay the amount sued for to some one, recited the facts pertaining to the assignment of the policies to Love and that the original beneficiary, Mrs. von Borcke, claimed either all or a portion of the fund in its hands. Defendant tendered the amount of the policies, together with the accrued interest thereon, into court, said that it had no interest in the matter whatever, other than that the fund should be paid to the rightful owner or properly distributed, prayed the court to order the parties to interplead and discharge it from further responsibility, etc. On a hearing, the facts above set forth appeared to be uncontroverted. Mrs. von Borcke admitted having joined with her husband, the insured, in executing the assignment of the policies to plaintiff, her husband's creditor, as his interest might appear and that plaintiff is entitled to a considerable portion of the fund, but she asserted a claim to some part thereof, which, of course, on the present hearing, was not ascertained. On the other hand, it is conceded by defendant insurance company that it consented to the assignment of the policies to plaintiff and agreed in writing at the time of the assignment to pay him on receipt of proper proof of death of the insured and the insurable interest of creditor. The court declared defendant's right to the relief prayed for, allowed it a reasonable attorney's fee and other costs and upon its paying the fund into court, less the attorney's fees and such costs, ordered its discharge and directed an interpleading between Mrs. von Borcke and plaintiff for the fund.

It is argued by plaintiff that the court erred in giving this decree for the reason it conclusively appears defendant is not a mere disinterested stakeholder between him and Mrs. von Borcke as by accepting and approving the assignment of the policies it contracted to pay the fund to plaintiff. There can be no doubt of the general principle of equity which operates to inhibit the right of interpleader in those cases where the party seeking the relief has placed himself under an independent liability to either of the claimants beyond the liability which arises from the title to the property or fund in controversy. The principle proceeds in accordance with the precepts of natural justice, for, as a rule, the court ought not to entertain the bill and award an injunction against the prosecution of a suit when such an independent obligation appears. Furthermore, sustaining the bill in such circumstances operates to discharge the interpleader of the duty to respond to such independent undertaking without a hearing as to that fact. The principle obtains, too, we believe, because in respect of such independent promise there is no privity between the claimants, but it exists solely between the party praying for the relief and the particular claimant to whom the promise was made. [See 4 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. (3 Ed.), secs. 1326, 1327; Beach's Mod. Eq. sec. 143; 23 Cyc. 5, 6, 7, 8; 11 Ency. Pl. and Pr. 459; Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Kidder, 162 Ind. 382, 70 N.E. 489; Sprague v. Soule, 35 Mich. 35; Pfister v. Wade, 56 Cal. 43; Crawshay v. Thornton, 2 My. & Cr. 1; Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836, 841; French v. Robrchard, 50 Vt. 43.]

In accordance with this doctrine, the High Court of Chancery in England denied the right of B & Co., wharfingers, to interplead in a case where A deposited certain iron with B & Co. and directed them to deliver it to C. It appears that B & Co. thereafter entered the same in their books as to the account of C and wrote him a letter saying that the annexed note was of the landing weights of the iron transferred into his name by A and now held by them, (B & Co.), at (C's) disposal. Upon D subsequently laying claim to the iron and asserting that A, who had deposited it with B & Co. for C had done so without authority on converting it from the true owner, D, B & Co. filed their bill praying that the court require C, to whom they had made the independent promise, and D, the alleged owner, to interplead for the iron. The court denied the bill because of the independent obligation with respect to the matter which B & Co. had assumed toward C by entering the iron on their books in his name and writing him the letter above mentioned. [Crawshay v. Thornton, 2 My. and Cr. 1.] But, upon scrutinizing this case, it will appear that no privity whatever existed between the claimants, C and D, and that their titles were not derived from a common source; for, while C's title was derived from A, who deposited the iron with B & Co., D's title was wholly independent of and paramount to that of A, who indeed was a tortfeasor, in that he had converted the iron from D, the true owner. A study of that case, however, will reveal instances cited where interpleader will lie, even though an independent obligation exists to one of the claimants, if the several claimants are in privity and it appears their several rights are derivative. Under the rule above suggested, interpleader has been denied, too, in a case where it appears a lessee had leased a mine by a separate indenture from two different persons asserting adverse ownership. Of course, there was no privity in such circumstances and the right to interplead the two separate lessors under independent and separate contracts of lease was denied. The lessee having thus obligated himself independently to respond to two separate landlords was not entitled to the aid of the court to have them interplead for the rents. By his express covenant he had agreed to pay both. [Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836; see, also, Hartsook, etc.,...