Love v. State

• Decision Date: 18 June 1913
• Citation: 158 S.W. 525
• Parties: LOVE v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 525

158 S.W. 525

LOVE v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 18, 1913.

Appeal from District Court, Liberty County; L. B. Hightower, Judge.

Taylor Love was convicted of second degree murder, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

E. B. Pickett, Jr., of Liberty, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

DAVIDSON, P. J.

Appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree, his punishment being assessed at 18 years' confinement in the penitentiary.

The complaints of appellant are directed against the court's charge on manslaughter. Briefly stated, so far as the disposition of the case is concerned, the facts show on Christmas day some negroes were congregated at a race course and engaged in horse racing. The deceased, Lewis, had trouble with two brothers of the defendant, Buck and Pete Love, and gave them both a whipping. About the time he finished these performances he said something to the defendant about giving him his money. It may be gathered from the facts the deceased thought that defendant was holding stakes in which he (deceased) was interested, and there is some evidence perhaps tending to show that appellant may have held stakes. Any way deceased thought so. Defendant left the grounds and went to the residence of Barney Wright, about 300 yards away. After a short interval of time, 20 or 30 minutes, deceased followed appellant to Wright's and told him that he (appellant) had gotten his (deceased's) money, which the appellant denied. This brought on a war of words, which finally ended in a personal difficulty, in which deceased severely punished appellant, causing him both pain and bloodshed. It is unnecessary to go into a detailed statement of the difficulty. There seems to have been no question, so far as these matters are concerned. Deceased had appellant down while beating him, and was pulled off, parties separated them, and after some 10 to 20 minutes, witnesses varying as to the time, the parties got together again, and appellant, during the latter altercation, stabbed the deceased, from which he died. The record of the testimony is very voluminous, covering 105 pages. It is deemed unnecessary to go into a statement of these matters further than as it pertains to the criticism of the court's charge. The court, with reference to manslaughter, instructed the jury: "By the expression `under the immediate influence of sudden passion' is meant: That the provocation must arise at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the passion is not the result of a former provocation. The act must be directly caused by the passion arising out of the provocation. The passion intended is either of the emotions of the mind known as anger, rage, sudden resentment or terror, rendering it incapable of cool reflection. By the expression `adequate cause' is meant such as would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror, in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection. The following are deemed adequate causes: An assault and battery, causing pain or bloodshed, is adequate cause, and any condition or circumstance which is capable of creating and does create sudden passion, such as anger, rage, sudden resentment or terror, rendering the mind incapable of cool reflection, whether accompanied by bodily pain or not, is deemed adequate cause. And where there are several causes to arouse passion, although no one of them alone would constitute adequate cause, it is for you to determine whether or not all such causes combined might be sufficient to do so."

Then follows another section of the charge, which informs the jury that adequate cause must exist at the time to produce the state of mind above referred to, and the state of mind must actually exist. Applying the law to the case, the court thus charged the jury: "Now, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with a knife, a deadly weapon, or instrument reasonably calculated and likely to produce death by the mode and manner of its use, in a sudden transport of passion aroused by adequate cause, as the same has been hereinbefore explained, with intent to kill did unlawfully cut and thereby kill said Teal Lewis, then you will find him guilty of manslaughter and assess his punishment," etc. It is contended this charge is too restrictive, and that while the court does tell the jury that an assault and battery causing pain or bloodshed is adequate cause, yet, applying the law to the case, the court does not instruct the jury that if they find the deceased inflicted pain or bloodshed, this would be sufficient cause to arouse sudden passion requisite under the statute. We are of opinion this contention of appellant is correct. The court should have instructed the jury, applying the law, that if deceased had inflicted pain or bloodshed upon appellant, and this produced sudden passion called for by the statute, then they should only find appellant guilty of manslaughter.

The proposition is thus laid down by Mr. Branch in his excellent work on Criminal Law: "If a cause...