Love v. US
| Decision Date | 10 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-100-CIV-3-H.,88-100-CIV-3-H. |
| Citation | 889 F. Supp. 1548 |
| Parties | Luola McCormick LOVE and husband Charles Love; Dougald Stuart McCormick; Rachael McCormick Brooks and husband Thomas Brooks, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America; State of North Carolina; Dunbar Corporation; McCauley and McDonald Investments, Inc.; Beskind and Rudolph, P.A. and David S. Rudolph; Southern National Bank of North Carolina and Ervin I. Baer, Trustee; Quick Stop Food Mart, Inc. and Albert McCauley and Kenneth McDonald, a Partnership; and CSX Transportation, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
William E. Clark, John, G. Shaw, Clark, Shaw, Clark, Lingle & Clark, Fayetteville, NC, for plaintiffs.
Paul Newby, Asst. U.S. Atty., Raleigh, NC, for defendant No. 1.
John F. Maddrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., N.C. Dept. of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for defendant No. 2.
Mark A. Sternlicht, Beaver, Thompson, Holt & Richardson, Fayetteville, NC, for defendants Nos. 3-11.
Charles B. Neely, Jr., Gilbert C. Laite, III, Maupin Taylor Ellis & Adams, P.A., Raleigh, NC, for defendants Nos. 12 & 13.
This matter is before the court upon objections to Memorandum and Recommendation dated September 28, 1992, and Memorandum and Recommendation and Order of March 31, 1992, entered by United States Magistrate Judges Charles K. McCotter, Jr., and Wallace W. Dixon. All remaining parties have filed objections and, in several instances, responses to objections. The matter has also been heard at oral argument. Several factors have delayed a decision in this matter including, the voluminous nature of the file, the number of issues and their complexity, and the press of other business. Nevertheless, the time for ruling has arrived.
This is an action to quiet title to real property in Cumberland County, North Carolina. Jurisdiction is found in 28 U.S.C. ?? 2409a, 1346(f) and 1345. The property in dispute was a former railroad right-of-way which was operated by Seaboard Systems Railroad (Seaboard), and both its predecessors and successors in interest, including CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX). Seaboard abandoned service over this property in 1979. As framed by the initial pleadings, a number of parties, including the United States, claim title to all, or portions of, the disputed property. While a number of these claims have been resolved, disputes remain as to some portions of the property. The remaining parcels are those that have been the subject of a pending state court condemnation action, and a small parcel located at the southern end of the disputed tract.
The property that forms the basis of this action is a strip of land approximately 80-100 feet wide and running in a northwest-southeast direction. The Fort Bragg Military Reservation borders the strip along the southwest. For over 135 years the property has been used for a single set of railroad tracks. Railroad use began on the property following the execution of certain documents by Duncan Murchison and Duncan McCormick in 1853. These individuals were adjacent landowners, with Murchison's lands being to the northwest of McCormick's. The documents are essentially identical in form, both sealed, witnessed, and signed by Murchison and McCormick, respectively. The documents recite:
For and in consideration of ONE DOLLAR, cash in hand paid, it is by this agreement witnessed that the undersigneth doth contract to grant and convey unto the WESTERN RAIL ROAD COMPANY, in case the said Company shall locate their Road through or upon the lands of the undersigned, a sufficient quantity of land for that purpose, viz.: a strip of land not exceeding 50 feet wide (40 feet wide in the Murchison document), on each side, measuring from the centre of the Road bed. The conveyance of the lands to be made upon demand, after the actual location is traced out or determined upon.
Neither of these documents was recorded in the Cumberland County Registry until 1981. The magistrate judges found that pursuant to these documents, the railroad entered onto the lands of Duncan McCormick and Duncan Murchison and established its track prior to August 18, 1872, and that the Western Railroad and its successors in interest, including Seaboard, made exclusive use of this property until 1979, and possibly until 1984.
In 1979, in a proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), Seaboard abandoned railroad service over a 3.52-mile portion of its line. The disputed property was a part of this larger abandonment. Following the abandonment, the railroad removed its tracks, except for two side tracks and a switch connecting a spur track serving Fort Bragg to the main track, located at the extreme southeastern end of the disputed strip. Following ICC proceedings, Seaboard conveyed a section of the abandoned right-of-way to Dunbar Corporation (Dunbar) through a quitclaim deed, dated September 10, 1984, and recorded in Book 3042, page 111, Cumberland County Registry. Upon receiving the deed from Seaboard, Dunbar made out-conveyances to several other parties; the most significant of which were to McCauley and McDonald Investments, Inc. (McCauley and McDonald). Three parcels were conveyed to McCauley and McDonald; of which only one remains in dispute, a ".46-Acre tract" located at the southern end of the subject property.
The North Carolina Department of Transportation (DOT) commenced a condemnation action of two parcels at the northeastern end of the property for a highway project by the filing of a complaint with a declaration of taking and notice of deposit, pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. ? 136-103, on August 17, 1984, in the Superior Court of Cumberland County. Dunbar was named as a party claiming an ownership interest in the property. The heirs of Duncan Murchison were added as parties to the state action; and by a deed dated April 3, 1986, recorded in Book 3155, at page 671, of the Cumberland County Registry, the Murchison heirs quitclaimed their interest in the condemnation property to Dunbar. The instrument also assigned to Dunbar the Murchison heirs' interest in any condemnation award.
On May 5, 1986, the State sought to add the United States as a party claiming an interest in the subject property. The action was removed to this federal court by the United States. On October 20, 1986, United States District Judge Terrence W. Boyle entered an order dismissing the action against the United States for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It was determined that the exclusive jurisdiction for actions to quiet title resides in the federal court, that the state court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate title to property claimed by the federal government, and that the federal court had no such jurisdiction within the confines of a removed case. Department of Transportation v. Seaboard System Railroad Corp., et al., No. 86-45-CIV-3 (E.D.N.C. October 20, 1986).
In the state court action, Superior Court Judge Coy Brewer held that the state, through the Department of Transportation and acting as a condemnor exercising the power of eminent domain, could not assert title to the property in the context of a condemnation proceeding. This assertion of title had been based on the principles of escheat to the state, or through an inability to establish a chain of title. Judge Brewer then found that, as between those parties properly before the court and asserting an interest in the contested property as of the date of taking,...
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