Lovejoy v. Whitcomb
| Decision Date | 29 November 1899 |
| Citation | 55 N.E. 322,174 Mass. 586 |
| Parties | LOVEJOY v. WHITCOMB. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
D. W. Quill and D. N. Crowley, for appellant.
J. W Porter and C. A. Sayward, for appellee.
The defendant appealed from the order of the court overruling his demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration, and, after a trial before a jury, filed a bill of exceptions.
The first question is whether the allegations of the declaration charge the defendant with an actionable slander. The language set out in the first count is as follows: It contains several disparaging expressions, no one of which, taken alone, would distinctly charge the crime of adultery. When ambiguous language is used, and there are several statements made by the speaker at the same time which throw light upon the language of doubtful meaning, and tend to show the sense in which it is used, the statements and the circumstances under which they are made may well be considered by the jury for the purpose of determining the meaning. In the present case the defendant's words begin with a strong implication that the plaintiff is an unfit man to act as the musical director of a church choir. Then comes the charge that he is of bad moral character, followed by a statement of a specific fact to show in what particular his character is bad. He speaks of 'proof,' which is a word that points to accusation and a hearing, and he adds with emphasis that the man is 'vile.' We are of opinion that this language, taken together, fairly implies that the plaintiff had been guilty of criminal intercourse with the house girl. If the only words were a charge that he was 'caught with the house girl,' it would be impossible to know how much was meant by the word 'caught.' In Snell v. Snow, 13 Metc. (Mass.) 278, it was decided that the words 'bad girl' do not import criminality; but in Riddell v. Thayer, 127 Mass. 487-490, the words 'bad woman' were used under such circumstances as to constitute an implied charge of adultery. The word 'caught,' with the accompanying expressions, would ordinarily be understood to mean discovered in such a position that adultery would be inferred. The demurrer was rightly overruled, and the judge rightly refused to take the case from the jury.
The jury were correctly instructed that 'A false and disparaging statement concerning one in his trade, occupation, or calling is actionable in itself; and the person concerning whom such a statement is made, although he should not be able to show that he suffered damage or loss, would still be entitled to recover.' Morasse v. Brochu, 151 Mass. 567, 25 N.E. 74, 8 L. R. A. 524; Dooling v. Publishing Co., 144 Mass. 258, 10 N.E. 809; Boynton v. Stocking Co., 146 Mass. 219, 15 N.E. 507.
The instructions requested which the court refused to give all relate to the defendant's contention that the statements were privileged. The requests for instructions were founded on an assumption that if the defendant acted in good faith and with a reasonable purpose to advance the interests of the church, he was not liable, and also that it was the defendant's duty to make known to other members of the choir what he had ascertained in regard to the musical director. There was no such relation between the defendant and the other members of the choir as to make it his duty to inform them what he knew or had heard in regard to the character of the plaintiff. The members of the choir were employés of the church, under a contract to assist at its services. They had no duty to perform nor interest to serve which...
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