Lovelace v. City of Shelby

• Decision Date: 07 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 312A99.,312A99.
• Citation: 526 S.E.2d 652
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Sharon Lynn LOVELACE, Administratrix of the Estate of Shayla Meagen Moore, and Sharon Lynn Lovelace, Individually v. CITY OF SHELBY and Thomas Lowell Lee.

526 S.E.2d 652

Sharon Lynn LOVELACE, Administratrix of the Estate of Shayla Meagen Moore, and Sharon Lynn Lovelace, Individually v. CITY OF SHELBY and Thomas Lowell Lee.

No. 312A99.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 7, 2000.

Deaton & Biggers, P.L.L.C., by W. Robinson Deaton, Jr., and Lydia A. Hoza; and Hamrick, Mauney, Flowers, Martin & Moore, by Fred A. Flowers, Shelby, for plaintiff-appellant.

Scott, Hollowell, Palmer & Windham, LLP, by Martha Raymond Thompson, Gastonia, for defendant-appellee City of Shelby.

ORR, Justice.

Plaintiff, Sharon Lynn Lovelace, individually and in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her deceased daughter, Shayla Meagan Moore (Shayla), initiated this action against defendants on 5 November 1997. Plaintiff alleged that defendant City of Shelby (City) was negligent in the dispatch of fire-fighting personnel to plaintiff's home, resulting in Shayla's death, and that the City, through its negligent dispatch of fire-fighting personnel, caused plaintiff severe emotional distress. Plaintiff also asserted claims against defendant Lee, but he is not a party to this appeal. On 16 January 1998, the City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

On 11 March 1998, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to allege additionally that the City's negligence was the direct and proximate cause of Shayla's death and that the City's actions created a "special duty" between plaintiff, Shayla, and the City. On 12 March 1998, the trial court denied the City's 12(b)(6) motion.

The City appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the trial court's denial of the 12(b)(6) motion because "plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Public Duty Doctrine." The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 12 March 1998 order and remanded to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing plaintiff's case. See Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 133 N.C.App. 408, 414, 515 S.E.2d 722, 726 (1999)

. The Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff had not alleged facts that adequately established the "special duty" exception to the public duty doctrine. See id. at 413, 515 S.E.2d at 726. Judge Wynn dissented on the grounds that plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to establish negligence and alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that the case fell within the "special duty" exception to the public duty doctrine. Id. at 414, 515 S.E.2d at 726 (Wynn, J., dissenting). Based on the dissent, plaintiff appealed to this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2).

Because this appeal is based on defendant City's motion to dismiss, we must treat plaintiff's factual allegations as true. See Cage v. Colonial Bldg. Co., 337 N.C. 682, 683, 448 S.E.2d 115, 116 (1994)

. The facts, as alleged, show that on 29 June 1996, plaintiff and her three minor children, including Shayla, resided at 706 Calvary Street, Shelby, North Carolina, when a fire was discovered inside the house. Their home was located 1.1 miles from the Shelby fire station. Plaintiff exited the house with two of her three minor children, but Shayla failed to follow them. The fire was reported to the City by calling its 911 emergency number. According to the pleadings, Helen Earley, the 911 system operator for the City, delayed dispatching the fire department until six minutes after she received the call reporting the fire. The fire department did not arrive at plaintiff's home until approximately ten minutes after that initial 911 call was placed.

While plaintiff and others waited for the fire department to arrive, Shayla could be heard inside the house talking and calling for her mother. Bystanders, including police officers who arrived on the scene before the fire department, made several attempts to enter the house, but the intensity of the flames thwarted their rescue attempts. Shayla was alive inside the house for several minutes immediately following the beginning of the fire and prior to the fire department's arrival.

The issue in this case is whether the public duty doctrine insulates the City of Shelby from liability for the alleged negligence of Helen Earley, a 911 operator for the City, and, if so, whether plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts to support the "special duty" exception to the public duty doctrine.

As early as this Court's decision in Hill v. Aldermen of Charlotte, 72 N.C. 55 (1875), the state and its agencies have been immune from tort liability under the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity continues to be a viable protection against tort claims for local governments. It is subject, however, to certain legislatively created exceptions allowing local governments to purchase liability insurance to protect the public, see N.C.G.S. §§ 153A-435 (1999) (applying to counties), 160A-485 (1999) (applying to cities), and court-made exceptions for public officials involved in conduct that is either corrupt,...