Lovelace v. Travelers' Protective Association of America
| Decision Date | 22 December 1894 |
| Citation | 28 S.W. 877,126 Mo. 104 |
| Parties | Lovelace v. Travelers' Protective Association of America, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. Daniel Dillon Judge.
Action upon a benefit certificate issued by the defendant. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed.
The contract sued upon is contained in the certificate, and certain parts of the constitution of the defendant, as follows:
THE CERTIFICATE.
FROM THE CONSTITUTION.
The other material facts are stated in the opinion.
Affirmed.
""Henry T. Kent for appellant.
It is not an accidental killing, such as to make the defendant liable, where the death was the result of a rencounter, or where the party killed was the voluntary agent in bringing on the difficulty resulting in his death, or placed himself in such a position as to induce it. ""Hutchcraft's Executor v. Travelers Insurance Co., 87 Ky. 300; ""Supreme Council v. Garrigus, 104 Ind. 133; ""Phelen v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 38 Mo.App. 640.
""Valle Reyburn for respondent.
(1) In construing the benefit certificate issued by defendant, and in interpreting its constitution and by-laws applicable thereto, a liberal construction favorable to the plaintiff should be adopted. Bacon on Benevolent Societies, par. 178; Cook on Life Insurance, sec. 18, p. 20; Niblack on Mutual Benefit Societies, pars. 172, 172a; ""Healy v. Association, 133 Ill. 556; ""Utter v. Ins. Co., 65 Mich. 545; ""Paul v. Travelers', etc., Co., 112 N.Y. 472. (2) The death of Lovelace at the hands of Graves was a death by accident, and not from natural causes in contemplation of law and within the language and significance of the membership certificate as defined by the provisions of defendant's constitution. Cook on Life Insurance, secs. 49, 50 and 51; ""Supreme Council v. Garrigus, 104 Ind. 133; ""Accident, etc., Co. v. Bennett, 90 Tenn. 256; ""Richards v. Travelers', etc., Co., 89 Cal. 170; ""Hutchcraft's Ex'r v. Travelers', etc., Co., 87 Ky. 300; ""Rippey v. Association, 2 Bigelow, Life & Accident Reports, 739; May on Insurance [3 Ed.], sec. 520.
This is an action upon a benefit certificate, in the nature of an insurance policy, issued to Charles H. Lovelace by the Travelers' Protective Association of America, the defendant, a benevolent association, incorporated under the laws of Missouri.
The pleadings need not be recited. No point is raised touching the formal presentation of the case.
Counsel for both parties, with commendable frankness and brevity, have put the material facts into compact form to facilitate the solution of the controversy.
It was submitted to the trial judge, without a jury, upon an agreed statement and depositions. The only question now urged is a question of law.
Mr. Lovelace was a member in good standing in the defendant association, when he met with his death, August 8, 1892.
The plaintiff is his mother, the beneficiary in his membership certificate.
The contract of insurance is contained in the certificate and in parts of the constitution of the association, which, counsel mutually agree, control the issue of the litigation.
In the statement, introducing the report of the case, copies of these documents are given.
No point is raised touching proofs of loss, notice, or any formal matter.
The defendant meets the case broadly, on its merits.
The decisive question before us is, was the death of the assured an "accident," within the true meaning of the contract of insurance. The question was presented by an instruction that, under the evidence, plaintiff was not entitled to recover; which the trial court refused to give. On the contrary, the court found for the plaintiff, and gave judgment accordingly for $ 4,119.30 (which included some interest).
Defendant then appealed, after the usual preliminaries.
The following facts show the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lovelace:
He was a commercial traveler. On the fifth day of August, 1892, he came as a guest to the hotel in Hazelhurst, Mississippi. He was a friend of the proprietor, and spoke to some member of the latter's family on the porch of the hotel before entering the office. Another man named Graves was in the office of the hotel, making more or less noise, and cursing at times, when Lovelace arrived, about half past 11 o'clock at night.
The only witness besides Graves who saw the killing was one Scott. From his testimony it seems that that night the proprietor, Mr. Brown, was sick, and there was no one in charge of the office.
Scott was putting in the chairs from the porch when Lovelace walked in and said: "Who has got charge of the office to-night?" Scott answered, no one, and that he was going to bed. Lovelace then said: "It looks like somebody ought to be about it." And Lovelace then turned to Graves and said: "Look here, young man, you have got to get out of here, drinking and cursing that way;" and Graves replied, "What have you got to do with it?" Lovelace answered, "I am a guest at the hotel, and I think a heap of the family; and I think, in the absence of Mr. Brown, it is sorter my duty to see after things." Graves said, "You had better put me out;" Lovelace replied, "I will do it in a pair of minutes." And Graves said, with an oath, "he would like to see him (Lovelace), put him out." Lovelace said, "I will do that quick." Scott then walked between them and separated them.
Lovelace started upstairs, but it seems that he turned again and went back to the register. Lovelace then said, with an oath, "Don't you shake your hand in my face." (Graves had made a gesture which Lovelace interpreted as he stated). They were then a few feet apart. Graves replied, Lovelace then declared he would slap Graves, and applied an opprobrious epithet to him. Lovelace then slapped and pushed Graves back until the latter struck the wall, or door which was closed; and whilst they were thus together, Graves drew a pistol from his pocket, and shot Lovelace several times, in consequence of which he afterward died.
Lovelace weighed one hundred and seventy-five pounds. He would have pushed Graves, who was much lighter and smaller, out of the door, if it had been open. Lovelace did not know Graves at the time. The next day he asked what boy that was that shot him.
The foregoing gives a sufficient description of the scene, as defendant claims it occurred.
The substance of the contention on that side is that Mr. Lovelace lost his life at the hands of Graves, in a fight with the latter, brought on by the language and acts of the former.
It was not claimed, however, that Lovelace knew that Graves was armed, when the difficulty began.
The defendant asserts that "it is not an accidental killing, such as to make the defendant liable, where the death was the result of a encounter, or where the party killed was the voluntary agent in bringing on the difficulty resulting in his death, or placed himself in such a position as to induce it."
On the other hand the plaintiff insists that the occurrence was an "accident."
The contract in this case is to be interpreted sas to give effect to the intention of the parties, as expressed by the language they have used. That intention is moreover, to be construed as the reasonable and natural one imported by their words. Rutherforth's Insts. [2 Am. Ed.], p. 413.
"In case of death by accident," is the language immediately in view.
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