Loveland v. Rand

• Citation: 85 N.E. 948,200 Mass. 142
• Parties: LOVELAND et al. v. RAND.
• Decision Date: 23 October 1908
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

200 Mass. 142

85 N.E. 948

LOVELAND et al. v. RAND.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

October 23, 1908

Oct 23, 1908.

COUNSEL

Clarence E. Tupper, for plaintiffs.

James A. Stiles, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON C.J.

At the trial of this case the plaintiffs obtained a verdict, and the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging, as reasons for his motion, that the verdict was against the law and against the evidence and the weight of the evidence. After a hearing and argument, the judge granted the motion 'ON THE GROUND OF MISDIRECTION IN LAW.' No exceptions were taken to the rulings or refusals to rule at this hearing, or to the order granting the motion. After an interval of thirteen days the plaintiffs filed a 'motion for rehearing and reconsideration,' on the ground of alleged errors of the judge in his construction of the motion and his action upon it. The judge entertained the motion and, after a hearing upon it, denied it. The plaintiffs requested certain rulings at this hearing which the judge refused, and they excepted.

One question that arises is whether the reasons stated in the motion for a new trial would warrant setting aside the verdict on the ground of misdirection in law. A new trial cannot be granted for a reason which is not stated in the motion. Rev. Laws, c. 173, § 112; Pierson v. Boston Elevated Railway Company, 191 Mass. 229, 77 N.E. 769. One of the reasons stated in this motion is that the verdict was against the law. The substance of the reason for granting the motion is that the verdict was founded on an erroneous view of the law, stated by the judge to the jury in his charge. Was such a verdict against the law? The plaintiffs contend that the words 'against the law,' in the motion, mean only against the law as stated by the judge to the jury in his charge, and that they authorize the granting of a new trial, only for a departure by the jury from the rules of law laid down by the presiding justice. There are decisions in some courts which tend to support this contention, but all or nearly all of them were made under Codes very different from our statutes, and they apply to motions for a new trial which are a part of the regular procedure for bringing before a higher tribunal questions of law that were raised and properly saved at the trial. They require a definite statement of the question of law intended to be raised.

Motions for a new trial under our system are of a different kind. By St. 1804, p. 140, c. 105, § 5, provision was made for taking exceptions at trials before the Supreme Judicial Court and for presenting the questions of law to the full court by a bill of exceptions. When the court of common pleas was established by St. 1821 (vol. 7) p. 545, c. 79, a similar provision was made in sections 5 and 6, for saving questions of law in that court and presenting them to a higher tribunal. The system thus established has been continued to the present time, and it is the regular method of obtaining a revision of the rulings of a court upon questions of law in trials before juries as well as in some other trials and hearings. Rev. Laws, c. 173, § 106. Except as affected by these and kindred statutes, motions for a new trial, as recognized at common law, are still permitted. Rev. Laws, c. 173, §§ 112, 113. In St. 1821 (vol. 7) p. 546, c. 79, § 7, the court of common pleas was authorized to grant a new trial 'for any cause for which, by the common law, a new trial may now be granted,' and 'when upon due examination it shall appear to said court that justice has not been done between the parties.' The jurisdiction to grant new trials upon motion still exists in the Supreme Judicial Court and the superior court. But under our present system this is not the way to bring up for rehearing questions of law that were raised, or that might have been raised, at the trial before the verdict was rendered. Unually such motions are addressed solely to the discretion of the court. Under our decisions a question that was raised, or that might have been raised, before a verdict, cannot be raised upon a motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. Com. v. Morrison, 134 Mass. 189; Murphy v. Com., 187 Mass. 361, 73 N.E. 524; Parker v. Griffith, 172 Mass. 87, 51 N.E. 462; Garrity v. Higgins, 177 Mass. 414, 58 N.E. 1010; Fitch v. Jefferson, 175 Mass. 56, 55 N.E. 623; Holdsworth v. Tucker, 147 Mass. 572, 18 N.E. 430. The statute provides that exceptions may be taken to rulings on questions of law at hearings upon motions for a new trial. Rev. Laws, c. 173, § 106. But as was said in Com. v. Morrison, ubi supra, and in other cases, these are not to rulings that were given or refused, or that might have been asked for and given or refused, at the trial before the verdict. They are to rulings upon questions arising for the first time at the hearing on the motion for a new trial. Until the enactment of St. 1897. p. 463, c. 472, now embodied in Rev. Laws, c. 173, § 112, it was in the power of a judge, either with or without a motion for a new trial, to set aside a verdict which in his opinion was founded on an erroneous view of the law, or was against the evidence and the weight of the evidence. Indeed, speaking generally and following with some strictness of construction the language quoted above St. 1821 (vol. 7) p. 546, c. 79, § 7, it was in his power, in the exercise of his discretion, to set aside the verdict when, if allowed to stand, it would work injustice such as the courts ought not to tolerate. Ellis v. Ginsburg, 163 Mass. 143, 39 N.E. 800. St. 1897, p. 463, c. 472 (Rev. Laws, c. 173, § 112), was not intended to limit the jurisdiction of the court as to the causes for which new trials may be granted, but only to limit its action to cases in which a motion is made stating the reasons for making the motion. In reference to the...