Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified School Dist.

Decision Date18 July 1996
Docket Number94-55717,Nos. 94-55715,s. 94-55715
Citation90 F.3d 367
Parties111 Ed. Law Rep. 116, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5296, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8625 Sarah LOVELL, a minor, By and Through her guardian ad litem, Gregory C. LOVELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; Scott Fisher, in his official capacity; Mary Heath, in her official capacity, Defendants-Appellants. Sarah LOVELL, a minor, By and Through her guardian ad litem, Gregory C. LOVELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; Scott Fisher, in his official capacity; Mary Heath, in her official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Christopher J. Welsh, Stutz, Gallagher, Artiano, Shinoff & Holtz, San Diego, California, for defendants-appellants-cross-appellees.

Elizabeth Schulman, Schulman & Schulman, San Diego, California, for plaintiffs-appellees-cross-appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Anthony J. Battaglia, Magistrate Judge. D.C. No. CV-93-00619-JSR.

Before: HALL and JOHN T. NOONAN, Jr., Circuit Judges, and PRO, * District Judge.

CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, Circuit Judge:

Sarah Lovell, a student at Mt. Carmel High School in the Poway Unified School District ("PUSD"), allegedly threatened Linda Suokko, a school guidance counselor, that she would shoot her if Suokko did not make changes to Lovell's class schedule. Suokko filed a disciplinary report with school administrators, and the school suspended Lovell for three days.

Lovell denies that she threatened Suokko, and claims that she merely uttered a "figure of speech" under her breath while in Suokko's office. Lovell and her parents discussed the incident with school officials and requested that the disciplinary report be removed from Lovell's file. When the school and the PUSD refused to take any action, Lovell instituted this suit against the PUSD and several school officials. She claimed that, by punishing her as a result of her speech, the school violated her rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the California Education Code. Furthermore, she claimed that she was denied procedural and substantive due process.

The district court rejected her due process claim, but found that the defendants did violate her First Amendment rights. Because she prevailed on one of her claims, the district court awarded her partial attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

The defendants timely appealed. Lovell cross-appealed on the due process claim and the amount of attorney's fees awarded. Her appeal of the due process claim was rejected, however, because it was not timely filed. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse.

I

In February 1993 Sarah Lovell was a 15-year-old 10th grade student. On February 2, she visited Linda Suokko to request changes to her class schedule. Lovell was shuttled back and forth between the counselor's office and the administrative offices for several hours while she attempted to effect the changes. When Lovell finally arrived back at Suokko's office around 1:30 in the afternoon she was frustrated and irritable. This visit to Suokko's office was to have been Lovell's final stop in this brouhaha; Suokko was to have simply entered the approved changes into the school's computer system.

As she entered the changes, however, Suokko noticed that Lovell had been approved for courses that were already overloaded. She told Lovell that she may not be able to make the changes. Lovell, at the end of her patience, made the remark that is the basis of this suit: Lovell claims she said "I'm so angry, I could just shoot someone," whereas Suokko claims she said "If you don't give me this schedule change, I'm going to shoot you!" 1 Lovell then apologized to Suokko for her inappropriate behavior. Suokko completed the requested schedule change, and Lovell left the office.

Later that day, Suokko reported Lovell's conduct to Assistant Principal Scott Wright. Suokko told Wright that she felt threatened by the statement and was concerned about some future reprisal by Lovell. Suokko filled out a Student Office Referral form and reported the threat as a disciplinary incident to Assistant Principal Mary Heath.

On February 4, two days after the incident, Heath called a meeting with Suokko and Lovell to discuss the matter. At that meeting Lovell admitted making one of the statements given above, although there is some dispute as to what she admitted. But she also claimed that she did not mean anything by it. Suokko said that Lovell was "angry, serious and emotionally out of control when the statement was made," and that she felt threatened. After Heath met with Lovell, Suokko, and Lovell's parents, Heath decided to suspend Lovell for three days.

At first, the Lovells planned to accept the suspension. But when they received a copy of the Student Referral Form submitted by Suokko, they were extremely upset by her portrayal of the events. Specifically they felt that Suokko's version of events differed a great deal from their daughter's version, and that Suokko's report was too strongly worded for the events as they understood them. 2 They wrote a letter to the school principal, Scott Fisher, demanding that the Referral be removed from Sarah's file. When the school refused to take any action, the Lovells filed this suit against PUSD, Mr. Fisher, and Ms. Heath (hereinafter referred to collectively as "PUSD").

Lovell asserted a variety of federal and state law claims that her rights were violated when PUSD suspended her from school. First, she claimed that the suspension violated her First Amendment free speech rights, as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Second, she asserted a supplemental state law claim that she was improperly suspended in violation of her free speech rights under California Education Code Section 48950. Third, she claimed that PUSD denied her adequate procedural and substantive due process. Finally, she claimed that PUSD violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by imposing discipline on her in contravention of the rights set forth above.

The parties stipulated to a bench trial before a magistrate judge. The court found that PUSD had provided appropriate procedural and substantive due process. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 847 F.Supp. 780, 785 (S.D.Cal.1994). However, the court also held that PUSD had violated Lovell's free speech rights because her statement did not constitute "the requisite 'threat' required by law, under either contention as to the exact words spoken, to allow infringement on her right of free speech." Id. The court awarded Lovell 50% of the requested attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, for work done in furtherance of the successful First Amendment claim.

II

We review a district court's conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 3 (9th Cir.1994). A district court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 54 F.3d 570, 576 (9th Cir.1995).

Different standards are sometimes used when reviewing district court cases in which the court adjudged the constitutionality of a restriction on speech. When the district court upholds a restriction on speech as constitutional, this court conducts a de novo review of the facts. Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir.1988). However, when the district court strikes down a restriction on speech, as in the current case, this court reviews the findings of fact for clear error. Id. "This rule 'reflects a special solicitude for claims that the protections afforded by the First Amendment have been unduly abridged.' " Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood Assoc. v. Chicago Transit Authority, 767 F.2d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir.1985)).

The magistrate judge found that PUSD violated Lovell's rights as guaranteed by the California Education Code and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Because we find that the magistrate incorrectly applied the relevant law, we now reverse.

A

Our first concern is that the magistrate judge improperly conflated Lovell's federal and state law claims. We recognize the rule that when a violation of state law causes the deprivation of a right protected by the United States Constitution, that violation may form the basis for a Section 1983 action. Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1482 n. 22 (9th Cir.) (holding that the violation of a state law requiring a post-arrest hearing before a magistrate judge constituted a cause of action under Section 1983), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 991, 114 S.Ct. 549, 126 L.Ed.2d 450 (1993). However, Section 1983 limits a federal court's analysis to the deprivation of rights secured by the federal "Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress. Brown v Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758, 764 (8th Cir.1980); cf. Hallstrom, 991 F.2d at 1482 n. 22.

The California Education Code ensures that "a student shall have the same right to exercise his or her right to free speech on campus as he or she enjoys when off campus." Cal. Educ.Code § 48950 historical and statutory notes. The district court merged this statute with Section 1983 and found that PUSD violated Lovell's free speech rights. But by analyzing the free speech rights at issue here as if both federal First Amendment law and the California Education Code were coextensive, the district court implicitly and inappropriately allowed the California Education Code to trump federal constitutional law. We cannot enlarge federally protected rights simply because California chose to expand its state-created rights.

As a result, the federal First Amendment claim,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
288 cases
  • Koller v. Harris
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • April 20, 2018
    ...(holding that "state law violations do not, on their own, give rise to liability under § 1983"); see also Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 370–71 (9th Cir. 1996).In sum, Plaintiff has not convincingly shown why it was clearly-established in 2016 that Elections Code §§ 6906 a......
  • Haughwout v. Tordenti
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 30, 2019
    ...threat to be serious." (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Taupier , supra, 330 Conn. at 183, 193 A.3d 1 ; see Lovell v. Poway Unified School District , 90 F.3d 367, 372–73 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that "any person could reasonably consider the statement ‘[i]f you don't give me this schedule ch......
  • McElroy v. Gomez, Case No.: 1:20-cv-00658-NONE-SAB (PC)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • November 9, 2020
    ...protected by the United States Constitution, that violation may form the basis for a Section 1983 action." Lovell v. Poway Unified School Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). "However, Section 1983 limits a federal court's analysis to the deprivation of rights secured......
  • Bolin v. Chappell
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • June 9, 2016
    ...letter was inadmissible because it contained only conditional threats.Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 339-40; see also Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that "any person could reasonably consider the statement 'If you don't give me this schedule change, I'm......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
11 books & journal articles
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • The Path of Constitutional Law Suplemmentary Materials
    • January 1, 2007
    ...42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908), 578 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938), 1348 Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996), 1440, Lovett, United States v., 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 90.Ed. 1252 (1946), 563 Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388......
  • Freedom of speech and true threats.
    • United States
    • Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol. 25 No. 1, September 2001
    • September 22, 2001
    ...are free to express themselves through speech advocating such ends."). See also KING, LETTER FROM A BIRMINGHAM JAIL, supra note 33. (306.) 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. (307.) See id. at 368. (308.) It is important to change the situation to one of a criminal indictment since there is a significant......
  • Tinkering With School Discipline in the Name of the First Amendment: Expelling a Teacher's Ability to Proactively Quell Disruptions Caused by Cyberbullies at the Schoolhouse
    • United States
    • University of Nebraska - Lincoln Nebraska Law Review No. 87, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...2002) (discussing divergent views among the circuits and the "true threat doctrine"); Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371-73 (9th Cir. 1996). The "true threat" doctrine has been applied in cases of student speech posted on the Internet, as well as some cases ......
  • Freedom of Speech in School and Prison
    • United States
    • University of Washington School of Law University of Washington Law Review No. 85-1, September 2015
    • Invalid date
    ...325 F.3d 412, 418 (3rd Cir. 2003) (no right for elementary school students to circulate petition). 96. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 1996); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 97. Hargis v. Foster, 312 F.3d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fle......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT