Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 61529-2,61529-2 |
| Citation | 887 P.2d 898,125 Wn.2d 759 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 66 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1755 Kimberly LOVERIDGE, Respondent, v. FRED MEYER, INC., a Washington Corporation, Petitioner. |
Miller, Nash, Wiener, Hager & Carlsen, Francis L. Van Dusen, Jr., James R. Dickens, Susan K. Stahlfeld, Seattle, for petitioner.
James R. Walsh, Lynnwood, for respondent.
Petitioner Fred Meyer, Inc. seeks review of a decision by the Court of Appeals, Division One, reversing an
order of the Snohomish[887 P.2d 899] County Superior Court which granted Petitioner's summary judgment motion and dismissed a discrimination action by Respondent Kimberly Loveridge against Petitioner. We affirm.
Respondent Kimberly Loveridge was employed as a janitor from December 20, 1984 to July 15, 1987 in various stores operated by Fred Meyer, Inc. (Fred Meyer), a Washington corporation. In October 1985, she complained that a leadman with whom she worked was sexually harassing her. Fred Meyer took corrective action. In November 1986, her foreman began harassing Ms. Loveridge, including making comments about her body and about her causing the former leadman to lose his job. She did not report this conduct for fear of losing her job. She later married (she is now known as Kimberly Lince) and resigned from Fred Meyer on July 15, 1987. 1
On October 5, 1987, Ms. Loveridge filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 2 against Fred Meyer for discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 3 She claimed she had been sexually harassed on the job continuously since 1985 and that, as a result, she had been constructively discharged. 4 In 1988, the EEOC determined that Ms. Loveridge had been sexually harassed in violation of section 703(a) of Title VII. 5 It also determined that she resigned from her job "when she married", and not because the working conditions were so intolerable as to constitute constructive discharge. 6
The EEOC attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate a settlement between Ms. Loveridge and Fred Meyer.
On May 2, 1989, the EEOC filed a Title VII action against Fred Meyer in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, 7 seeking to enjoin Fred Meyer from engaging in discriminatory practices on the basis of sex and to require the company to institute a non-discrimination policy. Respondent Loveridge was not a party to this action, and the EEOC did not seek reinstatement or compensation on her behalf. On October 19, 1989, Respondent filed a separate lawsuit in the Snohomish County Superior Court seeking damages from Fred Meyer for the alleged sexual harassment. 8 That lawsuit is the subject of this petition for review.
On April 17, 1990, the United States District Court, the Honorable Barbara Rothstein, entered an order approving a consent decree in the suit by the EEOC against Fred Meyer. 9 The agreement requires Fred Meyer to reaffirm its commitment to comply with Title VII in its employment decisions, to post a notice in each of its King and Snohomish County stores expressing support of and compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws, and to maintain procedures for resolving employee complaints of discrimination. The decree states it "effectuates the full, final, and complete resolution of all Title VII allegations of unlawful employment practices encompassed by the original discrimination charge filed by Kimberly Loveridge, the EEOC's administrative determination, and the complaint ..., including all claims which could have been asserted by the EEOC...." The decree also provides that it "shall not constitute an adjudication or finding on the merits of the case and shall in no manner be construed as an admission by Fred Meyer of any violation of Title VII." Pursuant to its terms, the consent decree terminated on April 17, 1992, two years after the date it was entered by the court.
On September 4, 1992, the Snohomish County Superior Court, the Honorable James H. Allendoerfer, granted Fred Meyer's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action by Respondent Loveridge on the ground that her claims were barred by res judicata. 10 On December 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals, Division One, reversed the trial court ruling. 11 We granted review on July 27, 1994.
The question presented in this case is whether a consent decree between the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and an employer in the United States District Court in a Title VII action against an employer precludes a subsequent state court action by an employee who was the subject of, but not a party to, the federal lawsuit.
Petitioner Fred Meyer contends that Respondent Kimberly Loveridge's discrimination claim against it in state court is barred by res judicata.
Res judicata refers to "the preclusive effect of judgments, including the relitigation of claims and issues that were litigated, or might have been litigated, in a prior action." 12 It is designed to "prevent relitigation of already determined causes and curtail multiplicity of actions and harassment in the courts". 13 For the doctrine to apply, a prior judgment must have a concurrence of identity with a subsequent action in (1) subject matter, (2) cause of action, and (3) persons and parties, and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. 14
Under the principles of res judicata, a judgment is binding upon parties to the litigation and persons in privity with those parties. 15 Respondent Loveridge was not a party to the consent decree between Fred Meyer as defendant and the EEOC as plaintiff in the United States District Court. Fred Meyer nevertheless argues that Ms. Loveridge was in privity because the EEOC brought the suit in response to her initial complaint.
The meaning of "privity" for res judicata purposes was discussed in Owens v. Kuro: 16
Privity does not arise from the mere fact that persons as litigants are interested in the same question or in proving or disproving the same state of facts. Privity within the meaning of the doctrine of res judicata is privity as it exists in relation to the subject matter of the litigation, and the rule is construed strictly to mean parties claiming under the same title. It denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same right or property.
Privity is established in cases where a person is in actual control of the litigation, or substantially participates in it even though not in actual control. 17 Mere awareness of proceedings is not sufficient to place a person in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. 18
The consent decree entered on April 11, 1990 was executed by John F. Stanley, attorney for the EEOC plaintiff To support its conclusion that Respondent is not bound by the EEOC action, the Court of Appeals 21 relied on interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by the United States Supreme Court in General Tel. Co. of Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC. 22 Fred Meyer is correct in contending that General Telephone is not directly on point. The case nevertheless provides a relevant interpretation of federal law which supports the decision of the Court of Appeals.
and James R. Dickens, attorney for defendant Fred Meyer. 19 Neither Respondent Loveridge nor her lawyer signed the document. Although Fred Meyer had earlier insisted it would not settle the case unless Ms. Loveridge's claims was dismissed, no agreement was obtained from her to that effect. Fred Meyer obtained an agreement only from the EEOC. Respondent did not exercise control or participate in the litigation. She was thus not in privity with the EEOC and should not then be bound by the terms of the consent decree. 20
The issue in General Telephone was whether the EEOC may seek classwide relief under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act without certification as the class representative under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court held that Rule 23 certification is not required and allowed the EEOC to proceed in its action. It noted that a Title VII suit does not supersede private civil rights claims, stating that:
[T]he aggrieved person may bring his own action ... if the agency has failed to move the case along to the party's satisfaction, has reached a determination not to sue, or has reached a conciliation or settlement agreement with the respondent that the party finds unsatisfactory. 23
This language counters the notion that a settlement agreement between the EEOC and an employer precludes a subsequent civil suit by an aggrieved party. 24 Commenting on the relationship between the EEOC and the aggrieved person, the court in General Telephone stated:
Although the EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay or benefits denied, on behalf of discrimination victims, the agency is guided by "the overriding public interest in equal employment opportunity ... asserted through direct Federal enforcement." 118 Cong.Rec. 4941 (1972). When the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination. 25
Consistent with this reasoning in General Telephone, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held in Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc. 26 that a federal consent decree between the EEOC and an employer does not preclude an employee not in privity with the EEOC from pursuing a separate discrimination action. In Riddle the court observed that, in obtaining injunctive relief, the EEOC does not have the same interests as a private litigant would have in seeking damages:
The EEOC is primarily interested in securing equal employment opportunity in the workplace. That interest is often most completely advanced through...
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