Lovett v. Lynch

Decision Date08 December 2016
Docket NumberNo. M2016-00680-COA-R3-CV,M2016-00680-COA-R3-CV
PartiesMARK W. LOVETT v. FRANK LYNCH, ET AL.
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Franklin County

No. 19990

Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

Appellant, the first, but not the highest nor successful bidder on a piece of real property in a delinquent tax property sale, filed a quo warranto action alleging that the tax sale was conducted illegally. The trial court dismissed appellant's suit for lack of standing because the property at issue had been redeemed by an individual with a mortgage on the property. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., and BRANDON O. GIBSON, JJ., joined.

Mark W. Lovett, Sewanee, Tennessee, Pro Se.

David J. Ward and Alix C. Michel, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Frank Lynch, Randy Kelly, and Ben Lynch.

OPINION
BACKGROUND

On May 20, 2015, Plaintiff/Appellant Mark W. Lovett ("Appellant") participated in a delinquent tax property sale ("tax sale") in Franklin County of the property located at 801 Lynchburg Road in Winchester, Tennessee. Appellant had made the first bid on the property, but it was later sold to a higher bidder. The next day, after allegedly learning that the winning bidder was the wife of Frank Lynch, the Franklin County Tax Collection Attorney, Appellant allegedly sent a letter to Chancellor Jeffrey F. Stewart to protest the sale. Chancellor Stewart responded to Appellant through the Clerk and Master, informing Appellant that he did not comment on matters not before the bench. Appellant subsequently sent letters to several public officials, including the Attorney General for the State of Tennessee and the Comptroller of the Treasury, seeking an investigation of the May 20, 2015 tax sale. However, these persons either sent no response or declined Appellant's request.

On July 17, 2015, Appellant filed a pleading, which consisted of a petition for a writ in the nature of quo warranto and a complaint,1 in the Franklin County Chancery Court against the Defendants/Appellees Frank Lynch, as Franklin County Tax Collection Attorney; Randy Kelly, as Franklin County Trustee; and Ben Lynch, as Franklin County Attorney, related to alleged impropriety of the tax sale.2 Therein, Appellant alleged that the auction was improperly conducted in violation of various statutory provisions because the winning bidder was the wife of Frank Lynch. Appellant also alleged other discrepancies that rendered the sale unlawful. Appellant sought, inter alia, the issuance of a writ in the nature of quo warranto and the appointment of an attorney pro tempore "to represent the interests of the Public."3

Appellees filed separate motions to dismiss on August 3, 2015, August 11, 2015, and August 13, 2015. In the meantime, Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment on August 26, 2015. Appellees' motions to dismiss were later amended. The amended motions to dismiss argued that Appellant's claim was moot because it was undisputed that the property at issue had been redeemed. Appellees contended that any claim regarding the impropriety of the tax sale was moot and that Appellant therefore had no standing to maintain his cause of action. Appellant thereafter admitted that the property had indeed been redeemed by a party having an interest in the property.4 The trial court granted the amended motions to dismiss at the November 13, 2015 hearing, and the order reflecting that ruling was entered on or about December 8, 2015. Therein, the trial courtruled that Appellant lacked standing to pursue his claim because he was not the successful bidder on the property at issue and the property had later been redeemed. As such, the trial court ruled that Appellant lacked "a special interest or injury that is not shared with other citizens" because he never had a valid legal interest in the property, and the redemption left "nothing capable of being redressed by a favorable decision of the court." Consequently, the trial court dismissed Appellant's petition/complaint with prejudice. On November 30, 2015, Appellant filed a motion for relief from the trial court's order.5 At the February 12, 2016 hearing on the motion, Appellant submitted testimony from the individual who owned a mortgage on the property prior to the tax seizure and who ultimately redeemed the property. Specifically, Bob Cortner testified that at the time of the delinquent tax property sale, he was the holder of the mortgage on the subject property. Although he testified that he had notice by publication of the delinquent tax sale, he did not attend the auction because he was "busy." Following the auction, he testified that he redeemed the property by paying the delinquent taxes. Thereafter, the mortgagor agreed to surrender the property to Mr. Cortner, and he testified that he now owns the property "free and clear." The trial court denied the motion for relief by order of March 7, 2016, and upheld its previous ruling, concluding that Appellant was "not entitled to a trial" because of his failure to establish standing. Appellant timely appealed.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Appellant presents sixteen issues before this Court, which are taken largely verbatim from his appellate brief:

1. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in holding that it has Constitutional authority [1][11] to determine who is, or who is not, entitled to a trial, as evidenced in it[s] Order of March 3, 2016: "It was found the Relator/Plaintiff did not have [']standing['] therefore he is not entitled to a trial[."]
2. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in making a judicial conclusion regarding Plaintiffs "standing" without any evidence theLaw was [2] upheld or applied to the material facts, or circumstances cited in THE COMPLAINT.
3. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in failing to address the attenuation between the alleged illegal conduct of the defendants, and the claims of violations of the Plaintiffs U.S. And Tennessee Constitutional rights [3].
4. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in concluding a lack of "standing" of the Plaintiff, in spite of the record that showed Defendant Frank Lynch, Franklin County Tax Collection Attorney did allow his wife to bid against the Plaintiff to win the rights in a property while he was being paid by the Court for "Official Duties" [4] officiating at the Court Ordered Public Delinquent Tax Auction of May 20, 2015.
5. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in failing to try the trier of facts evidenced in the record, (that substantiated violations of Law), that were not denied by any of the Defendants under Rule 8.04 [5].
6. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in failing to address the effect of Involuntary Dismissal of the case (pre trial) [6] had on the Plaintiffs responsibility to meet his burden of proof, [7][[30] State ex rel[. ]De Selm v. Owings

, 310 S. W 3D 353[ ](Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) by "a preponderance of the evidence" to prove "injury in fact"[8], (without any question of record from the bench; have you concluded your case-in-chief[6]), and before [all] the witnesses could be called to testify upon duly executed Subpoenas issued by the Clerk of the Chancery Court [14].

7. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred by failing to address at it[s] earliest opportunity what was the undefined and undeclared [ "]Conflict of Interest" found by Jeffery F. Stewart [12][141, Chancellor of the Franklin County Chancery Court in "the file[,"] (with only THE COMPLAINT and record of the Auction contained therein at that time of his recusal), prior to the Honorable Larry Bart Stanley Jr. assuming his appointment to preside that could have assured all, what ever the "conflict of interest" was, did not persist after the recusals of other Justices.

8. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred by proceeding under Honorable Larry Bart Stanley Jr. by allowing the Franklin County Chancery Court's Clerk and Master, Ms. Brenda Clark, (a Subpoenaed material witness) to appear on the bench in Court at the 2nd. MOTION HEARING in this case.

9. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred by failing to try the facts raised that are evidenced in the exhibits, and pleadings that delineate in detail the possible violation of Law as cited in , "Private Acts of 1980, Chapter 268" of Franklin County[9] that does not permit a County Official to be represented by anyone save the County Attorney except at their own expense, and the appearance by Attorney Alix C. Mich[]el who under direct questioning from the bench responded " I represent them as

Employee's[,"] leaving the question open: Were the Defendants Legal Pleadings Fraudulently placed before the bench in violation of the Law[2]?
10. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred by failing to examine the facts contained in the exhibits filed with the Court; wherein the letter from Franklin County Clerk, Philip Custer custodian of the Franklin County Board of Commissioners shows no appointment by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners, (current day Quarterly Court), after May 20, 2015 of Attorney Mr[.] Alix C. Mich[]el to represent Frank Lynch, or Ben Lynch, (both Private Practice Attorneys), or any appointment by the board for Attorney Alix C. Mich[]el to represent interest of the citizens of Franklin County in their "officials offices" as Franklin County Attorney, or Franklin County Tax Collection Attorney, or Franklin County Trustee.
11. Whether the Franklin County Chancery Court erred in failing to examine the difference between the Plaintiff admitting Mr. Cortner has a lawful interest in the property, (transcript 2nd. MOTION HEARING), as a mortgage holder, and [not] admitting to the lawfulness of the redemption of 801 Lynchburg Rd. Winchester in light of Mr. Courtner's
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