Lovich v. Salvation Army
Decision Date | 30 June 1947 |
Citation | 75 N.E.2d 459,81 Ohio App. 317 |
Parties | LOVICH v. SALVATION ARMY, Inc. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Harrison, Thomas, Spangenberg & Hull, of Cleveland, for plaintiff appellee.
McKeehan Merrick, Arter & Stewart, of Cleveland, for defendant appellant.
In this action originating in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, now before this Court on appeal on questions of law a recovery was had by plaintiff in the sum of $2,000 against the defendant, the Salvation Army Inc., for personal injuries and illness as the result of an attack of typhoid fever suffered while the plaintiff was a resident of a home for working girls known as 'Evangeline Residence' conducted by the Salvation Army. The case was tried on a second amended petition containing the following specifications 'Plaintiff says that at the time herein referred to the defendant was reckless and negligent in the following respects to-wit: * * *
'(3) In serving to the plaintiff, food and drink which was contaminated with typhoid infection.
'(4) In serving food and drink which was unwholesome and infected and was prepared, served and sold in violation of the so-called pure food laws of Ohio. * * *
'(7) In providing impure, infected and dangerous food drink for plaintiff in violation and breach of its promise and/or implied warranty that the food provided served and sold in said restaurant would be fit for human consumption and free from dangerous or harmful infections or bacterial contamination.
'As a direct result of the negligent acts hereinBefore set forth, and of the breach of the implied warranty that the food served and sold would be fit for human consumption and free from impure substances and bacterial contamination, the plaintiff became infected with typhoid bacilli, was rendered seriously ill * * *.'
Contained in the answer are allegations of defendant that it is incorporated as a religious and charitable organization not for profit and that the plaintiff was a beneficiary of its charity. Defendant denied generally any negligence on its part and denied specifically that it was negligent or careless in the employment of a person to serve food who was a typhoid germ carrier as alleged in the amended petition.
A number of errors are assigned but the principal errors claimed are: (1) That the Common Pleas Court erred in instructing the jury to return a verdict for plaintiff appellee and in submitting to the jury only one form of verdict, namely, a verdict for plaintiff appellee; (2) that the Common Pleas Court erred in overruling defendant appellant's motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence.
We shall consider these assignments of error in the order named.
There was evidence that plaintiff was one of 350 young women residing in the home and one of the 18 sufferers in the typhoid fever epidemic that broke out in the home in January, 1944.
The evidence bearing on the issue of the cause of the illness of plaintiff and other sufferers was the testimony of one Dr. Theo. G. Duncan, Chief of the Subdivision of Communicable Diseases of the Division of Health of the City of Cleveland, who testified that an epidemiological survey was made under his direction. He described the measures taken to ascertain the source of infection which resulted in the identification of one Martha Brown as a typhoid carrier, who was in the employ of defendant in the kitchen, having been hired September 14, 1943. This identification was made after a series of microscopic tests. Concerning Martha Brown, Dr. Duncan testified in part as follows:
* * *
* * *
* * *'
The foregoing testimony is the only direct evidence in the record in respect of the cause of the epidemic. A careful analysis thereof discloses, (1) that the doctor expounds a theory developed by him, based upon his investigations conducted after the outbreak of the epidemic, and (2) an opinion expressed upon an assumed hypothesis.
It will be noted that while the hypothesis excluded the plumbing and water supply, other hypotheses are not excluded such as possible contacts of one or more of the residents with persons infected with the disease outside of the home. We think it is a matter of common knowledge that typhiod may be communicated by personal contact.
It is well settled in Ohio that expert testimony may be received by the court to assist the jury in arriving at a just and correct verdict. Insofar as such testimony aids the members of the jury in their deliberations it should be used. However, the members of the jury are the sole judges as to what weight the opinion of the expert is entitled to receive at their hands and should be instructed to give such testimony just such weight as they in their judgment deem it entitled to receive.
With respect to hypothetical questions, the opinions of experts based upon facts assumed are of no value unless the assumed facts forming the basis of such opinions are supported by the evidence and are true, and if the jury finds that the assumptions are not true, then they should disregard the answers to such questions. Such opinion evidence is but to supplement and not to supplant the judgment of the jury. There is a wide difference between unrebutted factual evidence and unrebutted opinion evidence, and in the instant case the court did not permit the jury, under proper instructions, to consider this evidence but instead directed a verdict for the plaintiff.
An issue was made by the testimony of the expert on the question of whether or not the orange juice prepared by Martha Brown if it was prepared by her, was the source of the infection. An issue was also made as to whether or not the Evangeline Residence served contaminated food, as to whether or not such serving was the...
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