Lovins v. City of St. Louis

• Citation: 84 S.W.2d 127,336 Mo. 1194
• Parties: Gertrude Lovins v. City of St. Louis, a Municipal Corporation, Max Zemel, Jacob W. Ratz and Genevieve M. Ratz, Appellants
• Decision Date: 05 June 1935
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

84 S.W.2d 127

336 Mo. 1194

Gertrude Lovins v. City of St. Louis, a Municipal Corporation, Max Zemel, Jacob W. Ratz and Genevieve M. Ratz, Appellants

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 5, 1935

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Arthur H Bader, Judge.

Transferred to the St. Louis Court of Appeals.

Chas M. Hay, Edgar H. Wayman, Oliver Senti, Louis A. McKeown and Forrest G. Ferris for city of St. Louis.

Green Henry & Remmers for Max Zemel, Jacob W. Ratz and Genevieve M. Ratz.

Erwin F. Vetter and Hays & Dyott for respondent.

OPINION

Hays, J.

This is an action for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff in falling upon a sidewalk in the city of St. Louis. The fall is alleged to have been due to the dangerous condition of the sidewalk, owing to the negligence of the city and the abutting property owners who were joined with the city as codefendants. From a judgment for $ 2500 rendered against all the defendants they have appealed.

The very statement of the nature and result of the case raises a serious inquiry in respect of this court's jurisdiction of the appeal which it is our duty sua sponte to investigate and determine. Viewed only from the standpoint of the amount of the judgment and of the city's being a municipal corporation, the appeal apparently should have gone to the proper Court of Appeals, just as in analogous appeals in actions brought by or against any other municipal corporation in this State, of which this court has invariably declined to take jurisdiction. [Kansas City v. Neal, 122 Mo. 232, 26 S.W. 695; Parker v. Zeisler, 139 Mo. 298, 40 S.W. 881; Webb City Water Co. v. Webb City, 143 Mo. 493, 45 S.W. 279; Smith v. Sedalia, 228 Mo. 505, 128 S.W. 735; Louisiana v. Lang, 251 Mo. 664, 158 S.W. 1.] Even in cases of appeals involving prosecutions under ordinances of the city of St. Louis, but involving no constitutional question, this court has, from time to time without question, accepted appellate jurisdiction. So too, in cases where the city, though a party, is interested, if at all, only in its corporate capacity. [City of St. Louis ex rel. v. Ruecking Const. Co., 212 S.W. 887; Straub v. City of St. Louis, 175 Mo. 413, 75 S.W. 100; Ely v. St. Louis, 181 Mo. 723, 81 S.W. 168.]

This distinction regarding jurisdiction as between St. Louis and other municipalities has long been fostered; ever since 1885 and down to the present moment appeals in all classes of cases, without exception as to the amount involved, have been entertained by our court invariably, indiscriminately and without analysis or discussion. The rule as thus applied seems to have had its genesis in Freeman v. Quarry Co., 30 Mo.App. 362, to which cause the city of St. Louis is therein stated to be a party, and in which it was said (l. c. 363) by way of introduction and further on the question of appellate jurisdiction:

"As the question presented is one of first impression, and it may frequently occur, and is not free from doubt, we have concluded to sustain the motion (to transfer the appeal), so that upon a motion to remand filed in the Supreme Court, that court may have an opportunity to establish a precedent for the guidance of this court in similar cases."

There were no facts stated, nor was there any discussion. The court grounded the ruling thus:

"The Constitution originally provided for appeals from this court to the Supreme Court, in cases where a county or other political subdivision of the State is a party. The Constitution now provides that in all causes or proceedings reviewable by the Supreme Court, appeals shall lie from the trial courts directly to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of such appeals. It will be noticed that neither the original Constitution nor its amendment makes the final or exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court depend upon the fact that such political subdivision is the sole party to the cause, but that it is a party. This court, therefore, has no appellate jurisdiction of any cause now in which a political subdivision of the State is a party."

In this case it was attempted to follow the statute which required the transfer of cases pursuant to the constitutional Amendment of 1884. We are of the opinion that this interpretation placed upon the amendment, and followed subsequently, is too broadly inclusive and that we should interpret it anew. In any endeavor to interpret the amendment in question it is proper to look to the previous state of the organic law and the conditions sought to be remedied by amendment.

For many years previously, and until the adoption of our present Constitution, there were existing in the State a number of judicial districts one of which was composed of the county of St. Louis, in which the city of St. Louis was located. The intermediate Courts of Appeal which were established in these districts eventually proved unsatisfactory and were abolished in 1870. Shortly thereafter the Legislature (Laws 1871), made provision for an amendment to the then Constitution increasing the number of Supreme Court judges from three to five. This amendment was adopted in 1872 and later incorporated in the Constitution of 1875.

The substance of the portions of Article VI, Section 12, of the original Constitution relevant to the establishment of the St. Louis Court of Appeals and the change made in its jurisdiction, is shown in the quotation from the Freeman case, supra. The amendment referred to, while depriving the St. Louis Court of Appeals of its intermediate appellate jurisdiction, placed that court in the same class and with exactly the same appellate jurisdiction with the Kansas City Court of Appeals and a third Court of Appeals for the establishment of both of which latter courts provision was made. The rule of appellate jurisdiction under discussion is not founded upon the constitutional provisions referred to, but upon other provisions of the amendment relating to the scheme and charter of St. Louis, as will later appear.

Notwithstanding the increase in the number of Supreme Court Judges in the early 70's the burden of this court was not appreciably lessened by the establishment of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, with its very limited territorial jurisdiction and its intermediate appellate jurisdiction. In 1882 relief, in a degree, was sought to be afforded by the appointment of three commissioners, who served until 1885. Meanwhile it became apparent that other means must be provided for a speedier determination of appeals through a different plan, a plan for a wider distribution of the same and for reducing the number of appeals coming to this court. Such was the end sought to be attained by the people in adopting the Amendment of 1884. The plan established thereunder is harmonious as a whole and in its several parts and, if permitted to do so, will operate equally and without discrimination throughout the State, and to that end the scheme embraced in the amendment must be construed and harmonized with the other provisions under discussion. The scheme and charter were formulated for the enlargement of the city territorially and for its operation, as thus enlarged, under the formulated plan.

They were adopted in October, 1876, and under the scheme the city of St. Louis occupies the dual relation to the State of both a county and a city. Though it is not a county in the ordinary sense as used in the Constitution, it is in a qualified sense a county, in that it is a legal or "political subdivision of the State." As such it performs the functions of a county. In all other respects, and predominantly, it is a city and not a county. [State ex rel. v. Finn, 4 Mo.App. 347; State ex rel. v. Bus, 135 Mo. 325, 327, 36 S.W. 636; State ex rel. v. Walsh, 69 Mo. 408.]

In the Finn case, supra, the St. Louis Court of Appeals determined that the office of sheriff of said city as reorganized pertains to the city in its capacity as a quasi county. That case contains a clear and extended analysis of said scheme as related to the newly organized territory of St. Louis, and points out the plainly separable and distinct functions and attributes possessed by the city in its dual capacity as a city proper and as a quasi county, and, among other things (l. c. 350), said:

"Because the organization of this body as a city is pronounced and its features strongly marked, and because they thus reduced its attributes as a county into comparative insignificance, it does not follow that the latter do not exist. That the body has some of the attributes of a county cannot be denied." (Italics ours.)

The city's "territory is also a subdivision of the State in which officers are elected to perform the functions of the State government as distinguished from those pertaining to municipal government. Those officers are in no sense municipal officers. Their designation as officers of the city of St. Louis refers to their territorial jurisdiction rather than to the governmental duties they perform. They are officers under the laws of the State and perform their duties within the city limits. The sheriff of the city of St. Louis is an officer in the same sense that a sheriff of a county is an officer of the county. He is no more a municipal officer than a...