Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co.
Decision Date | 05 July 1938 |
Docket Number | No. 11047.,11047. |
Citation | 97 F.2d 816 |
Parties | LOWDEN et al. v. SIMONDS-SHIELDS-LONSDALE GRAIN CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Dean Wood and Hale Houts, both of Kansas City, Mo. (Luther Burns, of Topeka, Kan., and Henry S. Conrad, Charles M. Miller, Cyrus Crane, and George J. Mersereau, all of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellants.
M. W. Borders, Jr., of Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.
Before STONE, WOODROUGH, and BOOTH, Circuit Judges.
This was an action brought by the appellants, hereinafter called "plaintiff-carrier", against the defendant, hereinafter called the "shipper", to recover for services in installing certain grain doors on the box cars in which grain in bulk was shipped in interstate commerce by the shipper.
The Court below found in favor of the shipper, and from the judgment, this appeal was taken.
The facts were largely stipulated, and, with headings and signatures omitted, are set out in the margin.1
Among them was a provision from a Freight Tariff, effective July 1, 1935. (See Exhibit "A" at the end of the stipulated facts). Said clause reads as follows:
"Kansas City......Mo.-Kan." Italics ours.
It is contended by the shipper that there was no prior arrangement made by it with the carrier.
It is contended by the carrier: First, that the shipper entered into a prior arrangement with the carrier; and, second, that the shipper waived the tariff provision requiring prior arrangement because of its acceptance of the carrier's service in installing grain doors.
The clause relied upon by the carrier is contained in a letter, dated July 2, 1935, from the shipper, and reads as follows See stipulated facts 4(a):
"Said undersigned parties further notify you that if ordinary box cars are furnished and supplied upon such orders they will expect them to be fully coopered or prepared with necessary side-door barricades completely installed and ready for loading."
This excerpt is taken from a letter written by the shipper to the local agents of the carriers. This excerpt gives rise to the principal questions in the case, viz.:
(1) Was there a prior arrangement between the plaintiff-carrier and the shipper relative to the service of installing the grain doors?
(2) Could such prior arrangement, if made, be waived by either party?
(3) Was there any waiver made or attempted by either party?
(4) Has the Interstate Commerce Commission exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the question of existence of waiver?
Taking up the first question, we fail to find either in the findings of fact, conclusions of law, or in the transcript of evidence apart from these, anything which would support a finding of a "prior arrangement" between the parties. On the contrary, the correspondence found in the findings of fact makes it very clear that no such prior arrangement had been made.
The clause relied upon by plaintiff-carrier, above quoted, is immediately followed by three other clauses in the same letter which remove any doubt about a "prior arrangement" having been made, even if the clause above quoted were ambiguous, which we think is not the case.
The trial Court in its Memorandum uses the following language:
The second and third questions may be treated together. They were so treated by the lower Court in its Memorandum. We quote the language used, even assuming that there was a prior arrangement.
We agree with this conclusion of the lower Court.
In the Henderson Case, supra, a shipper of cattle sued the Railroad for failure to furnish a car within a reasonable time after notice. The defense was that the notice had not been given in writing as required by the tariff. Oral notice had been given by plaintiff to the station agent and accepted by him. The Supreme Court in its opinion said:
See also Van Dusen Harrington Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 32 F.2d 466, and Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Van Dusen Harrington Co., 8 Cir., 60 F.2d 394; American Railway Express Company v. American Trust Co., 7 Cir., 47 F.2d 16.
Furthermore, the correspondence shows that neither the Railroad Company nor the shipper ever attempted to waive the requirement in question.
The fourth question remains: Does the Interstate Commerce Commission have exclusive jurisdiction of the matter of waiver to the exclusion of the Federal Courts?
The construction of a tariff is a matter of law for the courts unless technical words are employed which must first be given an interpretation by the Commission. Where words of a tariff have an ordinary meaning, the construction of such tariff, its effect and validity, is for the determination of the court. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 42 S.Ct. 477, 66 L.Ed. 943; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 235, 51 S.Ct. 429, 75 L.Ed. 999; Butler Motor Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 272 F. 683.
It is so ordered.
The "arrangement" required by the tariff is for the shipper to let the railroad know before shipment which one as between the two of them is to perform the service in question and for how long. Nothing else. These shippers unequivocally indicated their expectation that the railroad would perform the service and fixed the time "from and after June 1, 1935." Their accompanying threat not to pay for the service was brutum fulmen — as though they had said they would not pay the freight on the goods they shipped, or demurrage. If the courts require them to pay, discrimination between those who have had the service and have paid for it and those who have had it without paying for it will be avoided. Discrimination is the evil and the courts should help, not hinder, doing away with it.
* Rehearing denied Aug. 4, 1938.
1 Stipulation and Agreed Statement of Facts.
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Lowden v. Grain Co
...Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co. v. Lowden, D.C., 19 F.Supp. 438. The circuit court of appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. 8 Cir., 97 F.2d 816. The ruling of the Interstate Commerce Commission determines that the installation is a duty of the shipper and that the carrier can only rece......
- Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
-
Southern Pac. Co. v. Southern Rice Sales Co.
...as the tariffs have the force and effect of statutes, their construction is a question of law for the courts. Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co., 8 Cir., 97 F.2d 816. Upon the authority of Swift v. United States, 7 Cir., 255 F. 291, the court held, in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.......