Lowe v. Richards

• Decision Date: 10 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–0234.,13–0234.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Dean LOWE and Martha Lowe, Individually and as Trustees of the Demar Revocable Trust, Petitioners v. Joseph C. RICHARDS and Joyce A. Richards, and Hugh E. Hegyi, Trustee of the Herman Hegyi Trust, Respondents.

234 W.Va. 48

763 S.E.2d 64

Dean LOWE and Martha Lowe, Individually and as Trustees of the Demar Revocable Trust, Petitioners

v.Joseph C. RICHARDS and Joyce A. Richards, and Hugh E. Hegyi, Trustee of the Herman Hegyi Trust, Respondents.

No. 13–0234.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted March 25, 2014.

Decided April 10, 2014.

Michael L. Scales, Esq., Martinsburg, WV, for Petitioners, Dean and Martha Lowe.

Charles F. Printz, Jr., Esq., Jonathan T. Mayhew, Esq., Bowles Rice LLP, Martinsburg, WV, for Respondents, Joseph C. and Joyce A. Richards.

Opinion

DAVIS, Chief Justice:

Dean and Martha Lowe, petitioners herein, (“the Lowes”) appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County dismissing their counterclaim and third-party complaint.¹ In the actions filed by the Lowes, they sought to obtain real property claimed by respondents Joseph and Joyce Richards (“the Richards”) and Hugh Hegyi as Trustee of the Hegyi Trust (“the Hegyi Trust”). The property in question is situated on the border of West Virginia and Virginia. The circuit court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the Lowes' claims because they involved a determination of a boundary line between West Virginia and Virginia. The circuit court also found that the Lowes failed to join indispensable parties to the litigation, i.e., the States of West Virginia and Virginia. Here, the Lowes contend that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and that the States of West Virginia and Virginia were not indispensable parties.² After a careful review of the briefs, the record submitted on appeal, and listening to the arguments of the parties, we reverse and remand.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter began in November 2011 when the Hegyi Trust filed an action against the Lowes seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction.³ The Hegyi Trust owned approximately 29 acres of real estate on the eastern boundary line of Frederick County, Virginia. The Lowes owned approximately 50 acres of real estate on the western boundary line of Berkeley County. The Lowes' property adjoined the Hegyi Trust property on the north and east. The Hegyi Trust filed its action against the Lowes to obtain a right of way across the Lowes' property so that it could access its property in Virginia.

In 2012, the Lowes filed a counterclaim against Hegyi Trust and a third-party complaint against the Richards alleging claims for ejectment and adverse possession. The third-party complaint alleged that the Richards owned 9.89 acres of real estate in Frederick County, Virginia, that was adjacent to the Lowes' property. The Lowes' third-party complaint alleged that part of the property claimed by the Hegyi Trust and the Richards was, in fact, located in Berkeley County, West Virginia. Consequently, the Lowes sought title to such property through adverse possession.⁴

The Richards filed a motion to dismiss the Lowes' counterclaim and third-party complaint.⁵ On February 15, 2013, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. In doing so, the trial court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the Lowes' claims because those claims had to be litigated in the United States Supreme Court or in a state administrative proceeding. The trial court also ruled that the Lowes failed to join two indispensable parties, those being the States of West Virginia and Virginia. As a result of these two rulings, the trial court also determined that the Lowes' third-party complaint failed to set out a cause of action against the Richards. The Lowes now appeal the dismissal of their claims against the Richards.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

In this proceeding, the trial court granted the Richards' motion to dismiss the Lowes' claims against them based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to join indispensable parties, and the failure to state a claim for relief. We have held that “[a]ppellate review of a circuit court's order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo. ” Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac–Buick, Inc., 194 W.Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995).⁶ This same standard applies to our review of statutes and rules relevant to this case. As we held in Syllabus point 1 of Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Department of West Virginia, 195 W.Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995), “[i]nterpreting a statute or an administrative rule or regulation presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review.” Mindful of these applicable standards, we will consider the substantive issues raised by the parties.

III.DISCUSSION

Resolution of the Lowes' appeal requires this Court to address two dispositive issues. We first must determine whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the Lowes' claims. Then, we must decide whether the States of West Virginia and Virginia are required parties. We will address each issue separately.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The circuit court granted the Richards' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court believed that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the issues. This Court has recognized that “[w]henever it is determined that a court has no jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of a civil action, the forum court must take no further action in the case other than to dismiss it from the docket.” Syl. pt. 1, Hinkle v. Bauer Lumber & Home Bldg. Ctr., Inc., 158 W.Va. 492, 211 S.E.2d 705 (1975). See Syl. pt. 5, State ex rel. Dale v. Stucky, 232 W.Va. 299, 752 S.E.2d 330 (2013). The circuit court determined that it could not resolve the Lowes' claims without establishing that a boundary line of N. 50° 16' 09? West existed between the States of West Virginia and Virginia. The circuit court further believed that this issue had to be litigated before the United States Supreme Court or administratively pursuant to W. Va.Code § 29–23–2 (1987) (Repl.Vol.2013). We disagree.

1. Exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court over boundary disputes between two or more states. The circuit court found that any dispute involving the location of a boundary line between two states had to be litigated in the United States Supreme Court. In making this determination, the circuit court recognized that Congress has expressly decided that the United States Supreme Court “shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of (1) all controversies between two or more states.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (1978). See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2123, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981) (“The Constitution provides for this Court's original jurisdiction over cases in which a ‘State shall be a Party.’ Art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Congress has in turn provided that the Supreme Court shall have ‘original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States.’ 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).”). The problem with the circuit court's ruling is that neither West Virginia nor Virginia were named parties in the Lowes' action. On at least two occasions, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of private parties litigating state boundary line disputes. As shown below, in both cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that its original jurisdiction is not invoked when private parties dispute the location of boundary lines between non-party states.

The first case decided by the Supreme Court that involved private parties litigating the location of the boundary lines of two states was Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963).⁷ In Durfee, two plaintiffs filed an action in a Nebraska trial court against a Missouri resident to quiet title to certain land located on the Missouri River. The main channel of the river formed the boundary between the states of Nebraska and Missouri. The defendant contested subject matter jurisdiction and argued that the disputed land was in Missouri. The trial court found that the land was situated in Nebraska and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the judgment. The defendant did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review that judgment. Instead, the defendant filed an action against the plaintiffs in a Missouri trial court alleging that the land was in Missouri. The suit was removed to a federal district court. The federal district court expressed the view that the land was in Missouri, but that the judgment of the Nebraska Supreme Court was res judicata and binding upon the court. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed after concluding that the district court was not required to give full faith and credit to the Nebraska judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. In finding that the Nebraska decision was res judicata, the Supreme Court determined that state courts could resolve interstate boundary line property disputes by private citizens but that such determinations are not binding on the affected states. The Supreme Court addressed the issues as follows:

It is argued that an exception to this rule of jurisdictional finality should be made with respect to cases involving real property because of this Court's emphatic expressions of the doctrine that courts of one State are completely without jurisdiction directly to affect title to land in other States. This argument is wide of the mark. Courts of one State are equally without jurisdiction to dissolve the marriages of those domiciled in other States. But the location of land, like the domicile of a party to a divorce action, is a matter to be resolved by judicial determination. The question remains whether, once the matter has been fully litigated and judicially determined, it can be retried in another State in litigation between the same parties. Upon the reason and authority of the cases we have discussed, it is clear that the answer must be in the

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