Lower v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 November 1932
• Citation: 163 A. 233
• Parties: LOWER v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

163 A. 233

LOWER

v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County.

Nov. 15, 1932.

Action by Clara L. (or H.) Lower against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

Judgment for defendant.

Quinn, Parsons & Doremus, of Red Bank, for plaintiff.

Clifford I. Voorhees, of New Brunswick, for defendant.

LAWRENCE, J.

This suit was submitted to me, without a jury, at the Monmouth circuit, for determination on a stipulation of the facts. The circumstances involved are that Francis T. Lower, fifty years of age, a laborer in the employ of one Raub, was, on August 4, 1930, the holder of a so-called double indemnity policy, theretofore issued to him by the defendant company, and in force, covering life insurance in a stated amount and a like sum in case of death, as the result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries sustained through external, violent, and accidental means. August 4, 1930, was evidently a torrid day, and in the morning he had been working out of doors at his usual employment, which he resumed after his midday meal. At 2 o'clock, the temperature registered 94 degrees Fahrenheit. Some time during the afternoon, he suffered a sunstroke, from the effects of which he died.

Plaintiff as the beneficiary named in the policy filed proof of death, in due course, and claimed not only the sum for which her husband was insured on his life, but the additional sum under the supplementary contract, attached as a rider and labeled, "Accidental Death Benefit-Benefit payable in the event of death from accident as herein limited and provided." Defendant paid the former, but declined as to the latter sum on the ground that death was not the result of bodily injuries sustained through external, violent, and accidental means, directly and independently of all other causes. In other words, the position of the company is that sunstroke is a disease likely to affect individuals of reduced vitality who expose themselves to excessive heat, and is not a bodily injury within the intent and meaning of the policy in question.

The controversial provisions of the contract are that the company "hereby agrees to pay to the beneficiary or beneficiaries of record under said policy, in addition to the amount payable according to the terms of the said policy, the sum of One thousand dollars, upon receipt, at the home office of the company in the City of New York, of the proof of the death of the insured, as the result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries sustained through external, violent and accidental means; provided, * * * (5) that death shall not have been the result of self-destruction, whether sane or insane, or caused by or contributed to, directly or indirectly, or wholly or partially, by disease, or by bodily or mental infirmity. * * *"

The question, therefore, is whether the sunstroke which occasioned the death of the insured was a bodily injury within the scope of the contract. The case must rest on the legal interpretation of the clauses quoted, and the evidence disclose that death resulted from a bodily injury, directly and independently of all other causes. Runyon v. Monarch Acc. Ins. Co., 108 N. J. Law, 489, 158 A. 530, and Runyon v. Commonwealth Casualty Co., 109 N. J. Law, 238, 160 A. 402.

It is to be observed that there is nothing in the contract listing sunstroke as a bodily injury subject to coverage by its terms, such as is generally found in those policies which have been judicially construed as payable when death results therefrom. This may be regarded as significant of the trend of decisions in the various states holding the right of the beneficiary to recover and in those adopting the contrary view in the absence of such a provision. Richards v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 58 Utah, 622, 200 P. 1017, 17 A. L. R. 1185; Continental Casualty Co. v. Bruden, 178 Ark. 683, 11 S.W.(2d) 493, 61 A. L. R. 1192; Elsey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 187 Ind. 447, 120 N. E. 42, 43, L. R. A....