Runyon v. Monarch Acc. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 February 1932
• Docket Number: No. 27.,27.
• Citation: 158 A. 530
• Parties: RUNYON v. MONARCH ACC. INS. CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

158 A. 530

RUNYON

v. MONARCH ACC. INS. CO.

No. 27.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Feb. 1, 1932.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. On appeals in civil cases at law the court is concerned only with correcting errors in law, and will not consider a ground of appeal that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

2. In an action by a beneficiary on an accident policy which provided that the defendant company was liable only if death resulted "exclusively from bodily injuries caused solely by external, violent and accidental means," it was proper for the judge to charge that "the defense appears to be that as a matter of fact the insured did not die solely of an accident which resulted in a fractured hip, and if that be true then the beneficiary cannot recover," when in fact that was the defense and the evidence tended to support it.

3. While an ambiguous provision of a policy of insurance, limiting or defeating liability, should be construed most strongly against the insurer who prepared it, yet that rule has no application unless the provision, considering all the language used, is ambiguous or at least is susceptible of the meaning the insured seeks to attribute to it.

4. A trial judge is not required to adopt either the form, or the words, or the collocation of phrases in which requests to charge are framed; and, having stated the pertinent legal rule, he may or may not, in his discretion, further elaborate it by applying it to any possible phases of the testimony.

5. When the issue submitted to the jury sufficiently disposes of the controversy, the appellant cannot complain because some other alleged issue was not submitted.

Appeal from Supreme Court,

Action by Gertrude L. Runyon against the Monarch Accident Insurance Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Leon E. Cone, of Morristown, for appellant.

King & Vogt, of Morristown (Harold A. Price, of Morristown, of counsel), for respondent.

TRENCHARD, J.

This is the appeal of the plaintiff below from a judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of the defendant at circuit.

The situation was this: On March 11, 1924, the Monarch Accident Insurance Company, the defendant below, issued a policy of insurance to James F. Runyon providing, among other things, insurance for loss of life caused solely by accidental means. The policy was outstanding at the time of Runyon's death on March 7, 1929. Payment of the principal sum of the policy, together with accumulations thereon, as set forth therein, was refused by the defendant. The beneficiary under the policy, the plaintiff herein, claimed that Runyon's death was caused solely by accidental means, namely, by a fall on an icy pavement on January 28, 1929, resulting in a fractured hip. The defendant's refusal to pay was based upon the contention that Runyon's death was not caused solely by injuries sustained in the fall, but in part by a disease known as paralysis agitans from which he was a sufferer. The policy provided that the defendant company was liable only if death resulted "exclusively from bodily injuries caused solely by external, violent and accidental means." The jury found a verdict of no cause for action, judgment was entered thereon, and the plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff-appellant made no motion for a direction of a verdict, and her grounds of appeal are only those now to be considered.

She says that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. But that question is not before us for this reason: On appeals in civil cases at law, as here, the court is concerned only with correcting errors in law, and will not consider a ground of appeal that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Auer v. Sinclair Refining Co., 103 N. J. Law, 372, 137 A. 555, 54 A. L. R. 623.

The plaintiff next contends that the judge erred in charging this: "The defense appears to be that as a matter of fact Mr. Runyon did not die solely of the accident which resulted in a fractured hip, and if that be true then the beneficiary cannot recover."

Our examination of the record discloses that such was the defense, and that the instruction was pertinent in view of the evidence. The defense was a good defense if established by the greater weight of the evidence, and so we find no fault with the instruction.

It is argued that the instruction was erroneous in law. We think not. It was in accordance with the express and unambiguous terms of the policy contract which limited the insurer's liability to death resulting "exclusively from bodily injuries caused solely by external, violent and accidental means." The instruction was well within the general rule that, under such a policy, if the insured, at the time of the accidental injury, was also suffering from a disease, and the disease aggravated the effects of the accident, and actively contributed to the death occasioned thereby, there can be no recovery upon the policy. 14 R. C. L. p. 1246; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661, 8 S. Ct. 1360, 32 L. Ed. 308; Western Commercial Travelers' Ass'n v. Smith, 85 F. 401, 56 U. S. App. 393, 29 C. C. A. 223, 40 L. R. A. 653; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Morrow, 213 F. 599, 130 C. C. A. 179, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1213; Stanton v. Travelers' Ins. Co., s3 Conn. 70s, 78 A. 317, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 445; White v. Standard, etc., Ins. Co., 95 Minn. 77, 103 N. W. 735, 884, 5 Ann. Cas. 83; Penn v. Standard Life, etc., Ins. Co., 158 N. C. 29, 73 S. E. 99, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 593.

But it seems to be contended that the...