Lowery v. Iowa Packing Co.

Decision Date15 November 1960
Docket NumberNo. 50053,50053
Citation106 N.W.2d 71,252 Iowa 112
PartiesHarry LOWERY, Appellant, v. IOWA PACKING COMPANY and Security Mutual Casualty Company, Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Davis, Huebner, Johnson, Herring & Burt, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brody, Parker, Miller, Roberts & Thoma, Des Moines, for appellees.

GARRETT, Justice.

In November, 1959, plaintiff filed in the district court his petition for commutation of future payments of workmen's compensation. Defendants filed a special appearance attacking the jurisdiction of the district court to grant relief sought. For the purposes of the decision the allegations of plaintiff's petition as to ultimate facts must be taken as true. The trial court sustained the special appearance and dismissed the petition and from that judgment plaintiff has appealed.

I. The appellant states that 'the sole question for determination is whether or not the Industrial Commissioner must determine the extent of disability before a Commutation Proceeding may be had in District Court' and that the question appears to be one of first impression, no cases directly in point being cited.

Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury in October, 1958 and appellees have been paying him compensation since that time pursuant to a memorandum agreement filed by the appellees on November 3, 1958. He further alleged 'That the period during which compensation is payable in this case can be definitely determined as the plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled,' and 'that it will be for the best interests of the plaintiff that the periodical payments of compensation * * * by commuted to a present worth lump sum.' A copy of the memorandum agreement was made a part of the petition.

In their special appearance appellees asserted the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, stating several grounds, namely, that commutation is allowable only when the period during which compensation is payable can be definitely determined; that the petition showed that no determination of the period had been made by agreement; that the petition did not allege the determination had been made by the industrial commissioner; and that no hearing had ever been held in any way concerning this alleged injury.

Section 85.45 of the 1958 Code of Iowa, I.C.A., provides: 'Commutation. Future payments of compensation may be commuted to a present worth lump sum payment on the following conditions:

'1. When the period during which compensation is payable can be definitely determined. 2. When the written approval of such commutation by the industrial commissioner has been filed in the proceedings to commute. 3. When it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the court or a judge thereof that such commutation will be for the best interest of the person or persons entitled to the compensation, * * *.'

Assuming the allegation that plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled is true the question still remains whether or not the industrial commissioner must determine the extent of disability before a commutation proceeding may be had in the district court. Reading sub-sections one and two together, it is obvious that before the commissioner can file his written approval he must determine the period during which compensation is definitely payable and the amount thereof, and before the court can order commutation the written approval of the commissioner must be on file in the proceedings. In cannot be presumed the legislature intended the commissioner should file his written approval of the commutation without first having determined the present worth lump sum he was approving. The court's decision is, then, dependent upon the prior determination by the commissioner of the extent of disability.

Section 85.45, providing that future payments of compensation may be commuted to a present worth lump sum, implies that weekly payments are being made by agreement of the parties or pursuant to a decision and order of the industrial commissioner.

In the instant case there was on file a 'Memorandum of Agreement as to Compensation,' not signed by the appellant but signed by the appellees and approved in writing by a deputy commissioner. The appellant is not complaining of the amount of the weekly payments of $32 but claims, without stating a specific reason therefor, that it will be for the best interests of plaintiff to receive a present worth lump sum pursuant to sections 85.45 and 85.46 of the Code, 1958, I.C.A.

Section 85.46 provides in part: 'Proceedings for commutation. A written petition for commutation may be made to the district court in and for the county in which the injury occurred or to any judge thereof, and shall have indorsed thereon the approval of the industrial commissioner. * * *.'

These statutes import a complete investigation and determination of the issues by the commissioner before the court takes jurisdiction.

In Scheel v. Superior Mfg. Co., 249 Iowa 873, 89 N.W.2d 377, 381, we said: 'It should be kept in mind the approval of the commissioner is a necessary condition to any valid petition or order for commutation.' In Reeves v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 202 Iowa 136, 209 N.W. 289, 291, we stated: 'In the absence of the approval of the industrial commissioner, the terms of the stipulation could not be enforced as a commutation of the future payments of weekly compensation.' 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 340.

At this point it may be said the Record does not disclose that any written approval of commutation by the commissioner has been filed in the proceedings nor that such approval was endorsed on the petition. In his written argument, however, appellant states, in parentheses: '(Although it is not so shown in the written record, the written approval of the petition of commutation by the Industrial Commissioner was endorsed upon the petition for commutation and it will be noted...

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4 cases
  • Groves v. Donohue
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • November 13, 1962
    ...229, 93 N.W.2d 771, and Hlas v. Quaker Oats Company, 211 Iowa 348, 233 N.W. 514, and urges as having some bearing, Lowery v. Iowa Packing Company, 252 Iowa 112, 106 N.W.2d 71, and Travelers Insurance Company v. Sneddon, 249 Iowa 393, 86 N.W.2d Section 85.20, Code of Iowa, 1962, I.C.A., (the......
  • Brauer v. J. C. White Concrete Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • May 8, 1962
    ...compensation matters, * * *.' (page 397 of 249 Iowa, page 873 of 86 N.W.2d). These quotations are repeated in Lowery v. Iowa Packing Co., 252 Iowa 112, 117, 106 N.W.2d 71, 74. Although the district court's order cites Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sneddon, supra, and the VA's brief cites and quotes......
  • Goar's Estate, In re
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • November 15, 1960
    ...106 N.W.2d 93 ... 252 Iowa 108 ... In the Matter of the ESTATE of James E. GOAR, Deceased ... Willis FLETCHER, Ai M ... ...
  • Diamond v. Parsons Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • July 16, 1964
    ...cannot be determined to be 500 weeks. This question was initially for determination by the commissioner. In Lowery v. Iowa Pecking Company, 252 Iowa 112, 114-115, 106 N.W.2d 71, 72, we said: 'The court's decision is, then, dependent upon the prior determination by the commissioner of the ex......

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