Lowrey v. Lowrey
| Decision Date | 06 July 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 76--75,76--75 |
| Citation | 260 Ark. 128,538 S.W.2d 36 |
| Parties | Pete LOWREY, Jr., Appellant, v. Lucy LOWREY, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Wm. R. Wilson, Jr., P.A., Little Rock, for appellant.
Daggett, Daggett & Van Dover by Jesse B. Daggett, Marianna, for appellee.
The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding appellee Lucy Lowrey, as part of her property rights under Ark.Stat.Ann. § 34--1214 (Repl.1962), a one-third interest in a pending Jones Act claim of appellant Pete Lowrey, Jr. The trial court, upon the award of divorce to appellee, awarded 'as her statutory interest, one-third of all proceeds derived either by judgment or settlement from the suit of Pete Lowrey, Jr. v. Canal Barge Lines Inc.' and directed appellant to execute an assignment.
We reverse the action of the trial court for the reasons set forth in Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company v. Wright Oil Company, Inc., 248 Ark. 803, 454 S.W.2d 69 (1970) and Fenney v. Fenney, 259 Ark. ---, 537 S.W.2d 367 (1976). See also In re Schmelzer, 350 F.Supp. 429 (S.D. Ohio 1972). Under those authorities an unliquidated personal injury claim does not constitute personal property for purposes of assignment or by operation of law in matters of bankruptcy. Consequently, we conclude that such a personal injury claim does not constitute personal property within the meaning of Ark.Stat.Ann. § 34--1214.
Appellee's suggestion that the assignability of the unliquidated personal injury claim was raised for the first time on appeal is not supported by the record.
Reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment not inconsistent herewith.
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McDermott v. McDermott
...his marriage and prior to his divorce, it was marital property. Id. In Goode we acknowledged our previous decision in Lowrey v. Lowrey, 260 Ark. 128, 538 S.W.2d 36 (1976), in which we held that an unliquidated personal injury claim was not personal property for the purpose of property divis......
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Bunt v. Bunt, 87-121
...at the time of the divorce was marital property. To the extent it might have applied to the contrary, we overruled Lowrey v. Lowrey, 260 Ark. 128, 538 S.W.2d 36 (1976), which had held that a personal injury claim was not included in the definition of "marital property" under an earlier stat......
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Liles v. Liles, 85-252
...expenses incurred, it does constitute marital property. The appellant contends we should be guided by our decision in Lowery v. Lowery, 260 Ark. 128, 538 S.W.2d 36 (1976), in which we held that a Jones Act claim was not "personal property" and thus was not subject to division pursuant to th......
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Morrison v. Morrison
...125 Ariz. 190, 608 P.2d 329 (Ariz.App.1980) and Hicks v. Hicks, 546 S.W.2d 71 (Tex.Civ.App.1976). I see no reason why Lowrey v. Lowrey, 260 Ark. 128, 538 S.W.2d 36 (1976) is not still good law. In Lowrey we held that unliquidated personal injury benefits were not properly divided in divorce......
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§ 8.01 Personal Injury Claims
...v. Botticello, 960 A.2d 1188 (Me. 2011).[71] Grace v. Peterson PC, 269 P.3d 663 (Alaska 2012).[72] See, e.g.: Arkansas: Lowrey v. Lowrey, 260 Ark. 128, 538 S.W.2d 36 (1976) (This apparently is no longer the law in Arkansas. See: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 9-12-315(b)(6); Clayton v. Clayton, 297 Ark.......