Loy v. Grayson
| Decision Date | 25 September 1957 |
| Citation | 99 So.2d 555 |
| Parties | Alton LOY, Petitioner, v. L. A. GRAYSON, as Judge of the Criminal Court of Record of Hillsborough County, Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Paul Lake, Tampa, for petitioner.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Asserting that more than twenty-five terms of the Criminal Court of Record of Hillsborough County had occurred since he was informed against for grant larceny and released upon bond, the petitioner moved the trial court to quash the information against him and discharge him from custody for the reason that such long delay in calling his case for trial amounted to a deprivation of his constitutional right under Sec. 11 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., to a speedy trial. The trial court denied said motion.
On Suggestion for Writ of Prohibition filed in this Court (as authority for such procedure, see Dickoff v. Dewell, 1942, 152 Fla. 240, 9 So.2d 804) rule nisi was issued and the matter again comes before us on the State's return and motion to quash.
The record does not show the exact date of petitioner's arrest and release upon bond, but it does show that he has been under bond in the cause since June, 1952. The information was filed on June 18, 1952 and the cause was thereafter passed from term to term until April 6, 1953, when it was placed on the 'absentee docket' at the request of the prosecutor. (The deputy clerk, who testified, stated that the 'absentee docket' is a docket 'upon which cases are placed that are not to be called each and every term that, for reasons not known to the Clerk, the Solicitor doesn't want to prosecute.') The petitioner's attorney, who was not present when the cause was placed on the absentee docket, never made any objection to such action. In the October term of 1956 the cause was set for trial for November 1, 1956. On October 18, 1956, petitioner filed a motion (previously mentioned) to quash the information, which was denied. On November 1, 1956, a continuance was allowed upon petitioner's request.
The record does not show that the petitioner prevented the attendance of witnesses or that he filed a pleading seeking a continuance until after the cause was first called for trial on November 1, 1956. (The continuance was requested by petitioner at this time because of the illness of his attorney.) The petitioner at all times has been within the jurisdiction, under bond and ready to appear for trial; but at no time has demanded trial. The prosecutor filed no motions for continuance.
There are six terms of court of the Criminal Court of Record in Hillsborough County: the first Monday in February, the first Monday in April, second Monday in June, first Monday in August, first Monday in October, and the fourth Monday in November. Article V, Sec. 26, Florida Constitution; 1 Sec. 32.03, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. From this it can be calculated that over twenty-five terms of court passed between the date of first commitment and the call to trial on November 1, 1956.
We said in State ex rel. Curley v. McGeachy, 1942, 149 Fla. 633, 641, 6 So.2d 823, 827, that Sec. 915.01 '* * * is merely declaratory of the rights guaranteed under the constitutional provisions.' Sec. 915.01(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides:
'When a person has been arrested and released on bond, and thereafter for three successive terms of court, files a written demand for trial (serving a copy on the prosecuting attorney) and he is not brought to trial on or before the third full term after the date he is first committed, he shall be forever discharged from the crime; provided, however, the attendance of the witnesses is not prevented by himself, and he has filed no pleadings seeking a continuance.'
In Kelly v. State ex rel. Morgan, Fla.1951, 54 So.2d 431, we held that the constitutional right of any defendant to a speedy trial did not come into effect until a request to be tried had been made by him:
In the recent case of State v. Williams, Fla.1954, 73 So.2d 295, the defendant was informed against for unarmed robbery and the case was set for trial March 12, 1953. At that time it was continued...
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Smith v. State
...statute takes effect. Silence on the part of the accused will not activate this statute', citing the Supreme Court cases of Loy v. Grayson, Fla.1957, 99 So.2d 555 and Kelly v. State ex rel. Morgan, Fla.1951, 54 So.2d 431. And in Dickey v. Circuit Court, Gadsden County, Fla.1967, 200 So.2d 5......
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Autrey v. State
...35 So. 370; State ex rel. Underwood v. Brown, 193 Tenn. 113, 244 S.W.2d 168; Williams v. State, 210 Ark. 402, 196 S.W.2d 489; Loy v. Grayson, Fla., 99 So.2d 555; State v. Sawyer, 266 Wis. 494, 63 N.W.2d 749, cert. den. Sawyer v. State of Wisconsin, 348 U.S. 855, 75 S.Ct. 80, 99 L.Ed. 674; P......
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V.C. v. Ferguson, 82-323
...independent of rights under [§ 915.01, Fla.Stat. (1970) ] was violated. 4 See Pena v. Schultz, 245 So.2d 49 (Fla.1971); Loy v. Grayson, 99 So.2d 555 (Fla.1957). Inasmuch as relator in the instant case asserts only a statutory right to speedy trial, this Court is without jurisdiction to ente......
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State ex rel. Soodhalter v. Baker
...independent of rights under Fla.Stat. § 915.01 (1970), F.S.A., was violated. See Pena v. Schultz, 245 So.2d 49 (Fla.1971); Loy v. Grayson, 99 So.2d 555 (Fla.1957). Inasmuch as relator in the instant case asserts only a statutory right to speedy trial, this Court is without jurisdiction to e......