Loy v. Kuykendall

Decision Date24 May 1961
Docket NumberNo. 13751,13751
Citation347 S.W.2d 726
PartiesJames A. LOY, Appellant, v. J. Edwin KUYKENDALL, d/b/a Merchants Delivery Service, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Hobart Huson, Jr., San Antonio, for appellant.

Morriss, Morriss, Boatwright & Lewis, San Antonio, for appellee.

BARROW, Justice.

This suit is by appellant against appellee for property damages to his automobile as a result of a collision between his automobile and a truck owned by appellee and operated by appellee's employee. The appellee answered, and thereafter presented a motion for summary judgment, based upon an asserted full release of appellant's cause of action. After a hearing thereon, appellee's motion was sustained by the trial court and a take nothing judgment rendered against appellant. This appeal is from that judgment.

At the outset we are confronted with a motion by appellee to take no other action than to affirm the judgment for the reason that the record fails to show that appellant excepted to the judgment rendered by the trial court. An examination of the record shows no exception to the judgment, but the record does show that appellant, in writing, timely filed his notice of an appeal, as required by Rule 353, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellee takes the position that both in exception and notice of appeal are required. The Supreme Court has decided this precise question adversely to appellee's contention in Swanson v. Swanson, 148 Tex. 600, 228 S.W.2d 156. Appellee's motion is overruled.

The propriety of the court's action in rendering the summary judgment presents two questions: (1) Where a plaintiff has a cause of action for both personal injuries and property damages against one defendant, based upon one tort, does a full release of all damages for personal injuries, expressly limited to such damages for personal injuries, have the effect, as a matter of law, of releasing the claim for property damages? (2) Does the release in this case, when properly construed, effectively release the defendant from all liability for both personal injuries and property damages?

Appellee contends that, as a matter of law, the releasing of one element of damages, while attempting to retain and litigate the other, amounts to a splitting of causes of action, and bars or precludes a suit to recover the damages not so released. In support of that contention appellee cites the decision of this Court in Cormier v. Highway Trucking Company, 312 S.W.2d 406; also the recent decision of the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals in Garrett v. Mathews, 343 S.W.2d 289, as well as numerous authorities from other jurisdictions annotated in 62 A.L.R.2d 977 et seq. These authorities all involved the question of whether two separate actions may be brought in court to recover separate items of damages. The courts in each and every case held that the causes of action or items of damage can not be so split and asserted in separate suits, but that the plaintiff must join in one suit all of the grounds of recovery. The holdings are based on sound public policy of avoiding a multiplicity of suits. None of the cases even suggests that a plaintiff cannot settle and release one item of damages and thereafter sue on the item which is not released. Appellee has not cited any authority in this State or from any jurisdiction which so holds, nor have we found any such authority in our own search. We are of the opinion that a release of one item of damage does not have the legal effect of a general release of the entire cause of action, unless the release so expressly provides. We can see no reason to litigate items of damage upon which the parties are in agreement and are ready to settle, for the sole reason that they cannot, or have not reached an agreement on all the other items of damage. The policy of our law is to encourage the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
30 cases
  • Williams v. Glash
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • 2 Mayo 1990
    ...and is subject to avoidance, on grounds such as fraud or mistake, just like any other contract. Cf. Loy v. Kuykendall, 347 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (treating release as a contract subject to rules governing construction thereof). Pursuant to the do......
  • Paradigm Air Carriers, Inc. v. Tex. Rangers Baseball Partners (In re Tex. Rangers Baseball Partners)
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Texas
    • 10 Octubre 2014
    ...[14th Dist.] 2000).193 Tricentrol Oil Trading, Inc. v. Annesley, 809 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex.1991) ; Loy v. Kuykendall, 347 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1961, writ refused n.r.e.); City of Brownsville ex rel. Public Utilities Bd. v. AEP Tex. Cent. Co., 348 S.W.3d 348, 354 (Tex.App......
  • National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Insurance Co. of North America
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 16 Octubre 1997
    ...(holding release is a contract subject to avoidance on same grounds as any other contract); Loy v. Kuykendall, 347 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (treating release as a contract subject to rules governing construction thereof); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CO......
  • Port of Hous. Auth. of Harris Cnty. v. Zachry Constr. Corp.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 9 Agosto 2012
    ...(holding that a release is a contract subject to avoidance on same grounds as any other contract); Loy v. Kuykendall, 347 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (treating a release as a contract subject to rules governing construction thereof); Restatement (Secon......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT